Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
(Confidential)

The Egyptian Ambassador, upon whom I paid my routine call this morning, was naturally very full of the present difficulties between Britain and Egypt about the revision of the Treaty of 1936 and the withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian territory.

The Ambassador, who is obviously a man of considerable intelligence and appeared very well disposed to Ireland, as most of his fellow-countrymen are, gave me an account of the whole business which served to underline the similarities between the Egyptian case and our case for the ending of partition. In each case, the British are using very much the same type of arguments - their defence responsibilities to the Western World, the right to 'self determination' of the population of the British-occupied territory (the Sudan in the case of Egypt and the Six Counties in the case of Ireland); the fact that they cannot be expected to exert 'coercion' on their friends, etc. etc. The Ambassador said that a favourite argument with the British was that there was no reason why Egypt should object to British troops in the Canal Zone because Britain, herself, was providing bases for American Air Force units in Britain. He commented on the obtuseness of mind which prevented the British from seeing that what was possible in the one case was not possible - for historical reasons - in the other. I assured him that every Irishman would know precisely what he meant.

He said that another argument the British use was that they had obligations to Australia and New Zealand and that neither of these countries would be prepared to send troops to Egypt in case of need unless there were British troops on the ground. He said the line he was taking in reply to this was that it was the duty of the British to tell the Australian and New Zealand Governments that positions which were merely survivals from the crude imperialism of the past were simply no longer tenable in the light of modern day conditions and that any policy based on their continuance in being was bound to fail in the end.

The Ambassador, who seemed to be quite well informed about our Partition problem, undertook to send me documentary material explaining precisely the basis of Egypt's policy with regard to the Sudan. I promised to send him material about Partition. He told me that his Foreign Minister was coming to London on the 27th November and he asked whether I would be available for an intimate lunch with the two of them. I told him that nothing would give me greater pleasure.