Memorandum by the Department of External Affairs on the London
Naval Conference
(Copy)

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE¹

The Naval Conference opens at London on the 9th December. As explained in the previous memorandum on this subject,² we are attending the Conference as a party to the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

2. It is anticipated that the Conference will conclude a treaty on qualitative limitation (i.e., limitation of size and gun power of the various types of vessel). It is extremely unlikely that there will be any treaty on quantitative limitation (i.e., limitation of total tonnages). Quantitative limitation is the form of limitation which gives rise to the objectionable use of the 'British Commonwealth of Nations' as a unit for the purpose of assessing tonnage in relation to the United States, Japan, and the other naval powers. It is anticipated that, in the place of any formal agreement on quantitative limitation, there will be annexed to the agreement on qualitative limitation a series of unilateral declarations made by the various governments represented at the Conference, stating what their future intentions are with regard to naval construction.

3. Our general objectives at the Conference will be to disassociate the Saorstát so far as possible from a problem in which, as long as we have no navy, we have no direct national interest, and to prevent, so far as we are concerned, the continuance of the system under which the ?British Commonwealth of Nations' is treated as a unit for the purpose of comparing tonnages.

4. While a treaty confined to qualitative limitation would not be open to the same objections as one on quantitative limitation, inasmuch as it would not necessarily involve the grouping of the Members of the Commonwealth into a unit, it would be our aim not to become a party to the treaty on qualitative limitation to be concluded at the Conference. Our participation in treaties of this kind, while we have no navy of our own, only tends to foster notions about uniformity of action as between the Members of the Commonwealth in matters of naval disarmament. Preferably, also, we would take no part in the declarations with regard to future naval construction which are to be appended to the formal treaty.

5. The danger of this line of policy is that advantage might be taken of it to attribute the meagre results of the Conference to difficulties created by the Saorstát The British reply to a South African proposal that the Members of the Commonwealth, other than the United Kingdom, should withdraw from the Conference, was to the effect that it would 'make an already difficult position impossible.' Canada agrees with the British argument that anything of this kind would lead to difficulties with the U.S.A. and Japan.

6. To avoid this danger, the High Commissioner would make no express declaration as to our position in his opening statement at the Conference but would confine himself to an explanation in general terms of our presence at the Conference and of our relation to the problem of naval disarmament. Briefly, his statement would be to the effect that we are attending the conference in accordance with our undertaking under the Treaty of 1930; that, having no ships ourselves, we have no contribution to make to the solution of the practical problems before the Conference; but that we are anxious to facilitate its deliberations so far as we can, and are prepared to abide by its decisions when the time comes for the Saorstát to consider the construction of naval units of its own.

7. It would be only at a later stage of the Conference when the time came for the various delegations to define their attitudes in detail that the High Commissioner would explain that, in view of the fact that the Saorstát has no ships of any kind, the treaty on qualitative disarmament, and the procedure for declaring projected naval constructions, could have no application in respect of this state, and we do not, therefore, propose to become a party to them. The principal objection which is likely to be put forward in opposition to this is that suspicion would be created in the minds of the American and Japanese Governments if Saorstát Éireann, or any other Member of the Commonwealth, were not bound by the same obligations as themselves. There might even be positive objections on the part of the U.S. and Japanese delegations. If these objections were pushed to such lengths that there were danger of the Saorstát being held responsible for the breakdown of the Conference, or if, for any other reason, it were found necessary to modify the line of action suggested above, it would be our object to secure that, in becoming party to the Treaty on qualitative limitation and the procedure for the notification of intended construction, we would not be committing ourselves to take part in any future naval parleys.