Memorandum by the Department of External Affairs on the General Disarmament Conference
(Secret)

1. The Inter-Departmental Sub-Committee¹ set up in connection with the preparation for the General Disarmament Conference has held several meetings, in the course of which it has made a preliminary survey of the matters arising for consideration in connection with the Conference.

2. The following notes deal briefly with some of these matters. There are, however, a number of further questions, mainly of a constitutional and political character, which the Committee feels will require consideration before the Conference meets. These will be dealt with in a later memorandum.

3. The General Disarmament Conference, if it succeeds, will definitely limit the number of our military personnel, our annual expenditure on war material, our gross expenditure for defence purposes, and the number and horse power of our military aircraft, for a period of years which will be fixed by the Convention. This period is not likely, in any case, to be much more or much less than ten years.

4. As a first step, the Cabinet Committee will require to know what our requirements in each of the categories mentioned are likely to be for, say, the next ten years. It is suggested, therefore, that the Department of Defence should be asked to furnish, at once, a statement showing as definitely as possible our probable requirements for the next ten years as regards military personnel, expenditure on war material, gross expenditure for defence purposes, and number and horse power of military aircraft.

5. It is a point for consideration whether we should accept limits coinciding with this estimate of our probable requirements or whether there should be some margin left between the two. In any case, the Sub-Committee feels that the delegation to the Conference should have specific instructions both as to what they should claim and as to what they should, in the last resort, accept. With a view to the giving of such instructions, definite indications on both these points will be required from the Department of Defence for the consideration of the Cabinet Committee. It is also felt that the Department of Defence should furnish such a reasoned memorandum as would enable the delegation to explain and defend such claims as it may be decided to advance at the Conference.

6. In connection with the consideration of what should be claimed and what should be accepted at the Conference, reference must be made to Article 8 of the Treaty, which reads as follows:-

Prima facie, it would appear that our claims should be based on this Article, and that our efforts at the Conference should be directed towards maintaining, under the General Disarmament Convention, the same proportion between our military establishments and those of Great Britain as exists between our respective populations. This policy would, however, encounter considerable initial difficulties. In the first place, Article 8 gives rise to obvious problems of interpretation, and these would have to be removed, as far as possible authoritatively, if the delegation were to take the Article as the basis of its claims, especially if it were to do so expressly.

7. In the second place, whatever interpretation is put on Article 8, a demand for the application of the proportion prescribed therein as between ourselves and Great Britain under the General Disarmament Convention would, in fact, amount to a demand on our part for the allocation to the Irish Free State of armaments much in excess of those which we at present have. In other words, if our claims at the Conference are based on Article 8, we will be in the position of claiming a level of armaments much higher than we now possess. If the delegation is to take this course, it must be in a position to advance concrete reasons for the increase. The Sub-Committee feels that it will be a matter of some difficulty to supply suitable reasons, but that, in any case, the delegation should have specific instructions as to what reasons they should advance in public in support of the increase. The British claims are not yet known, but it is very unlikely that they will be for establishments, etc., lower than their present ones.

8. It may, on the other hand, be decided not to proceed on the basis of Article 8, but to accept at the Conference a limitation of our armaments at a level based either on our existing position or upon our probable requirements over the period of the Convention. In either of the latter cases, we would be almost certainly in the position of accepting limitation of our armaments at a level much lower in relation to the armaments of Great Britain than that to which we are at present entitled under Article 8 of the Treaty. The Sub-Committee felt that the question whether we should accept, under the Disarmament Convention, a much less advantageous military position vis-à-vis Great Britain than we now have under the Treaty of 1921 was a question of political rather than of practical importance, and that it was, therefore, a question upon which the delegation should have specific directions from the Cabinet Committee.

9. The draft Convention which is to form the basis of the Conference proposes to limit, not merely the categories of armaments dealt with in paragraph (3) of this memorandum, but also other categories of armaments, such as naval personnel, of which there are at present no establishments in this country. It is assumed that it is improbable that we should want to establish new armaments of these kinds in the Irish Free State during the period of the validity of the Convention. But should we make it impossible for ourselves to do so? It is important to realise at this stage that, if we claim nothing, and if, consequently, nothing is allocated to us, in these categories, the adoption of the Convention will make it impossible for us to establish such new armaments, even if we want to do so. Moreover, and more important, it might make it impossible for us, during the period of the validity of the Convention, to undertake the negotiations with a view to taking over part of our coastal defence provided for under Article 6 of the Treaty. It is felt that the delegation to the Conference should have specific instructions on this matter.

10. It is assumed that, in accordance with prior policy, the delegation to the Conference will be instructed to accept a global naval tonnage for all the Members of the Commonwealth, but to insist on the separate treatment of their several military and air armaments. It is impossible to ignore the discrepancy between the two attitudes, and it is, accordingly, felt that the delegation should have instructions as to the attitude to be adopted in the event of the argument being advanced by the delegates of foreign Powers that there is no reason why the military and air forces of the Members of the Commonwealth should be treated differently to their naval armaments, and that, therefore, they should be limited as a unit in relation to the units of other great Powers, such as France or the United States.

11. Finally, it may be useful to summarise briefly the conclusions of this report:-

Subject to the approval of the Cabinet Committee, it is proposed to approach the Department of Defence at once with a request for the information referred to in (1) and (2).