Extract from a handwritten letter from Francis T. Cremins
to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(Confidential)

Italo-Ethiopian Dispute

[matter omitted]

The Anglo-French proposals were only issued here at 6.30 pm. last evening. The actual text does not appear to have dissipated the unfavourable impression given by the Press reports. Last evening, in the lobbies, before the text was released, the general impression appeared to be even more unfavourable than on the previous evening. The loss of prestige sustained by the British was in particular very much commented upon in every quarter, and the British seemed to feel this acutely. Even members of the British delegation expressed their dislike of the whole development. This may of course be part of their technique, but there is no doubt whatever that they are very worried both at the general feeling of their fall from 'grace', and at the reactions in Great Britain itself. They do not seem to know where they are, and so far as the British delegation at the Committee of 18 was concerned they seemed to be at pains to give the impression that they would like to see the proposals dead and buried. One member of the delegation rather hinted to me that at next Wednesday's Council meeting he would be in favour of a short statement by Mr. Eden simply saying that the representatives of France and Great Britain had submitted certain proposals to the parties as a basis of negotiations: these efforts had failed, and it was now for the Council to say what further efforts should be made. Mr. Strang,¹ whom I met at the end of the meeting of the Committee of 18 said to me ?Are you going to attack me, too? I said, no - what's going to happen now, are the proposals likely to be accepted by the Council? He replied that he thought that the proposals were dead. He then asked me what I thought of the general impression and I said that even though the actual text of the proposals was not known, people seemed to have the feeling that they had been 'had'. 'Yes', he said 'that is the worst of it'. He then said he would give me some information for my background. It was all very well for public opinion to criticise, but in the last analysis this whole procedure against Italy rested on the British Navy. All their information went to show that Italy was having preparations which could only mean an attack on the navy in the Mediterranean, and, frankly, the navy was not ready for that. The British navy was moreover designed more for manoeuvring in large open spaces than for the confined inlets of the Mediterranean. I asked what about France, and he said that they could not rely on France. French public opinion was against drastic action, and French defences in the Mediterranean were unready. The British had full information regarding that, and it was clear that the British navy would sustain heavy losses, at any rate in the beginning of the hostilities. He then referred to the Far Eastern trouble, in which Japan is a menace, and mentioned the other Great Powers. No one knows what Russia is after. Germany is outside the League and is an unknown factor. The U.S.A. is benevolent but will do nothing. And France is lukewarm. Therefore it all boiled down to this that the whole thing rested on the British navy, and they could not take the responsibility, without at any rate going as far as they possibly could for conciliation. He thought that even if the proposals were turned down, the hands of the French would be strengthened by the British adhesion. Then, Laval could say to his public opinion 'Now you see that the British do not want war - they are prepared to go as far for peace as we are.'

At the Committee, M. Laval appeared to be as calmly confident as usual. I am told that Mr. Eden regards him as being a man of 'exceedingly short vision, but with a genius for handling diplomatic difficulties - two very dangerous qualities'.

What the next moves will be no one seems to know. The Council may decide to throw the whole affair over on the Assembly, as one of the parties has asked for a meeting of that body. Suggestions are also going the rounds that the Council may decide on fresh efforts at conciliation, with a new Committee, at the same time laying down some general principles outside which the Committee would not have power to go. Everyone realises, however, how much more difficult it might be to deal with Italy after what has happened, especially if before the Council meeting Italy had accepted the Anglo-French suggestions as a base, even if it were considered that the British and French representatives had exceeded their functions. I have been told here that all the members of the British Cabinet except Cunliffe-Lister, who were present at the Cabinet meeting the other day, agreed to give Mr. Eden a very free hand in connection with the handling of the whole matter by the League. Of course, nobody imagines that France will not make every effort and use every influence with other States to obtain some sort of favourable reception of the proposals by the Council.

[matter omitted]