Memorandum from Leopold H. Kerney to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)¹
(S.S. 19/1)

SPAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY

On Tuesday, 11th April, the Spanish Government, Franco presiding, held a Cabinet meeting in Burgos from 6.30 p.m. till 1 a.m. The official communiqué published the following morning mentioned the various matters which had been discussed; there was no reference at all to matters affecting foreign policy - to my mind the clearest possible evidence that questions of great importance relating to Spain's foreign policy were under consideration at the meeting. On an earlier occasion, quite recently, a cabinet meeting was held; the communiqué gave great prominence to decisions regarding internal policy and dismissed foreign policy in one brief line; the next day Spain joined Italy, Germany, Japan and Hungary in the anti-comintern pact.

On this present occasion, it will be remembered that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was busy with Franco on Sunday night 9th April, and that this prevented him from receiving a visit from me, and also that, for the same reason, he had to keep me waiting 11/2 hours on Monday 10th April, whilst the Brazilian chargé d'affaires, who had arranged an appointment for 12.30 p.m. before leaving San Sebastian, had to wait for over 2 hours, and was somewhat wrath that such a thing should happen to him for the first time in his career of 25 years. It is natural to conclude that foreign policy was very much in the foreground before the Cabinet meeting of 11th April.

The British Ambassador ('Peterson' in one official diplomatic list, 'Petterson' in another) presented his credentials on 11th April - and, by the way, he, a non-military official, gave a military salute, a sort of compromise solution I suppose, when the national anthems were played - and saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs the same afternoon, before the beginning of the cabinet meeting; he may have been interested in Spain's foreign policy.

Prior to the signing of the anti-comintern pact, the French Ambassador, Marshal Pétain, went specially to Burgos to see Jordana, and shortly afterwards returned to France, and he has been seeing Bonnet, Daladier and others in Paris.

It is reasonable to suppose that France and England must be much concerned as to Spain's attitude in the event of war; the strategic importance of Spain is such that France and England may be seeking very definite assurances; Spain's anti-comintern ties will make it very difficult - even omitting the probability of secret commitments entered into with Italy as the price of Italian support - for her to preserve any other 'neutrality' than such as may be useful to Italy and Germany. Two questions present themselves to my mind - Are France and England taking a strong attitude and demanding guarantees of friendly Spanish neutrality? Is Spain free and willing to give assurances without which presumably pro-Italian neutrality may not be respected?

It has to be borne in mind that the new Spain is pretentious and ambitious; one of her ambitions is to figure as a great Power, as in the days of yore; Spain intends to play her part in the Mediterranean and will be encouraged by Italy to do so; the new Spain will choose some propitious moment for raising the question of Gibraltar; the original pre-war Falange Española agitated in a small way for the return of Gibraltar, but in those days the aims and methods of that small organisation were looked upon as fantastic by most people; the day after Madrid capitulated bodies of young men paraded before the British Embassy in Madrid shouting - 'Gibraltar, Gibraltar!'; and level-headed Spaniards, not quite so young, do not need much inducement to speak with indignation of how England robbed them of Gibraltar in peace time; the question is never referred to in the press, which is of course controlled. It is easy to imagine a Spanish 'natural aspiration' for Gibraltar, and mighty consequences arising therefrom.