'Special Secret Memorandum to Government' by Seán MacBride

• Partition;
• Trade and general publicity abroad.

The relationship of these two matters, for implementation purposes, will become apparent in the course of the memorandum.

Yet, while we have 32,171 civil servants, there is not one of them who is charged with any function in relation to Partition. The expenditure on State services is over £70 millions yet not one penny is devoted to dealing with this vital problem. Beyond sabre rattling speeches and occasional protests there has been no carefully thought-out policy pursued by the Governments in relation to Partition; the approach has been more of a hit or miss nature and has often been motivated with an eye to internal politics rather than with a view to the undoing of Partition.

While we have much better means and organisation available to us for publicity of this nature, we have, so far, taken no steps to counteract this propaganda, as there is no machinery within our present Civil Service structure to deal with such matters.

• Diplomatic action in the U.S. to secure the co-operation of American public opinion and if possible, unofficial intervention of the U.S. Government.
• Diplomatic action in Australia, New Zealand and Canada to secure co-operation and, if possible, intervention.
• Co-operation of British Government for strategic and/or political reasons.
• Friendly co-operation of certain Western European countries to secure their support.

To a large extent I believe that in recent months I have been able already to secure a good deal of the co-operation necessary to secure the achievement of some of these objectives. A considerable part of my energies and the diplomatic action at the disposal of my Department has, however, had to be concentrated on the events connected with the passage of the Republic of Ireland Act.

Given the necessary diplomatic opportunities, coupled with the necessary machinery, I believe that a situation can be created, wherein a discussion on Partition, through the medium of some intermediaries with a view to finding a solution, can be forced. This may be sheer optimism on my part, but whether it is or not, it appears to me to be essential to try it.

Broadly, the steps that I visualise as necessary are::-

• The raising of the status of our Legation in Washington to that of an Embassy and the appointment as our Ambassador of an outstanding personality, whose function, apart from ordinary diplomatic work, will be to enlist sympathy and co-operation of the American public and Government.
• The appointment of a Press Attaché at Washington or New York.
• The appointment of a Counsellor attached to the High Commissioner's office in London, whose function would be to influence publicity in the British press.
• The preparation, publication and distribution of pamphlets, literature and articles. Apart from counteracting the outflow of publicity emanating from the Six County Government, three separate and distinct lines of publicity will be required:
  1. Publicity for use in Britain to enlist (not antagonise) British public opinion.
  2. Publicity in U.S. and elsewhere abroad to assist in the formation of a public opinion.
  3. Publicity in the Six Counties to counteract the spreading of antagonism and misconception that generally exist in the minds of some sections of the Partitionist supporters.
• The procuring of basic economic intelligence from within the Six Counties. I have far more political and economic intelligence available to me from every capital in Europe than I have from Belfast. Apart from basic economic information, it is essential that I should have available to me political intelligence as to the various trends within the Unionist Party. From casual reports that I receive through non-Departmental channels, it appears that the Government supporters are far from being a happy family. Regular reliable information on these matters would be invaluable in the months to come.

  Members of the Government suggested the possibility of opening a trade office in Belfast and I considered this proposal carefully, but rejected it. I felt that such an office would inevitably become a storm centre and that it would aggravate rather than help; constant difficulties would arise in relation to the office in such matters as national anthems, toasts, flags, etc. Furthermore, our own people would naturally turn to it for a lead at times of political excitement.

  Instead, I think it is essential to have a responsible representative whose function it would be to supply economic and political intelligence. Such a representative would have to be completely unknown, both to the Six County Government and to our own people. He should, of course, refrain from engaging in anything even bordering on illegality.

  Even if this proposal is approved of it might be very difficult to find a suitable person.

• Contacting and utilising Irish people in Britain holding positions of influence.

  The vast Irish population in Britain is not of much value, save at election times, in constituencies where they may hold a determining vote. The use of Irish votes in British politics is fraught with difficulties and dangers; nor do I think that the holding of public meetings, save for the purpose of keeping our own people together, and of publicity, is of any real value.

  The real potential value of the Irish population in Britain lies in a small number of Irish people who hold key positions in the labour and trade union movements and in other political organisations, as well as in the newspaper world. This potential at present is unused completely, or its efforts are not directed.

  It is necessary, therefore, to make contact, organise and direct this potential force into channels which will co-ordinate with the general policy. At least one officer, who either could be attached to the High Commissioner's office, or directly to the Department, would be required for this purpose.

• A very small brains trust, consisting of about three officers, would be required in the Department to direct, co-ordinate and implement the activities enumerated at (d), (e) and (f) above. Their function will be to compile the material for propaganda and publicity, to plan for the distribution and publication of the publicity, to arrange for the supply of publicity material through our existing diplomatic channels and generally co-relate the work of this section with our existing diplomatic organisation.

As regards a Press Attaché in London; we have suffered heavily already by not having one before. Hardly a week passes without my feeling the lack of someone to look after publicity and to counteract hostile propaganda.

Both in regard to Washington and the Press Attaché in London, it will be a completely false economy to reject it on the ground of additional cost. Our failure to provide these will involve us in far greater indirect financial losses.

• To seek outlets for our goods and also to seek sources of goods in which we are in short supply. Each issue should contain a complete list (which would be compiled by Industry & Commerce) of any products we have for export.
• To promote tourist traffic by containing articles and photographs likely to attract visitors; the material could be prepared in conjunction with the Tourist Association.
• Promote interest in Ireland by features on cultural topics, such as literature, art and the theatre.

Apart from free distribution through our Missions abroad, travel agencies, air lines, etc., I think that it might be possible to arrange for the sale of such a bulletin through the book stalls and newsagents in Britain and in the U.S. as well as through business firms in Ireland who do an export business. It also should be possible to secure advertising from hotels, manufacturers and transport companies. It is not anticipated, however, that the revenue obtainable would defray the cost of publication, but it would make some contribution towards it.

Some of the staff required probably could be obtained from other Departments. In some cases it might be necessary to go outside the Civil Service to find people of suitable calibre.

As already pointed out the cost of these proposals is negligible, having regard to the importance of the work, and may save, in the long run, vast sums to the Exchequer. The development of our foreign trade and the solution of Partition are matters of prime importance which cannot be measured in terms of money.