Dictated memorandum by Frank Aiken of his mission
to the United States of America (March–June 1941)

We arrived in New York on the 18th March. We were met by a number of prominent Irishmen and the officials of the Consul and by Judge Mahoney, representing the Mayor. The Mayor had placed his car and a police escort at our disposal for the journey to the hotel. Later in the morning I called on Mayor Le Guardia at the City Hall. That same evening I discovered that the President was leaving on the second next day – 20th – for a ten days sea trip and I got in touch with the Secretary to the Legation in Washington and asked him if possible to arrange for an interview with the President on the 19th. The Irish Minister to Washington, Mr. Brennan, arrived in New York from Detroit later on in the evening and we proceeded to Washington.

On the 19th, in Washington, we learned that it would be impossible for the President to see us that day, but an appointment was made to see Mr. Atherton,¹ who was in charge of European affairs. Mr. Brennan and I saw Mr. Atterton and I outlined to him the reasons for my visit and made arrangements to see Mr. Welles, who was in charge of the State Department while Mr. Hull was on leave on holidays.

Mr. Brennan and I saw Mr. Welles on the 21st March and I outlined to him the reasons for my visit and our attitude towards the war. I told him that our people are united on the policy of neutrality and determined to resist aggression from any quarter. I said that we had tried to get the British to accept the situation that our people would not take part in the war unless attacked and to get from them a guarantee that they would not attack. I said that unfortunately some evil influence seemed always to bedevil Irish-English relations and although we could persuade British Ministers individually what was the right thing to do regarding Ireland when they came together they seemed to act under influence of the small clique in England who hated Ireland and would rather see the British Empire going down than Ireland getting her rights. I hoped that they might bring influence to bear on the British to behave reasonably in the present situation first of all, and to realise that though the Irish would not voluntarily enter the war, they would defend themselves against any attack, and that there was a point at which the interests of both Britain and Ireland, and those in the United States who wanted to see Britain win, coincided, and that was in the defence of Ireland against an Axis attack. I pointed out that the safeguarding of Ireland from being over-run by Axis Forces was a vital concern for the British, but of even more vital concern for the Irish people, and Irish soldiers would fight more determinedly in defence of Irish soil than the soldiers of any foreign Power; that one rifle in the hands of an Irishman defending Irish soil would be more effective for that purpose than ten rifles in the hands of Englishmen.

Mr. Welles said that the policy of his Government was that England should win and that they were prepared to take whatever steps necessary to ensure this, wherever that might lead to. This he said with great emphasis and significance. I said I quite realised the policy of the American Government and pointed out that as there was only one route – that north of Ireland – now usable between the United States and England, it was important for their Government, in view of their policy, to help us to keep the Axis out of Ireland and so keep them from cutting the sole remaining line of communications.

Mr. Welles pointed out that there was a limited supply of arms and that they were committed to giving all the arms they could spare to England and to the other nations actively engaged in resisting aggression. I said I realised that that was their policy and proceeded to use the Taoiseach's argument about the man defending the four-sided house with five rifles. I said that the defender would be a fool if he devoted three rifles to one side and left one side undefended.

Mr. Welles asked what did we desire to purchase and I gave him a rough idea of what was in the official list and promised to send him the list that evening, which we did later. He promised that as soon as the list arrived he would hand it to the proper authorities and that I might be called in later to discuss various items with the Military heads.

During the following week I saw Mr. Atteson, another European Secretary of State, who is in charge of Army supplies. I also saw the Secretary to the Navy, Colonel Knox, and Mr. Forrestal. My talk to these gentlemen followed the same lines as that with Mr. Welles. Colonel Knox asked me if our determination to prevent anybody using the ports applied to America, and I said, yes.

On the 19th March, Representative Martin Kennedy of New York, called attention to the press notices of my visit and to the fact that I was here to get arms and supplies and he suggested to the Congress and to the President that Ireland should get aid in her present dilemma.

On the 21st March I was interviewed by representatives of the various papers and news services in Washington and was pretty fairly reported in the newspapers. I also saw several Senators and Congressmen and representatives. We made particular efforts to see the leading Congressmen and Senators who had voted for the Lease-Lend Bill and tried to get their co-operation in securing arms and ships. A dinner was given in my honour by Representative McGrennory², who is a thick and thin supporter of the President. At this dinner there were about 37 Congressmen and Senators, mostly in favour of Lease-Lend, and Congressman McCormack³ – Majority Leader in the House – expressed himself in favour of our getting arms and ships, and his speech was well received by all present.

At a luncheon given in my honour by the head of a labour paper, supporting the President, I also met about 15 Congressmen and Senators and explained the situation to them at length.

Mr. Brennan and I also spent a great deal of time in the lobbies of the Congress and Senate and met a large number of Congressmen.

On March 25th Congressman Healy⁴ and Representative Connery⁵ and Majority House Leader John McCormack spoke in the Senate and said they considered that it was important for the national defence of America that the things Ireland needed in food and armaments should be sold or given to the people of that country as quickly as possible.

On 7th April, Mr. Brennan and I saw the President. He began by recalling his contact with the Taoiseach in 1919-20 and about having advised him regarding the issue of the Dáil Éireann Loan within the American law. The President then went on to say that he had heard that I had said that the Irish had nothing to fear from a German victory. I said I had never said anything of this kind publicly or privately because I did not believe it, – that we feared a German victory, that we also feared an outright British victory. The President said that a difficulty about supplies was not knowing whether they would be used against Germany if the latter attacked. I replied that the Taoiseach had made many public declarations on this point from 1935, when he said that, in the case of war, we would not allow Ireland to be used as the base of an attack against England. I pointed out that the policy of neutrality and of resisting attack from any quarter had the approval not only of all the representatives in Parliament but also of all the newspapers in the country and of practically the entire people. The President said that if the British were convinced on this and told him they were satisfied, the arms would be supplied. I asked him to use his own initiative and judgment on the matter in order to save the British from their own folly. I spoke to him on the same lines as I spoke to Mr. Welles of the vital necessity to the British of ensuring that their last line of communications would not be straddled, and that we were more vitally interested and would fight better to keep the Axis out of Ireland than any foreign soldiers. When we came to the question of the transfer of the flag on the ships we had purchased, I said that a delayed 'yes' on the question of ships and arms was tantamount to a 'No'. He replied that we must not have convinced the State Department that the arms would not be used against England and went on to allude to convoys and the fact that we were dependent upon them for supplies. He implied that there was an obligation on our part to aid these convoys and suggested that we establish a 50 mile sea patrol to stop submarines. I replied that we could do nothing in this regard that would be a breach of our neutrality, that we judged every situation in relation to its effect on the solidarity of our own people and that we would do nothing which might legitimately be held to be a breach of neutrality upon which our people had decided, and upon which they were more united than the people of any other country were in any question of peace and war. I pointed out that Ireland's unity and ability to resist aggression would be completely smashed if they took any step leading towards war. At this point the President said that he was a great hand at finding formula and that he was sure that he could find one if he thought it over. He said that he himself had extended the neutrality patrol first of all 300 miles and was contemplating extending it 1,500 'and I got away with it'. 'But' I said, 'Mr. President you are a very big country and very far away from the seat of war.' All during the interview, which started at ten minutes to 1 o'c I found it very difficult to outline the purpose of my mission and the attitude of our people in a connected way. Indeed, in order to do so, I had to interrupt the President and keep talking against his attempts to interrupt me in what would be a boorish way in dealing with an ordinary individual. I did, however, succeed in giving him clearly to understand that neutrality is supported by 99.9% of our people, that it was decided upon in their own interests and that the Government would take no step leading our people towards involvement in the war and that we were determined to resist aggression from any quarter. The interview which was scheduled to last ten minutes, lasted three-quarters of an hour, although we were interrupted every few minutes after the ten had elapsed by the President's Secretary coming in with remarks to the President about various engagements, &c. &c. The interview was finally terminated in the presence of three or four negros who entered and placed the President's lunch on the table. Towards the conclusion of the interview I asked the President if I might report that we had his sympathy in our stand against aggression. He said, German aggression? surely. I said, British aggression too. He said, nonsense, there is no fear of a British aggression. I said we had asked the British officially for assurance that they would not attack us and that they had refused to give it to us. He again said, nonsense. The British have no thought of attacking you and I am certain Churchill would tell me so. I said Mr. President, will you ask Mr. Churchill, and he said, yes. We wound up the interview by asking him to let us have a definite reply on the question of arms and ships and the assurance from Mr. Churchill within a few days. He promised to let us have the reply and we bade him goodbye.

On the 12th April I saw Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State. I stated our case as stated to the other members of the Government. He gave us a long lecture on the iniquities of Hitler and how he had foreseen what was going to happen and had tried to prepare the various countries for what was coming. He promised that he would look into the question of the arms and ships.

About 14th April we handed in a copy of my main speech to the State Department.

On 16th April the Secretary of State told the newspapers that the American Government had no intention of asking us to grant the use of naval bases to Britain and said that there had been no discussion, much less negotiation, on the question with Irish officials here.

On the 15th I started out on a tour of the United States in response to a number of invitations which I received from various States asking me to address meetings on the subject of Ireland's situation and attitude to the war.

On the 17th April I interviewed the press and got a very good report. I also called on Cardinal O'Connell⁶ and was received very sympathetically. He promised to do all he could to help.

From Washington I went to Philadelphia and spoke at a dinner which was attended by the Mayor⁷ and several members of Congress. The speech was broadcast. I had an audience with Cardinal Dougherty,⁸ Philadelphia, who was very friendly and promised to do all he could to help.

On 18th, the Mayor of Boston⁹ gave a luncheon in my honour which was attended by about 100 important and influential citizens and that night I spoke to a big meeting in the Symphony Hall.

On 23rd I saw Archbishop Curley¹⁰ in Baltimore, who was friendly and promised to do all he could to help.

On 24th, the Under-Secretary of State, when seen by Mr. Brennan, promised a decision on the arms and ships within a few days.

Senator Mahoney¹¹saw the President and asked him what reply he got from Churchill. The President repeatedly avoided the question and said – 'I can give you my personal guarantee and word of honour that they will never do anything of the kind.'

On 24th April, there were over 1000 Masses said throughout the United States for the preservation of Ireland's neutrality. I attended Mass in the Cathedral Church in New York.

On the following Thursday, a luncheon was given in my honour in the Waldorf Astoria, presided over by Martin Conboy,¹² and attended by Judge Cohalan¹³ and a large number of representative citizens. The following night I spoke at a big public meeting in New York.

Following the meeting in New York, I visited Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Butte, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. In all these cities I was received enthusiastically by all sections of Irish extraction and treated courteously by the State and City officials.

Interviews with the press were also extremely satisfactory, with the exception of one paper in Seattle. My speech was several times broadcast and, in addition, I gave several radio interviews and talks, which were on the same lines as my speech.

On Saturday, 21st June, the evening before I left for home I gave a radio talk over the Columbia-National hook-up.