Memorandum taken over the phone from Geneva by Seán Murphy of Eamon de Valera's views on reform of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, with covering note from Murphy to Maurice Moynihan

Mr. Moynihan
I send you herewith a copy of the statement I took on the phone from Geneva giving the President's views on the position if Article 16 of the Covenant is invoked. I am having 15 copies made and will send them to you in the course of the day.

1. On any allegation of resort to war by a member of the League in violation of Articles 12, 13 or 15 of the Covenant, providing for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the Council will meet at once at the request of any Member of the League to consider the situation. Representatives of all the neighbouring States, of all States with close economic relations with the State alleged to have violated the Covenant and of all States whose direct co-operation in any action to be taken by the League would be required, will be invited to attend the meeting.
2. The first business of the Council once it had been convened would be to express its opinion as to whether or not the Covenant had in fact been violated. If the Council arrived at an affirmative conclusion on this question a copy of the Council's opinion would be sent to all the Members of the League, who would be asked to shape their action accordingly. No Member of the League would be justified in rejecting the Council's opinion unless it were manifestly contrary to what the Government of that Member considered right and just.
3. The next stage would be the setting up by the Council of a technical committee to elaborate the measures of an economic, financial, and commercial character to be taken by the Members of the League of Nations collectively in execution of paragraph (1) of Article 16 of the Covenant against the State alleged to have violated the Covenant. This Technical Committee will include representatives of the States directly concerned in the execution of the contemplated measures. The Committee would report to the Council which would thereupon recommend to the several Members of the League the measures which each of them should take in pursuance of the common plan, and the date upon which the measures in question should be brought into operation. Although no Member of the League can refuse to participate in a common plan of action under paragraph (1) of Article 16 without violating its obligations under the Covenant, nevertheless, technically speaking, the particular recommendations made by the Council in this connection do not impose legal obligations on the States concerned. The measures which the Council might recommend at this stage would vary with the circumstances of the case, but it is understood that such measures might include a prohibition of imports from, and an embargo on the export of arms and of all essential raw materials to the State alleged to have violated the Covenant, as well as the withholding of credits and the interruption of shipping and other communications. In recommending the measures to be taken by each State in execution of the common plan of action, the Council must take into account the particular circumstances of each State, and may vary its recommendations with a view to minimising national loss and inconvenience.
4. The next stage would be the breaking off of diplomatic relations. The consular and humanitarian relations with the State alleged to have violated the Covenant could be maintained.
5. If the measures adopted in the first instance are not successful the Council may recommend more rigorous measures of the same character. If these more rigorous measures fail the League may revert to a blockade of the sea-board of the State alleged to have violated the Covenant. It is expressly contemplated that the conduct of the blockade operations would be entrusted to a limited number of Members of the League, that is, those in a position to take the necessary naval measures. In the case of this, as in the case of other measures of collective action which the League might take, special efforts would be made to secure the cooperation or acquiescence of non-member States.
6. As the task of the League is to maintain peace the application of military measures will only take place in extreme cases in which the other measures taken have failed in their object. In this event it would be for the Council to draw up a plan of collective action and to recommend to each State the effective contribution which it should make to the collective forces of the League. The Council's recommendations in this connection do not impose legal obligations on the Members of the League to which they are addressed. But provided that the collective character of the proposed action is maintained, and provided that the Council's recommendation is made with due regard to the geographical circumstances and to the state of the armed forces of the Member of the League concerned, it would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant for the member concerned to refuse to take part in the collective military action to be taken by the League, if asked to do so by the Council.

This is the President's view of what the position is under Article 16. This is meant to convey what we would have to do in the most extreme circumstances.