Memorandum by Joseph P. Walshe
'Moments of Special Crisis During the War'
DUBLIN, 15 May 1945
| 1. November, 1939. | Request for ports (Maffey, acting on instructions). Taoiseach's reply 'persistence means war '. |
| 2. May, 1940. | 'Held' incident. |
| 3. June, 1940. | Written communication from British Legation that there were 'growing indications that German invasion was not only seriously planned with the help of the I.R.A., but imminent'. |
| 4. June, 1940. | MacDonald's visits of 17th, 21st, and 26th. Proposal to come into the war. Possibility of immediate German invasion strongly urged. |
| 5. July, 1940. | Tension. Rumours of British intention to take over early part of the month.
On 10th July, Maffey gave me text of telegram from D.O. that German invasion had been on point of taking place on 4th July. On 14th July, were informed by British Legation that British Intelligence had information Germans would invade following day. |
| 6. November, 1940. | Churchill's speech in House of Commons 5th November. 'It is a most grievous and heavy burden that we cannot use the south and west coast of Ireland to refuel our flotillas and aircraft'.
Very strong anti-Irish campaign followed in British and American Press. The 'New York Times' on 24th November stated that the War Department felt it ought to have its own sources of information in Ireland to guard against surprise developments. |
| 7. December, 1940. | On 19th December, German request for extra staff to reach Limerick by 'plane on 21st: practically an ultimatum. Taoiseach informed German Minister that, if proposal were persisted in, it would be refused. |
| 8. February, 1941. | On 19th February, Maffey said his Government could not declare that they would not invade Ireland without a mental reservation, because they felt that, if the Germans 'had them by the throat', they wanted to be free to take whatever measures here might be necessary to save themselves. Irish neutrality was an advantage to the Germans and a danger to them. |
| 9. March, 1941. | On 14th March, Maffey said that we must realise the time might come – indeed he believed it certainly would come – when Britain or America, or perhaps both, would have to bring serious pressure to bear upon us. It would be better for us to prepare for such an eventuality. They could not give us arms unless they were absolutely certain that the arms would not be used against themselves. They could not omit from their calculations the possibility of having to use force in a vital emergency. The Americans would consider that Ireland's neutrality constituted a menace to the forces of democracy. |
| 10. May, 1941 | Conscription crisis.
On 22nd May, Churchill said to Dulanty that, if we persisted in not giving them the ports, there were ways of getting them. Since the Irish repudiated the Treaty, he had drawn the sword and was definitely against them. |
| 11. 8th December, 1941. | Message from Churchill to the Taoiseach conveyed through Sir John Maffey to the effect that the appropriate moment for Ireland's entry into the war had arrived. |
| 12. 21st February, 1944. | American Note, supported by the British, requesting the removal of the Axis Representatives from Dublin. |
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