Memorandum on events in Spain, with covering letter, from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(S. 9/12) (Confidential)

Confidential

MEMO

Señor D. de las Bárcenas, Minister Plenipotentiary, Representative of the National Government of Spain, called to see me on Monday, 19th September, 1938, the object of his visit being to ask that the Irish Delegation should do what it could to ensure that the question inserted on the Agenda of the Assembly by the Barcelona Government, namely, the protection of civilian populations against air bombardment in case of war, should be treated objectively, in the Report of the Third Committee, and that no censure of the Nationalist Government or forces should appear. He said that if the question were treated objectively, everyone could agree regarding it, but he feared that the Spanish Delegation would endeavour to use the Committee's report for propaganda purposes and he was anxious that that should be prevented. He added that as a matter of fact 44 out of the 46 reports made to the British Government by the Commission which investigated the bombing of towns in Spain were favourable to the Nationalists. I told him that I would do what I could in the Third Committee to ensure that there would be no censure of anybody, and that I shared his view that in the interests of a solution of the problem it was essential that the question should be treated objectively.

In the course of conversation, Senor de las Bárcenas remarked on the fact that the Irish Government had not yet established any representation at Burgos. He said that the Government of Ireland had not 'followed the example of Great Britain'.

On instructions from the Taoiseach, I took advantage of the conversation with the Burgos representative to suggest on behalf of the Taoiseach that it might help to bring about a cessation of hostilities if General Franco could reassure those on the Barcelona side that their lives would be safe in case of Nationalist victory. Information which had reached the Irish delegation was to the effect that the Barcelona forces were now engaged in a war of desperation; that they believed that there would be wholesale shootings in the event of surrender, and that they were therefore convinced that they might as well continue fighting. Senor de las Bárcenas said that General Franco had promised that no one would be executed merely for taking part in the war on the side of Barcelona, but that of course there would have to be justice. He, for example, knew the man who had murdered his sister, and he added that 100,000 persons had been murdered by the Reds in Madrid alone. I asked if that meant that all persons who were known to have committed serious crimes would be dealt with: in view of the number, it might be difficult to bring about surrender on such terms. I urged that notwithstanding the personal feelings of the relatives and friends of those who had been murdered, something more than justice - and I suggested amnesty - was necessary if the war was to be ended speedily, and if further huge losses to Nationalist Spain were to be avoided. There was the further consideration that a general outbreak of war in Europe might have serious repercussions on the fortunes of the Nationalist side, as France might intervene directly for Barcelona. He appeared to be impressed and remarked that certainly there would be dangers from a European conflict. He said that he would report the conversation at once to Burgos, and would direct special attention to the matter when in the near future he returned to Spain. He asked me to express to the Taoiseach his gratitude and appreciation for the interest which he was taking in the matter.