Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)¹
(43/33)

The last weeks have brought events which in the opinion of many of those most competent to judge created a definite military superiority on the side of the authoritarian states in the eventuality of a war. It will be well to take these events in order so that their importance may be appreciated.

1. The establishment of a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia. As is obvious to anyone who has looked at the map of Europe, the former state of Czechoslovakia was a threat in 1918 to the allied states of Germany and Austria; in 1939 it was equally menacing to the Greater German Reich. That it was intended by its creators to constitute such a threat is known to anyone who has read any of the standard works on the Peace Conference of 1919; that it was so considered to the last is clear from, inter alia, a speech of Mr. Cot², French Minister for Aviation, who pointed out that Germany's most important industrial districts could be bombed from Czechoslovakia in a 20 minutes' flight.

   That the Czechs of the Masaryk-Beneš. regime would have been not only able but willing to carry out the policy so devised for them by the Allied Powers was ensured by the completely Masonic character of the Czechoslovak regime, which did not at any time since 1919 seriously attempt to find a modus vivendi with Germany. It was the general opinion in Germany - which was strikingly confirmed by the course taken by subsequent events - that the object of the clique governing Czechoslovakia was not the interests of the Czech peoples but the carrying out of a Franco-British anti-German policy.

   Under the circumstances it was scarcely to be expected that Germany could continue to tolerate a perpetual menace to her frontiers. It had been hoped that, when in September 1938 the German, Polish and Hungarian minorities had regained the freedom to join their respective countries, the new government would see its way to pursue a different policy. Unfortunately this was far from being the case; Mr. Chvalovsky committed errors similar to those committed by Beneš: the Czechs continued to adopt an attitude of hostility towards the Germans and to deny to the Slovaks the independence which they had promised them in 1918 and again in 1938.

   Only one outcome was possible, - the establishment of a German Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, and the complete independence of Slovakia, which had experienced a persecution for 20 years from the anti-Catholic Czech Government, and now had formed a Catholic Government under Monsignor Tiso under the protection of the German State.

   To Germany the events of March have brought the advantages of an immensely shortened frontier, the acquisition of highly developed armament factories, and the elimination of an enemy on her eastern front.

2. The commercial treaty between Germany and Roumania. This agreement has been an effective response to the boasts made by English Ministers that English gold was bound to win any war in the long run and to the reference to a blockade of Germany in the English and French Press. Two of Germany's main needs in the event of a war would be wheat and oil; both of these are secured in a very large measure by the treaty. Its importance may best be judged of by the frantic efforts made by England to prevent its coming into operation, - the rumours launched by English agencies on the authority of English officials in Bucharest that it had been brought about by a German ultimatum (which was immediately denied by the Roumanian Government), the newspaper statement that it would not be ratified by Roumania, etc., etc. It is probable that the German view that the treaty makes Germany immune against any attempted blockade by England and France is reasonably accurate.

3. The occupation of Albania by an Italian army. The existence of a hostile Albania would have presented a grave danger to Italy in the event of a European war. The late King of Albania³, who had reached his position by Italian help, had, so far as can be ascertained, lent himself to English intrigues against Italy: inducements offered him by his new friends are alleged to have been of a pecuniary nature. The situation was obviously one which Italy could not tolerate, and accordingly, with the knowledge of Yugoslavia, the Italian army has brought to an end a possible source of danger to Italy.

4. The adhesion of Spain to the anti-Comintern pact. It was obviously inevitable that Franco would tend to support those countries which had supported Catholic Spain against Communism; and the speeches by Spanish ministers, the special honours conferred by General Franco on General Fieldmarshal Goering, the messages sent to Hitler and Mussolini by the Spanish chief never left any doubt as to the future policy of Spain. It was apparently expected by England and France that, after doing everything possible to support the Communist and Masonic forces in Spain and retarding Franco's victory for at least a year, they could buy the support of the victors. This expectation has been disappointed, and with it the hope that the Catholic Spain of the future would sell its honour for an English loan and support the Western democracies and Soviet Russia in a war against the central powers.

   These four events are in themselves, as I have pointed out, of enormous importance in strengthening the position of Germany and Italy in a military and economic sense. From the point of view of prestige they are of almost equal importance, in that they are the best proof to the states of middle and eastern Europe of the impotence of England and France. There was a possibility that the accounts so assiduously propagated by the Anglo-Jewish news agencies of the progress of English rearmament and the obvious efforts of the British Government to form an anti-German front would have a certain success. I do not think that this possibility any longer exists: the fact that Bohemia, Memel and Albania have successively been placed under a protectorate or annexed and that England after protesting has not ventured to lift a finger has in the opinion of those Ministers for East- and North-Eastern states with whom I have talked destroyed English and French prestige completely.

   English policy may best be judged by its attitude towards the Memel question. On being interrogated by the Lithuanian Government the British Government declared it the duty of Lithuania to fight in defence of its territory: on being asked what assistance it would give, it stated that England was not in a position to offer any assistance of a military nature. The Lithuanians not unnaturally preferred to come to an agreement with Germany rather than swell the ranks of those countries which had fought at England's request and been deserted in the hour of defeat.

   The opinion of the German Chancellor, as I know from a conversation recently held by him with the Minister of a foreign state, is that England and France are completely powerless against Germany, and that both the danger of direct military defeat and that of defeat by a hunger blockade may be regarded as eliminated. If this view is correct, as would appear very probable, and if its correctness is realized by England and France, the danger of a war would appear to have very much receded, as the democratic countries would scarcely engage in hostilities in which they would not have at least a great probability of success.

So far as it is possible to judge, the situation has been realised by the more responsible elements in both England and France. In England, in particular, as the German press frequently points out, the first step necessary towards fighting would be to introduce conscription, but England refuses to do so. Therefore, it must be assumed that England will not venture to make a war, as she cannot in 1939 find other countries willing to be slaughtered in English interests as she did in 1914, and the French are not likely to sacrifice some millions of their youth before England is prepared to send a serious expeditionary force to the continent.

The German press, and indeed most Germans, are indignant at the attempts of the British Government to encircle Germany by a system of alliances directed against the 'Axis', but I do not think that there is any serious alarm. It is perfectly realized that, whatever be Polish hostility to Germany at the moment, no Polish Government could possibly enter into an alliance with the Soviet Government; it is not thought that Roumania would abandon the prospect of good relations with Germany for the usually fatal gift of English friendship; and it is obvious that Yugoslavia knows that her interests be with the authoritarian states.