Memorandum by Frederick H. Boland
on matters arising in the event of Ireland becoming involved in hostilities

1. On the 18th January, the Secretary discussed with the Taoiseach the various questions which would arise in the event of this country's being invaded and becoming involved in the War. The Assistant Secretary¹ was present.

2. The Taoiseach approved the proposal that instructions should issue at once to the missions abroad telling them, in the event of an invasion, to present a formal note of protest to the Governments to which they are accredited. The Taoiseach approved the draft text of the proposed note (marked A opposite)² and the draft text of the proposed instructions (marked B opposite).³

3. The Secretary suggested to the Taoiseach that, in the event of our being invaded, a formal declaration of war against the invader would not be necessary. If there were a formal declaration of war, it would be necessary to notify it to the foreign countries with which we are in diplomatic relations; but inter-national law did not require a formal declaration of war in the case of resistance to an unprovoked attack. The resistance itself was sufficient. The Taoiseach said that he personally accepted this view and didn't think a formal declaration of war would be necessary, but he thought the point was one which might be discussed at the Defence Conference⁴ and he asked Mr. Walshe to bring it to Mr. Aiken's notice for this purpose.

4. The Secretary also raised the point whether, in the event of an invasion by Germany, we should break off diplomatic relations with Italy and/or declare war against that country. He said that, in his view, we should avoid taking these steps if at all possible. The Taoiseach said that he agreed with this view but he thought that this point also might be raised at the Defence Conference.

5. Mr. Walshe told the Taoiseach that the question would also arise what action, including necessary measures of restraint we should take against the diplomatic representative of the invading country, his staff and their families. Probably the best course would be to quarter the entire staff of the mission or missions concerned together in a hotel or suitable residential premises pending the making of arrangements for their repatriation. To leave them in their Legation or ordinary residence, would involve the risk of secret means of communication being used. On the other hand, the Legation and its office and residential premises would pass at once into the hands of the 'neutral' power and, therefore, to search or occupy them might lead us into diplomatic complications. Mr. Walshe suggested that the steps to be taken in connection with this particular matter should be discussed, and agreed upon in advance, between this Department and the Department of Defence. The Taoiseach approved of this proposal.

6. Mr. Walshe told the Taoiseach that, in the event of invasion, it would be necessary to ask some neutral power to take charge of Irish interests in the invading country, and in any other country with which we might be involved in war as a result of the invasion. Such an appointment was necessary, not only to ensure protection of the interests of our nationals, supervision of their conditions of internment, etc., but to make possible the formal communications under the provisions of the Red Cross and Hague Convention which one belligerent had to make to another on the outbreak of hostilities. Mr. Walshe proposed that we should sound the United States authorities as to whether they would be prepared to take charge of Irish interests in Berlin and, if necessary, in Rome. If the United States themselves became involved in war, the next best choice would probably be Spain. The Taoiseach agreed that the United States Government should be approached informally as proposed. The question of the protection of Irish interests in the United Kingdom if Britain were the invading power was left over for a later decision.

7. Mr. Walshe explained to the Taoiseach that, when Finland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France had been invaded, all the assets of those countries in the United States, including their current accounts in American banks, had been 'frozen' by executive orders made by President Roosevelt. The effect of this action was that the assets in question could not be touched or used at all, so that the countries concerned had been virtually left without the foreign assets necessary for the support of their diplomatic missions in the United States and elsewhere; for the conduct of essential propaganda work and the purchase of vital supplies. We understood that the Dutch Government had successfully anticipated this action by the President of the United States by giving beforehand a contingent power of attorney to their Minister in Washington. Mr. Walshe suggested that we should consider similar action and that, for this purpose, the matter should be discussed between this Department and the Department of Finance. The Taoiseach agreed.