No. 146 NAI DFA Secretary's Files A2
DUBLIN, 12 November 1941
Taoiseach, Minister for External Affairs.
The German Minister came to see me this morning by appointment. His immediate purpose was to hand in a Note from his Government denying President Roosevelt's allegation concerning Germany's intentions about the division of South America and the abolition of religion in the world. He wants us to make it known through the Press that the German Government have officially communicated their denial to us. I feel it would be difficult not to comply with this request.
2. I took the opportunity of the German Minister's visit to refer to the recent bombing of Irish ships, and to the failure of the German Government to give us satisfaction in regard to the January bombings. I told him that the Wilhelmstrasse had informed Warnock that their enquiry in that regard was completely negative, and that very careful investigations had ascertained nothing to suggest the responsibility of German aircraft. His Government had also informed Mr. Warnock that they had no wish to reject our protest and they proposed that further consideration of the matter be postponed until after the war.
On this the German Minister said that he would like to support his Government's appeal for a postponement until after the war. His communications to his Government, as we knew, were exceedingly difficult. He felt that, if he could even have an hour with his colleagues in the Foreign Office, he could secure a settlement, but, without personal contact, the difficulty was insuperable. We should remember, too, that, in the case of Campile and the North Strand, the German Government acknowledged the probability of their airmen being responsible and offered compensation accordingly. We should not take their present attitude as being expressive of anything but doubts about the facts or their real difficulty in discovering what they were precisely in so far as their aircraft were concerned.
I told him I would refer the whole question to you. I felt sure that you would share my view that, as far as he personally was concerned, he did everything possible to solve the difficulties outstanding between the two Governments.
3. I then went on to urge upon him once more the extreme necessity of renew- ing his warnings to his Government concerning the bad effects on Irish opinion of any recurrence of the bombing incidents.
He said he would, of course, do so. He had been disappointed, however, that we gave no reply to his Government concerning the marking of Dublin by some special lights which the German aviators could see from a distance and so enable them to avoid the area.
I answered that our military authorities were quite satisfied that the present lighting of Dublin was a sufficient indication of the identity of the city as part of neutral Ireland. Moreover, the German Government must be aware of the nature of the shipping lights off these coasts, and the German navigators should be able by means of them to keep clear of Irish territory.
Dr. Hempel suggested that we should send some such reply to the German Government, even if we did not undertake to establish any more obvious system of signal lights. Our reply would bring the whole matter again to the attention of his Government, and no doubt would cause them to issue instructions once more to the Air Ministry.
4. The German Minister seemed most anxious to give any help he could, and he suggested that in any matters likely to cause difficulty between the two Governments his intervention should immediately be sought.
You might perhaps think well of considering having a talk with him with a view to the elimination of activities which have recently come to light.
[initialled] J. P. W.
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