Extracts from a confidential report from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe¹ (Dublin)
(S. Gen. 1/1) (Confidential)

With further reference to the international situation, I have to state that the general feeling here in international circles remains pessimistic as to the outcome, and, so far as I can judge, little of a practical nature is expected from the letters of President Roosevelt. From conversations which I had in Scandinavian circles last week, I gathered that those circles, and the Danes in particular, were extremely pessimistic, fearing that an attack might be made on Demark and/or Sweden in the immediate future - Denmark to ensure supplies and naval bases, and Sweden for raw materials of military value and strategic considerations. Such an attack was expected even before an attack on Danzig and the corridor. I met the German Consul-General also and I asked him as before in a friendly way what was going to happen next. He spoke furiously against France and Britain, repeating that all the excitement was due to those two countries. I asked him whether he retained his optimism, and, on his replying yes, I enquired whether he really felt that nothing which would result in war was likely to happen in the near future. He said 'Something will come, but not now'. I thought that he had lost a good deal of the sang-froid which he had displayed on a previous occasion.

[matter omitted]

With regard to President Roosevelt's letters, the opinion held here in various circles is that they can hardly lead to practical results. First of all, the President had identified himself closely with one side, with the result that he is regarded as an enemy by both Hitler and Mussolini, especially the former. Secondly he as an intermediary on main questions is not in a position to deliver the goods. The proposals also followed rather too quickly his declaration to the Board of the Pan-American Union. The atmosphere for a peace move of the kind was hardly therefore too favourable. The démarche could however have the effect of putting the dictatorial regimes more completely in the wrong before the American peoples, and might encourage the more moderate elements in Italy and even in Germany to become less enthusiastic than ever for war.

The great gap which I see in the President's proposals is that they do not suggest more directly political discussions. Such discussions are, no doubt inevitably left by the President to the initiative of the Governments which are directly interested, if those Governments deem them necessary or desirable. Presumably he has in mind such questions as Danzig and the corridor between Germany and Poland; colonies between Germany and Britain, France, etc; Tunis, Djibouti, Suez between Italy and France, etc. etc.. Notwithstanding the questions which have already been settled by force, it is principally political problems, and German ambitions in Eastern Europe, which stand in the way of appeasement. To propose that an arrangement regarding armaments should be discussed at the same time as an arrangement in the economic field, with no certainty of even an attempt at fruitful discussions in the political field, does not seem to me to be a really practical proposition, as it has all along been recognised that no serious advance could be made on economic lines - raw materials, etc. - whilst the political problems remained unsolved. And it is hardly likely that Germany and Italy would agree to a limitation or a fixation of armaments until their political claims had been in some way dealt with. I have no illusions that any attempt to settle German or Italian claims would be an easy matter, but, with a world war as the alternative, it seems not unreasonable to expect that discussions of all questions outstanding, no matter what they are, should definitely be tried, and that no question of prestige should stand in the way. It is certainly absurd, for example, that apparently for reasons in which questions of prestige play a great part, neither M. Daladier nor M. Mussolini are prepared to get down to discussions regarding the matters in dispute between them.

Bearing in mind, therefore, that the British Premier has more than once stated that in his view there was no question which could not reasonably be regulated by peaceful discussion, and that M. Mussolini at least has stated that his country needs an era of peace, it occurs to me that it might be a good follow-up of President Roosevelt's proposals if both Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier took an early opportunity of sending letters to Hitler and Mussolini, setting out frankly the French and the British points of view and indicating that they were ready at any time to discuss peacefully in Conference not only the questions of an effective limitation and fixation of armaments and the opening up of international trade as proposed by the President of the United States, but also any problem that was on the political horizon. Perhaps the Minister, who is also still President of the League Assembly, might be prepared as in September last to give consideration to the question of sounding the persons chiefly concerned (British and French)² as to whether such direct action on their part would be a possibility. Both Premiers have of course more than once stated their willingness to discuss any and every question. It is one thing however to express such readiness in general speeches, but it would to my mind be more effective from the points of view of enlightening public opinion, and clarifying the position generally, if proposals were made by letters addressed direct to the principals. Moreover, proposals made in this way reach more certainly the people of the various countries and gain time. It is serious to my mind that on the eve perhaps of hostilities, there is no direct contact between the persons who have or ought to have the power to take decisions. And I still do not believe that in any quarter there exists a hankering for a European war.