Memorandum by the Department of External Affairs on
the League of Nations Vote

NOTES ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS VOTE

The present position of the Saorstát at Geneva

1. Our prestige and influence at Geneva increased more last year than during any previous year of our League membership. It is not possible, of course, to adduce concrete proof of the truth of this assertion, but evidence of it is furnished by the fact that Irish nationals were called upon to play a much larger part in the conduct of League affairs last year than ever before.

2. The quite remarkable increase in our prestige at Geneva is due to the disturbed international situation. The greater the political tension at Geneva, the greater is the importance of the action of States, such as the Saorstát, whose independence and sincerity are above question, and the more are their good offices, and those of their representatives, in demand to supply that element of arbitrament which is necessary to prevent political tension developing into open hostility.

3. Such considerations had a good deal to do with the appointment of an Irish national as Chairman of the Committee on the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute, the appointment of an Irish jurist on the Bernheim petition committee, the appointment of an Irish national as High Commissioner of the League at Danzig, the appointment of an Irish chairman of the Committee on the Colombia-Peru dispute, the appointment of an Irish Corresponding-Member of the League Economic Committee, the appointment of an Irish member of the Assyrian Minority Committee, the appointment of an Irish authority on medical education as a member of the League Health Committee, and so on.

4. All these appointments were made within the last year. The Saorstát was thus intimately associated with every major question which came before the League during the last twelve months. The efforts of the League to obtain an Irish judge as a member of the Saar Plebiscite Tribunal indicate that this position is likely to continue. It would appear that only Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, and the Irish Free State were asked to nominate members for this Tribunal, and our information is that particular importance is attached to having an Irish member. Thus, there is probably no state which enjoys a higher degree of prestige as a member of the League than the Irish Free State, and the policy of independence, frankness, and straight dealing which we have always followed at Geneva is now receiving due recognition.

5. Details of our normal participation in the work of the League during the year (Conferences attended, Conventions accepted, etc.) are given in the Annex in this memo.¹

THE PROPOSED REORGANISATION OF THE LEAGUE

6. Contemporaneously with this increase in the prestige and influence of the Saorstát and other smaller states of similar policy and outlook, proposals have been made in certain quarters to reorganize the League in the direction of lessening the influence of the smaller states and increasing that of the Great Powers.

7. The idea made its appearance first in the Four Power Pact. It was freely mooted in Germany after that country's withdrawal from the League, and the Italian press makes not secret of the fact that it inspired the resolution passed by the Fascist Grand Council in December last subordinating the continuance of Italy's membership of the League to a 'radical reform of that organisation ... from the point of view of its constitution, its method of work and its objectives.'

8. It is curious that this idea should have made its appearance just at the moment when the Disarmament Conference had reached a deadlock entirely due to differences among the Great Powers themselves. And it is very interesting to recall in connection with this idea the Italian reply to Briand's European Union Memorandum of the 1st May, 1930. The Italian Government objected to a 'council on which some only of the states would sit' on the ground that it would 'place the smaller states in a position of inferiority', and they deprecated any 'hierarchical classification of States' on the ground that it would 'imply undermining the principle of the absolute integrity of sovereign rights'.

9. The idea has not reached the stage of a concrete proposal either at Geneva or elsewhere. But it is certainly not a dead issue. Two factors are operating to keep it alive. In the first place, the disarmament question has split the world into two camps - the small states, who want disarmament and peace, on the one hand, and the Big Powers, whose rivalries prevent the attainment of either, on the other. In the second place, the Fascist ideology is making so much headway in the internal politics of European countries that it is bound to obtrude itself more and more into international affairs.

10. The proposals for the reorganization of the League made in Germany and Italy are due to the operation of the latter factor. They are obviously inspired by the desire to score a 'succéss de prestige' for the political ideas in accordance with which those countries are governed, by having them adopted as the basis of the organization of international society.

11. Fascism as a rule of organization for international society is impossible for a very good reason. The element common, and indeed essential, to all the internal regimes based on Fascist principles is the confidence reposed in the leader, and the willing obedience accorded him in consequence. That essential element is conspicuously lacking, for very good reasons, as between the smaller states and the Great Powers.

12. With all its defects, the Covenant has this virtue that it put an end to international feudalism, and initiated the era of international democracy and international government with the consent of the governed. The Saorstát, like all the other smaller members of the League, has a vote and a veto at Geneva. It may be hard to get the League to take positive action in cases in which it should do so; but at least the Covenant enables the smaller and weaker states, by using their veto, to prevent unjust action being clothed with the mantle of legality, and to put states which follow certain courses in the position of violators of the law and rebels against the international order.

13. That is a valuable safeguard. It may not in practice prevent aggression by the Great Powers, but it is an advance on the time when aggression could be committed in the name of the law. It will be certainly surprising if the smaller states abandon this advance without a struggle. Certainly the Saorstát would leave the League rather than pledge itself to abide by the decisions of a body composed exclusively of the Great Powers.

14. On the other hand, the League might very usefully be reformed in three directions:-

1. achieving the universality of the League,
2. doing away with any connection between the Covenant and the Peace Treaties, and
3. doing away with political combinations within the League itself which, although compatible with the letter of the Covenant, are contrary to its spirit and corrupt its application.

15. In connection with the first of these objectives, it is better to have a purely consultative body of universal membership than an organization of limited membership, even though membership carries with it specific obligations. The accession of Mexico, Turkey and the Argentine to the League does not compensate for the absence of such states as Russia, Germany, the U.S.A., and Japan. No matter how specific the obligations of the Covenant were made, it could not possibly be applied (e.g. economic sanctions would be impracticable) as long as such states as those mentioned were not members of the League. The first object in reforming the League should therefore be to secure its universality, and great sacrifices should be made to attain that result.

16. The severance of the connection between the League and the peace treaties would probably be found necessary in the process of making the membership of the League universal. But in any case, this severance must be made. It is absurd that the fate of the form of organization adopted for international society should be anchored to the destiny of political arrangements of doubtful justice and, consequently, uncertain duration. Article 10 and similar provisions of the Covenant must go. They are an obstacle to the achievement of universal membership by the League. They have proved completely ineffective in practice, and the existing members, including the Saorstát, have consequently no faith in the guarantee which they purport to afford. The founders of the League, in their anxiety to make it responsible for the maintenance of the territorial settlements made as a result of the war, incidentally placed upon it the responsibility of guaranteeing existing frontiers all over the globe. The League has proved quite incapable of discharging this task, as a moment's reflexion at the time would have made it obvious that it would. It is absurd to ask the League, which should be the fountain and the pillar of international justice, to guarantee all the frontiers of the world and thus to assume that all existing frontiers are just. The most that the League can be expected to do is to provide a procedure whereby existing frontiers can be peaceably discussed and if necessary altered, and to take action against any state which resorts to force to maintain or alter an existing frontier.

17. This is not a pleading for or against the revision of the peace treaties. It is simply a pleading that the fate of the League and the Covenant should be just as independent of the future of the peace treaties as, say, the Kellogg Pact is.

18. Suggestions (relating to the amendment of Art.19 of the Covenant) have been made designed to facilitate reconsideration and revision of the peace treaties by and through the League. Full account must be taken of the fact that revision of the peace treaties in present circumstances would mean war. On the other hand, the League is only posturing as the organ of international justice and morality as long as it does not provide states with a reasonable opportunity of making known their legitimate grievances in this connection, and with a reasonable possibility of having their grievances remedied in a legal and peaceable manner. Art.19, which makes reconsideration of the peace arrangements dependent on the consent of those who made them, does not fulfil this latter requirement. A reasonable possibility, even though remote, of having their grievances remedied in a legal and peaceable manner through the League should go a long way towards satisfying the aspirations of the defeated countries, and calming the present agitation. It is to be hoped that the victorious Powers will see the wisdom, in their own interests, those of the League and those of peace, of amending Art.19 so as to provide such a possibility.

19. The third objective in reorganizing the League should be in the direction of discouraging, and if possible preventing, the formation of combinations within the League itself. France's alliances with Poland and the little Entente are the main cause of German and Italian dissatisfaction with the League and inspired the Four Power Pact and the proposals to reduce the influence of the smaller states in the League. France is now going to play the same game with Russia. France claims that these alliances are legal under the Covenant. They may be within the letter of the Covenant (Art. 21) but they are entirely contrary to its spirit. They corrupt its application and promote jealousy and rivalry between the Great Powers.

20. The German and Italian Press charge the League with being a Franco-British institution and base the charge on the assertion that France is always supported by her allies and Britain by the Dominions. The assertion about Britain and the Dominions is very common in the European, including the French, press. It appeared recently in a leader in the 'Temps'. It would do a great deal of good if the position and policy of the Saorstát vis-à-vis Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth at Geneva were made clear by the Minister in any formal statement he may make about the League. Incidentally, the line of action followed by New Zealand, Australia, etc. at Geneva is directly connected with Italian and German dissatisfaction with the League, the Four Power Pact and the current proposals for League re-organization, a fact to be remembered when proposals for group action by members of the Commonwealth are afoot.

21. These are the three directions in which the League needs reform - universality, no connection with the Peace Treaties, no internal combinations. When these three reforms are made, it will be time to consider whether and on what conditions the members of the League should agree to the restriction of their national sovereignty necessary to make the League more than a purely consultative body, in other words, an effective instrument of world government and order. It would be premature to do so beforehand.