Memorandum on the Italo-German Pact from Michael MacWhite to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(It/376/39)

Enclosed herewith is a Memorandum dealing with the recent Italo-German pact, its origin and possible consequences.

[Enclosure]

THE ITALO-GERMAN TREATY ITS ORIGIN AND CONSEQUENCES

The signature of the Italo-German Treaty at Berlin a fortnight ago, committing each country to give the fullest diplomatic help to the other in peace and the support of all its military forces in war, does not seem to introduce any new factor in European politics as the Axis has been from the beginning an Alliance for the purpose of revising certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, by force if necessary.

The fact that it was found necessary to put its conditions into documentary form possibly resulted from the successful negotiation of a British Pact with Turkey which affects Italy's position in the Aegean Sea. Be this as it may, the step exemplifies the dangerous point which the policy of revision has now reached. It is more difficult to explain why the Reich, in order to obtain Italy's signature, has curtailed its individual freedom of action through the obligation to consult its ally on all questions affecting common interests as well as the general European situation.

On the other hand, Italy cannot now adopt the attitude of neutrality she had been able to follow in 1914 within the framework of the Triple Alliance, for, under the present Treaty the possibility of unilateral action by one or other of the signatories appears to be excluded, such as was the case in regard to Czechoslovakia and Albania. These changes, if such they be, are meant no doubt to impress public opinion, both at home as well as abroad, and above all, an effort to intimidate Britain and France into making the oft demanded sacrifices to meet Italo-German aspirations.

The fact that this treaty does not rigidly correspond to Italian national sentiment, in so far as the mass of the people show little enthusiasm for collaboration with Germany, will make little difference in its working as the Fascist Party is in absolute control throughout the Kingdom and public opinion is, for many reasons, incapable of making itself felt. Impartial observers, everywhere, admit the conclusion of the pact to be the logical outcome of the Sanctions policy initiated at Geneva in 1935.

In order to understand its full bearing it is necessary to retrace some of the steps in the relations between the two dictators since Hitler took control of the destinies of the Reich. At the outset there was no spontaneous sympathy between the two revolutions although in their origin there were many points of similarity. Italy wanted Austria as a buffer state and the Stresa agreements² constituted a serious barrier to the Anschluss. When Hitler made his first move in this direction in 1934, several Italian divisions were sent to the Austrian frontier.

In 1935, however, the Reich took advantage of the Ethiopian war and the Sanctions policy of the League to cultivate the good graces of Italy. The moral effect of that policy which the Italian people felt much more deeply than the material effect shook the confidence which they had until then in the Western democracies. It is from this time one can trace the first sign of an Italo-German understanding. In 1936, gratitude to Germany was such that Italy facilitated the conclusion of the Austro-German agreement which she had previously opposed. There was a further manifestation of a new development in Italy's foreign policy when, in the same year, she declined representation at the Brussels Conference for the revision of the Locarno Pact. The policy of the Popular Front in France and the delay in sending a French Ambassador to Rome compromised the advantages that might be derived from the Mussolini-Laval agreement, the intent of which was to stabilise the relations between the two countries.

Rome now turned deliberately towards Berlin and Count Ciano paid his first visit to Hitler in October 1936 when the foundation of what has since come to be know as the Rome-Berlin axis was laid. In May 1937 the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, visited Rome and was followed a few weeks later by Marshal Blomberg, Minister for War, which gave rise to the supposition of a wider and more general understanding between the two regimes. The visit of the Duce to Berlin in 1937 was the consequent result of this policy which culminated in the signature of the Rome-Berlin Treaty of the 22nd of May. It would, therefore, be a mistake to minimise the effect of this act which had been concluded under the pressure of necessity to realise their policy of revision on which depends, in their opinion, the solution of their difficulties.

According to Signor Gayda, the spokesman of the Duce, the pact constitutes the last invitation to the democratic powers to extend the necessary collaboration so as to assure to all people the just conditions of existence. This means equality of rights and an equal distribution of wealth and of raw materials according to the needs of each people and its capacity for development. In order to attribute to themselves the moral advantage and to gain favourable world opinion the totalitarian states endeavour to make the democracies responsible for the actual situation and accuse them of having violated international justice and the rightful aspiration of a young and prolific people. The policy initiated by England at the time of the Sanctions to defend her hegemony against what Italy claimed to be her own legitimate interests, was, therefore, the origin of the reaction of the Dictators. Encircled and menaced by what has been regarded as Franco-British imperialism, they were forced to create that policy which has kept Europe in a state of suspense ever since.

If, therefore, the Italo-German alliance in its latest phase is the direct reply to the Turco-British pact which has unbalanced the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean to the detriment of Italy, one may be fairly certain that the conclusion of a Franco-Anglo-Soviet entente which is detested by the Axis Powers will provoke another striking reaction culminating, perhaps, in the denunciation of the Italo-British agreement of last year. In addition, they will, in all probability bring all their pressure to bear on the States of the Balkan peninsula to attach them to their policy, while the situation of Spain does not exclude the possibility of its collaboration with them in the Mediterranean.