No. 140 NAI DFA Secretary's Files A43
Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin)
'American Forces in the Six Counties. Note to the State Department.'
(Secret)
DUBLIN, 3 November 1941
If we send a Note (and a Note must be sent if only to put us right before posterity), we must seek some object other than that of making a protest. There are two possible objects
- to prevent the Americans taking the final step of sending substantial forces, whether naval or military; or
- to secure from the American Government an admission of the principle of the moral unity of Ireland and consequently of the right of the majority Government to regard the anticipated intervention of a third Power in the Six Counties as a major interest for them.
We should naturally hope that the admission would be accompanied by a guarantee of future unity and independence. Of course, we cannot ignore the possibility of the Americans retorting with an offer of unity and independence in the future in exchange for our immediate entry into the war. We should find it difficult to reject this offer without making a counter proposal for immediate unity together with freedom of choice by the representatives of the whole people.
The mere possibility of such a sequence of events emphasises the extreme gravity of the moment for our country. We seem to have no choice between sacrificing the principle of unity, which complete inaction on our part would seem to involve, and taking a step (i.e., sending a Note) which almost certainly places us at the beginning of the road (short or long) to war.
The first object might be achieved by an extremely strong Note, but our success would be only temporary. The American Government would simply refrain from doing anything until their people had become more united on the war issue and Irish-American opposition had lost its strength. Moreover, we should not have improved the outlook for the future (assuming an Anglo-American victory), and we might provide fuel for violent propaganda against us.
It would, therefore, seem better to aim at securing acceptance in principle of our rights, and to frame our Note in such a way as not to put the American Government in the dock. The American Government would have a good case for not publishing a strong Note (leading to mere inaction for the moment) while the other Note would have to be published as the American Government would be obliged to justify a guarantee or declaration of principle, either of which would have to be publicly made to be of any value to us.
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