Extracts from the
'Joint Report of Delegation to the USA - 18th to 28th, May 1948'

[matter omitted]

THURSDAY, May 20th
Meeting of delegation at 10 a.m. Much of the first day (Thursday 20th May) after arrival in Washington was mainly devoted to joint study by the Delegation of the briefs prepared before leaving Dublin, with a view to deciding the most expedient line to adopt in presenting the Irish case to the Administrator. Attention was also given to the information made available by the Irish Minister in Washington as to the predisposition of the U.S. authorities towards the Irish claim from both the political and financial angles.

In the forenoon of the 20th, the Minister for External Affairs, accompanied by Mr. Nunan, called on Mr. Marshall, the Secretary of State. The Minister expressed appreciation of the generous scheme of aid for European recovery which the U.S. Government had brought into being and stated that Ireland wished to co-operate to the fullest extent in that Scheme.

MR. MARSHALL spoke in general terms of world problems particularly that of Communism in South America. The Minister urged the necessity of rallying the forces of democracy behind an ideal; he expressed the view that the strength of Communism lay partly in the fact that it had an idealistic basis and partly in its method of organisation. While economic and material aid was essential it would not by itself provide a full solution. General Marshall agreed fully with this and stated this was just the viewpoint which he had sought to have recognised by the democracies. The Minister expressed appreciation of the language used by Mr. Marshall in his public utterances, as it showed a deeper realisation of the problem.

Mr. Marshall referred to the final instalment of Mr. Churchill's Memoirs which had appeared in that day's American papers and to his command of language. The conversation was general and nothing else of note arose.

In the afternoon, the Minister, Mr. Boland and Mr. Nunan, had an interview with Mr. J. Hickerson who is the permanent Director of the European Affairs Division of the State Department. From information available, as well as because of his position, it was considered that he wielded a considerable amount of influence in regard to the policy aspect of E.R.P. It will be recalled that the decision of the E.C.A., in regard to the allocation of aid was reached 'after prior consultation with the State Department concerning foreign policy aspects.'¹ We had been informed that in general, Mr. Hickerson was not favourably disposed towards Ireland.

The State Department is not directly concerned with E.R.P. or economic matters; its interest in E.R.P. is limited to questions of policy. But its advice in this sphere is regarded as important.

The Minister explained that while the State Department had no direct say in the allocations made, we felt that possibly the State Department had given advice to E.C.A. which had resulted in cutting Ireland out of aid by way of grant. If that were so we were anxious to have a discussion as to why this course had been adopted; on the other hand, if no advice of this nature had been given to the E.C.A. we were anxious to enlist the support of the State Department of our representations to the E.C.A.

Mr. Hickerson said that no recommendation had been made to the E.C.A. with regard to Ireland. He turned to Mr. E.T. Wailes (Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs of the State Department) who was present at the interview, for confirmation. Mr. Wailes somewhat hesitatingly confirmed that, as far as he recollected, no advice concerning Ireland had been tendered by the State Department. At a subsequent stage during the course of conversation, the same question was addressed again by Mr. Hickerson to Mr. Wailes and the same hesitancy was noticed.

The Minister explained that unfortunately, while he was certain that this was not adverted to in Washington, the cutting out of Ireland from aid by way of grant would inevitably have political repercussions in Ireland. He explained that portion of the $300 millions given as a grant to Britain would inevitably find its way to the Six-County area, thus increasing the disparity between the economies on both sides of the border. The Minister said that he appreciated fully that the policy of the State Department was that it would not interfere in the Partition question, but that, unfortunately, the allocation of $300 millions by way of gift and $100 millions loan to Britain and the Six Counties would be compared with the offer of a $10 million loan to Ireland, so that the impression would be created that the U.S. were, in fact, intervening in favour of the continuance of Partition.

A general friendly discussion was followed regarding Partition. During the course of this discussion Mr. Hickerson said that the State Department always adopted a neutral attitude in regard to Partition and that from time to time they received many representations in regard to Partition. Both the Minister and Mr. Boland explained that while they had not come to raise the Partition question, they felt that the State Department would render a great service to Britain and Western Europe by helping to get it ended; that it precluded Ireland from playing a more important role in Western Europe; that it was a festering sore that was not compatible with the ideals of democracy; that it would continue to be a problem until solved and that it was liable to erupt at any time; that the statesmanlike policy was to solve it now.

Mr. Hickerson was generally interested but not enthusiastic - though towards the end of the interview he seemed more interested than at first.

Reverting to E.R.P., Mr. Hickerson said that he clearly saw that no matter what public explanation were given the impression would be created that the allocations made by the E.C.A. were intended to support Partition; that neither the State Department nor the E.C.A. had adverted to this, but that he saw that that construction was likely.

He asked to be kept informed of the progress of the discussion with the E.C.A. and promised to do what he could.

In the course of the interview, the case for a grant on the lines set forth in the memorandum was explained by the Minister and Mr. Boland.

IMPRESSIONS gathered by the Minister and Mr. Boland as a result of the interview were:-

1. That while Mr. Hickerson had no knowledge that the State Department had given advice to the E.C.A. in relation to Ireland, it was probable that such advice had been given. Mr. Wailes' qualified denial and hesitancy indicated this likelihood; on the other hand, if Mr. Hickerson knew that such advice was given it is unlikely that he would have asked Mr. Wailes for confirmation of his denial.
2. That Mr. Hickerson now realised that the allocation made was bound to be regarded as support of Partition by the U.S. and that it was therefore, a matter of policy upon which the State Department could advise the E.C.A., if it so chose.
3. That while predisposed to be more friendly to Britain than to Ireland, he realised that it would be an advantage if Partition were solved.

[matter omitted]

Mr. Frank Lee,² who also ranks as Minister attached to the British Embassy and is in charge of E.R.P. matters in Washington also called on the Minister. He is a friend of Mr. Pritchard's of the U.K. office in Dublin and he communicated with Mr. Boland on arrival. Mr. Lee, who was formerly Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Supply in Britain is of the newer school of diplomacy, i.e., diplomat-cum-economist. Not as polished or cultured as Sir John Balfour,³ but intelligent and a 'go-getter'.

It became clear from the conversation that Mr. Lee was in extremely close contact with Mr. Bissell,⁴ Mr. Nitze,⁵ Mr. Maffrey⁶ and Col. Bonesteel,⁷ and knew their minds fairly well. He considered that they were very able and influential in E.C.A. matters. He expressed the view that Mr. Bissell was the ablest. Mr. Lee stated that he had received a cable that morning from London with regard to the Irish visit instructing him to give any help he could. He gave his views on the personnel of E.C.A. and their individual characteristics. He did not think it at all possible that the Administrator would reverse his decision that the current quarter's allocation to Ireland should be a loan. The British were not satisfied with the amount which they had been asked to take as loan - $200 millions. They were considering taking the grant portion for the second quarter and refusing the loan - it was not yet clear whether this would be acceptable to E.C.A. or whether it would be good policy - particularly in view of the provision of the Act - which might well have determined the Irish allocation - that one-fifth of the total aid must be by way of loan.

At the dinner given by the Irish Minister (Mr. Nunan) on the 20th May, the guests included the Australian Ambassador,⁸ the Swiss Minister,⁹ the South African Minister,¹⁰ Rev. Edmund Walsh, S.J., Dean of the Catholic University, Col. Bonesteel of E.C.A., Congressman John Fogarty,¹¹ Mr. Martin, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank,¹² Mr. Hickerson, and Mr. Nitze of the State Department.

During and after the dinner, the Minister for External Affairs had long conversations with Mr. Hickerson concerning Partition in general. These conversations were initiated by Mr. Hickerson. From the tenor of the conversation it appeared, incidentally, that the discussions that had occurred earlier in the day in the State Department concerning the advisability of finding a solution of Partition had registered. There was also a discussion concerning the trend of development in Europe and the necessity for closer co-operation between Europe and the U.S.

FRIDAY, May 21st Delegation held a Conference at 10 a.m.
On May, 21st, at 11 a.m., the Irish Delegation met the Administrator and members of his staff. Mr. Hoffman was not present at the opening of the meeting when the chair was taken by Mr. Bruce, Deputy Administrator. Also present on the E.C.A. side: Mr. Wayne [Chattfield-] Taylor (Financial and Monetary Adviser), Mr. Bissell (Assistant Deputy Administrator), Mr. Maffrey (Chief of Loans Division), Mr. Wilds (Personal Assistant to Administrator).

The Minister, in his opening statement, stressed the opportunity which Ireland had of playing a useful part in E.R.P. provided suitable assistance was given; the inadequate extent of Irish dollar earnings; the consequent inability to repay a loan in dollars no matter how generous the terms that might be fixed; the unwillingness to take a loan unless it could be repaid; the serious effects of the war on the Irish agricultural economy; the further decline that would ensue from failure to get quickly abundant supplies of fertilisers, feeding stuffs, machinery etc.; the complex problems arising from the vast number of small holders and their lack of working capital; the requirement not only of adequate dollar aid, but also of State assistance to achieve optimum production of food for export in the shortest possible time; and the advantageous uses to which local Currency funds could be put. The Minister quoted figures for 1938 and 1947, in respect of the yield per acre of the main crops and also figures showing the projected expansion of agricultural production by 1951-52.¹³ Mr. McElligott quoted figures for over-all trade deficits, and for U.S. imports and exports.

Mr. Hoffman pointed out that the E.R.P. funds had not yet been appropriated. The House and Senate would insist on projects for investment of dollars, and must be satisfied that the programme would produce recovery. If the recovery produced the means of repayment then it would seem right to have loan terms. He appreciated 'the fine attitude' of refusing a loan when the means of repayment were not clearly foreseen, but both he and Mr. Bruce emphasised that if the plan was successful, and they must act on the presumption of its success, there would be free convertibility of major currencies, and this would solve our problem of repayment. Mr. Hoffman said that, knowing that full recovery would take time, particularly in the field of agriculture, it would be possible to be liberal in repayment terms.

Mr. Hoffman emphasised repeatedly that the allocations made for the present quarter were in no way indicative of the allocations for the coming and subsequent quarters; that the allocations for the next quarter had not yet been considered.

The Minister again referred to the smallness of Irish farms and the low economic level of the Irish agricultural producers. He compared [the] Irish Agricultural wage of 50/- a week with the 90/- a week paid in Britain. For real recovery the necessary supplies would have to be injected on a grant, and not a loan, basis.

In the course of the general discussion, the E.C.A. justification of the loan basis rested mainly on the arguments that sterling would be convertible after the period of aid ('if we are prepared to take that chance, you should'): that although Ireland might be currently running a deficit, her overall balance of payments might be expected to adjust itself by 1951-52; that our suggestion that the assumption of dollar repayment burdens would nullify the dollar gains or dollar savings that might result from E.R.P. could be applied to any loan transaction, whereas under the European Recovery Act one-fifth of the aid must be given by way of loan; that even if the individual Irish smallholder was not a good mark for loan obligations, the whole Irish economy would benefit from the recovery and provide a wider tax base which could bear the servicing charges for an inter-governmental loan.

The Irish delegation pointed out that even if there was a belief in the prospect of convertibility, the assumption of the loan burdens would prejudice and postpone the chances of sterling recovery to free convertibility. The serious position of the sterling area reserves was well known and they would be under great strain during the whole period of aid. It was suggested to E.C.A. that the decision that 100% of the aid to Ireland should be loan was difficult to reconcile with the treatment of other countries. The Minister mentioned that the Six Counties showed a surplus on dollar account, yet as part of the U.K. they would be getting 75% grant in the current quarter.

Mr. Maffrey asked what were our present arrangements with the sterling area, and suggested that we might continue to draw from the dollar pool for some purposes. Mr. McElligott explained the arrangements operative to 30th June 1948, and the intention, in agreement with the British that we would not make any drawings from the pool during the period of aid, in the expectation that our dollar deficit would be fully met by E.R.P. aid plus our own earnings. Our programme of imports as submitted to E.C.A. for the current quarter showed that they were all for essential purposes.

In winding up the discussion, Mr. Bruce said that there were a lot of things to consider and the information given by the Irish delegation had been most helpful. He would like to be furnished with some table or diagram indicating what would be the progressive result of injections of E.R.P. dollars for agricultural recovery on our balance of payments over the four years ahead, in other words what would be the result of the 'investment project'.

The Minister thanked Mr. Hoffman and his colleagues for their reception of the Irish delegation, and undertook to submit a memorandum stating the main points which he wished E.C.A. to consider and also to see what could be done about a diagram of the kind suggested by Mr. Bruce. It was agreed to meet again on Tuesday, 25th May.

In a private conversation after the conference had broken up Mr. Wilds gave the Minister to understand that the allocation to Ireland for the next quarter would contain a substantial grant and that a mistake had been made in the case of Ireland as far as the current quarter was concerned.

During the afternoon and evening of the 21st May, the delegation considered the result of the meeting with E.C.A. and the Minister directed the lines on which the memorandum should be prepared. A cable was sent to Dublin asking for forecasts over the four years to 1951-52 of (a) imports from U.S. and other Western Hemisphere countries of commodities directly applied towards agricultural production and of other essential commodities and (b) exports of agricultural products, showing countries of destination.

In the afternoon of the 21st May, the Minister met by appointment Mr. Harriman at the E.C.A. Building. Mr. Harriman is the E.C.A. special representative in Europe. In the course of discussion the Minister re-stated the various arguments that had already been placed before Mr. Hoffman. The only thing of note stated by Mr. Harriman was that they had not made any plans about Ireland, or thought of the personnel of the local E.C.A. Mission it was intended to send to Ireland. He stated that sometime during the year he hoped to visit Ireland.

By invitation of Mr. Frank Lee, Mr. Boland visited Mr. Lee's office and Mr. Lee showed to Mr. Boland the various despatches he had sent recently to London. One of those indicated that Mr. Lee had been informed by Mr. Bissell that he could tell his Government that the allocation for the coming quarter (i.e. July-September) for Britain would total 500 million dollars, whereof 400 million dollars would be by way of grant and 100 million dollars would be by way of loan. This proposed allocation showed an increase of 100 million dollars on the current quarter and also an increase in the ratio of grants as against loans. In the current quarter the ratio had been 300 million dollars grant and 100 million dollars loan. It was of great interest inasmuch as the E.C.A. Officials had all stated repeatedly that no allocations had yet been made in reference to the coming quarter. The despatches shown to Mr. Boland made it clear that Mr. Lee had succeeded in establishing exceptionally close contact with E.C.A. Officials.

SATURDAY, May 22nd At 10 a.m. delegation met in conference and discussed contents of memoranda to be supplied to E.C.A. It was decided that the Minister himself would draft the memorandum and that Mr. McElligott, Mr. Boland and Mr. Hogan would prepare the notes and tables to be appended to it. The work of drafting then proceeded.

On Saturday afternoon, Mr. Sweeney, the Research Assistant at the Irish desk in the State Department called on the Minister, by invitation. He is believed to be favourably disposed. His information was discouraging, holding out little hope of a decision in our favour.

He said that our case suffered from the absence of a Communist movement in Ireland and from propaganda about our tourist trade and the good living conditions in Dublin. We should have reacted more strongly and more formally when Mr. Willard Thorp informed the Senate Committee that aid to Ireland would be by way of loan. Other countries had been more active in Washington than we. We were relatively unimportant in the eyes of the State Department and the State Department would continue to have a big say in E.C.A. decisions. Our objection to loans on the ground that we could not be sure of being able to repay owing to lack of assurance of sterling convertibility did not carry us very far because the restoration of convertibility was a basic assumption of the whole E.R.P. plan.

He suggested that political pressure inside and outside Congress by Irish-American influence might prove the best course of action.

In the evening, the Minister and Mr. Boland attended a charity baseball match between the Democratic and Republican members of Congress as guests of Congressman Regan of Texas.¹⁴

SUNDAY, May 23rd. The work on the memoranda continued all day. Numerous consultations took place between members of the delegation.

Cable received from the Department of External Affairs stated that the British representative in Dublin had informed us that the allocation to Britain for the next quarter would be 400 million dollars by way of grant and 100 million dollars by way of loan.

In the evening a reception was held by Mr. Nunan at which some 50 Irish-Americans attended. These included Senator Joe O'Mahony (probable Democratic candidate for Vice-Presidency), Senator James E. Murray, ex-Senator Meade, Congressman John Fogarty. The Minister discussed the position fully with Senators O'Mahony and Murray. Senator O'Mahony promised to take up the matter and asked the Minister to let him have a copy of the memorandum which was being handed to E.C.A.

MONDAY, May 24th. The Minister, accompanied by Mr. Nunan called on the President at 11 a.m. The conversation was general. The question of the Irish relations with E.C.A. was not discussed at the interview. Incidentally, the President's Secretary, Mr. Matt Connelly,¹⁵ is related to the Minister.

Subsequently, the State Department entertained the Irish delegation to lunch at Blair House. The hosts were Mr. Norman Armour and Mr. Willard Thorp, Under Secretaries of State, and officials of the State Department present included Messrs. Hickerson, Nitze, Wailes and Fales.¹⁶ Mr. McCabe, President of the Federal Reserve Bank, and Mr. Wayne Taylor of E.C.A. were also present. In the course of conversation, Mr. Hickerson stated with obvious intention and emphasis: 'You ought to take a chance on the loan - we want you in'.

In the afternoon of the 24th, the Minister and Mr. Boland had an interview with Mr. Willard Thorp, Under Secretary of State, who was accompanied by Mr. Paul Nitze, a financial adviser in the State Department. Mr. Knapp of the State Department (International Trade Division) was also present. The Minister explained our point of view on the loan-grant issue as before. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Knapp repeated the familiar argument that eventual convertibility was a basic assumption of E.R.P. Mr. Nitze said the State Department had not felt happy about the Brown Book figures for Ireland, and he admitted that the argument that 'recovery goods' by helping to increase production, would create the means of repayability, did not apply to the bulk of Ireland's scheduled imports which consisted of current consumption goods. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Knapp said the State Department had proceeded on the assumption that Ireland would not draw dollars from the sterling area pool once E.R.P. came into operation. A very full discussion took place as to all the issues involved. Both the Minister and Mr. Boland felt satisfied that the case made by them was sympathetically understood. During the course of the discussion references were again made to the fact that Ireland could draw from the sterling area pool until the 30th June. Casual references were also made during the course of discussions to sterling devaluation. Earlier at the luncheon both Mr. Bissell and Col. Bonesteel referred specifically to the advisability and likelihood of the devaluation of sterling.

In the evening, the Minister and Mr. Boland attended a cocktail party given by Admiral and Mrs. Wright, at which a number of friends of Mr. Garrett were present. These included Mr. and Mrs. Foley (Assistant Secretary of the Treasury), Representative Andrews (Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the House) and Mr. and Mrs. Garnett, Mrs. Forrestal, wife of Secretary of State for War, and numerous others.

Mr. Garnett told the Minister that he hoped to be appointed as E.C.A. Administrator in Ireland and that he had applied for the post. Otherwise nothing of importance was discussed.

TUESDAY, 25th May. The Irish delegation again met representatives of E.C.A. headed by Mr. Bruce, Deputy Administrator, who had with him Mr. Wayne Taylor, Mr. Wood and Mr. Wilds.

Mr. Bruce said that the Irish memorandum was most informative and interesting. He enquired as to the diagram. Mr. Hogan handed in and explained a coloured diagram illustrating in vertical columns over the 4 years 1948-49 to 1951-52, inclusive, the dollar value of (a) projected imports of agricultural requisites from the U.S. and other W.H., and (b) the projected exports of agricultural goods to the U.K., other participating countries and the Dollar area. While this diagram showed quite clearly the effect of E.R.P. in enabling Ireland to expand quickly the supply of food to participating countries, Mr. Bruce said he was anxious to have a picture of our total balance of payments on current account, projected over the four years. Admittedly this required assumptions and guesses, but we were (he said) in the best position to guess. He made it clear that whether future aid was to be loan or grant, or part loan and part grant, it was important for the U.S. to know what return would flow from the injection of dollar aid and this could be seen realistically only through the projected balance of payments. He accepted the Minister's argument in relation to the Irish smallholders, but that did not dispose of the question of a loan. The Minister said he would have a projected Balance of Payments diagram sent to Mr. Bruce as soon as possible.

It was pointed out to E.C.A. that Ireland, in common with other participating countries, had the fundamental problem of a dollar deficit. It was not only a question of importing goods directly required for agricultural recovery. There was also a large range of essential consumer goods which Ireland could not finance from her dollar earnings. This had been fully explained in the Irish memorandum. These goods went into consumption and for the most part created no means of repayment of a loan obligation; yet to cut off these goods would have very damaging effects on the Irish economy.

Mr. Wayne Taylor said he had been considering our objections to assuming liability for dollar repayment. How would we feel about a dollar loan which would be repayable in sterling which the U.S. could if she wished, use for some future purpose in transactions with the British? Mr. McElligott indicated that we would not like any such triangular arrangement - repayment in Irish currency would be the proper method, although, of course, under existing arrangements Irish currency was freely inter-changeable with sterling. Mr. Taylor said he had not clarified his own mind on the question whether such a solution would be feasible, but he would like to have the Irish view on the general question of such a loan.

Mr. McElligott said that without prejudice to the case for total grant, which would obviously solve all the difficulties he considered that a loan should be for a long term, carry a low interest rate, and include some safeguard for a borrower against devaluation. He described the present position of the Irish public debt, recent terms of State borrowing, and the pending burdens of redemptions, which added to anxiety in relation to assuming any large external obligations. The objection to borrowing for consumption goods was also stressed.

Mr. Wood said that the Act provided for repayment of loans in dollars and this seemed to exclude the expedient suggested by Mr. Taylor as regards repayment in sterling or Irish currency. Mr. Taylor said he was to some extent thinking aloud in making these suggestions but he felt that Mr. Wood's difficulty was not insurmountable. Mr. Wilds explained in detail the rigidity of the financial provisions in the Act which, both as regards the present preliminary operations and the future allocations of aid over the four year period, made it essential that a proportion of the aid given must be by way of loan.

After further discussion of the special needs of Ireland, her dollar deficit, and her inability to service a loan, Mr. Bruce said that the allocation for the current quarter could not be changed, but that the decision in that regard did not in any way govern allocations in respect of future periods. In reply to the Minister's query, he said that we were free to state that publicly. The Minister said that he would have to consult his Cabinet on the general question of taking a loan. It was a point of fundamental importance in relation to Ireland's participation in the whole Recovery Plan.

After mutual expressions of goodwill, the meeting terminated.

In the afternoon of the 25th May, Messrs. McElligott and Hogan interviewed Mr. Wayne Taylor.

Mr. McElligott explained that, without any commitment on our part that we intended to take a loan, we wished to have some more detailed information as to terms and procedure. Mr. Taylor said he would give what information he could; although no loans under E.R.P. had yet been finalised, certain decisions in principle had been reached and the procedure of Import-Export Bank Loans would broadly be followed.

As to the interest rate, the National Advisory Council and the Treasury had made recommendations to the Administrator. The principle was that the rate on an E.R.P. loan should be the average of the cost of long term money to the U.S. Treasury and the lending rate of the International Bank. This, at present, would give a rate of 3%.

The interest payments would accrue as from the date the loan money was drawn. It was intended that at the end of each period, it might be a month, or a quarter, or even longer, all loan issues within the period would be consolidated into one loan for the purpose of redemption. Pending consolidation a flat rate of 2? % would be charged.

As regards the period of the loan, the National Advisory Council had recommended 30 years, but the Administrator preferred to leave it open to have a shorter or longer term in individual cases, depending on the nature and the purpose of the product which was being financed. The instalments would not begin until at least 4 years after the date of consolidation, and they would not be equal instalments throughout the term but would be at a progressively increasing rate towards maturity. Mr. Taylor admitted that in our case too short a term would present difficulties, and he indicated that it should not be less than 30 years and might be longer.

[matter omitted]

The Minister left Washington on the night train for New York. Before leaving he wrote to Mr. Hickerson (copy of letter herewith).¹⁷ He also wrote to Senator O'Mahony as requested.

WEDNESDAY 26th May
Washington
On Wednesday, 26th May, the Irish delegation (officials only) had a discussion with Messrs. Wailes, Fales and Beale of the State Department regarding the draft Bi-lateral Agreement. At the outset, Mr. Boland made it clear that the Minister for External Affairs intended to report to the Irish Cabinet the result of his discussions with E.C.A. and that no question of negotiating the agreement could arise until the Irish Cabinet had decided on its future action. The State Department representatives who had privately expressed the hope that Ireland could be the first to sign a Bi-lateral Agreement were visibly disappointed at this statement but agreed to discuss the document informally and provisionally with a view to reaching understanding on any points the Irish delegates might wish to raise. Mr. Boland said there was little of substance, merely drafting points in the main. He referred to the proposed meeting in Paris on 3rd June and inquired whether the Americans intended to discuss the bilateral agreement with the participating countries as a whole on that occasion. Mr. Fales replied that nothing had occurred to change the view that each bilateral agreement should be separately negotiated in Washington.

[matter omitted]

Mr. Fales and Mr. Beale took notes of the points that had been raised. It was agreed that any outstanding points would be mentioned again when the agreement would be under final negotiation. Mr. Fales expressed some concern at possible delay in securing Dáil ratification before the final date. Mr. Boland assured him that the urgency of the matter would be borne in mind.

[matter omitted]

NEW YORK
On the 26th May the Minister had a long interview in New York with the Mayor of New York, Mr. William O'Dwyer, with whom he discussed the whole position in relation to the loan-grant issue. As a result of discussion Mr. O'Dwyer rang Mr. Tom Clarke in Washington, who is Attorney General and a member of the Government. Mr. Clarke is the member of the Government who looks after interests of the Democratic Party in the Government. He had a lengthy conversation with him on the phone in the course of which he pointed out that the Irish American population in New York were very indignant at the decision of the Administration to cut Ireland out of aid by way of grant. He pointed out that the Democratic Party was already in a weak position and that they could not afford to antagonise any section of voters much less as important a section as the Irish-American elements. He pointed out that the decision of the E.C.A. would inevitably be construed as assistance in support of Partition. Mr. Clarke agreed with the views put forward by the Mayor and undertook to get busy on the matter at once. The Mayor placed a car at the disposal of the Minister during his stay in New York.

The Minister met the Editors of the four principal Irish-American papers and the leaders of the various Irish-American Societies. Among those met by the Minister were Mr. Con Noonan, Mr. Charles C. Rice, Major Kinkaid, Mr. Forde, 'Irish World', Mr. McDermot, 'Gaelic American', Charles Connolly 'The Echo', Miss O'Connor, 'The Irish Advocate', Mr. Seán Keating, Mr. Paul O'Dwyer, Mr. Jim Comerford, Mr. Dick Dalton, Mr. Joe McLoughlin, Prof. James O'Brien. He explained to them generally the position in relation to the loan-grant issue.

The Minister also met Ambassador Frank P. Corrigan, to whom he is related, and who ranks as second senior Ambassador in the American diplomatic service. Mr. Corrigan, who is a friend of President Truman and Mr. Marshall, promised to use any influence he could in the State Department to ensure that a proper view would be taken of Ireland's case.

[matter omitted]