Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
(Confidential)

Dear Seán,
The British reply to our representations about the Dutch troops, though not wholly unexpected, was none the less a great disappointment. It would, of course, have been a great gain if we could have got the arrangements postponed or cancelled. I gather, however, that when our representations got to the high policy level here, the reaction against them was quite flat and definite. The considerations of principle which Gordon Walker mentioned when I sent to see him carried the day. The fact is that the Six Counties are a vital position in the strategy of British Atlantic defence. That is one of the chief reasons why Britain holds on to them so tenaciously at some political cost to herself. The feeling that, if our representations were accepted, a precedent would be created which would tie the hands of the British Government as regards the military use of the Six Counties in future, was the chief factor in the rejection of our proposals.

Disappointing as the result is, there are certain things on the credit side of the ledger. The vigour of the national reaction was impressive. I don't imagine other Governments will be in a hurry to follow the Dutch example. The considerable publicity given to the affair here, in the Netherlands, and in other countries, must help to keep Partition in the forefront of people's minds. No one can say that the Government's efforts on the diplomatic plane lacked energy, and we were right, I think, not merely to protest, but to ask that the arrangements made should be cancelled.

What is rather disturbing is the thought of the future. Given the geographical position of the Six Counties, it seems to me only too likely that as time goes on, increased use will be made of them in connexion with joint exercises, manoeuvres, training courses, etc. organised by the Defence Committee of N.A.T.O. Although the Dutch case will certainly act to some extent as a deterrent, the possibility of similar arrangements being made in future cannot be ignored and, of course, if war broke out, the stationing of large numbers of American and other troops in the area would become at once an immediate likelihood. We must be ready to cope with these developments when they arise.

In this connexion, I cannot help feeling that the lines which our national reaction followed in the Dutch case, would hardly be suitable for general application. If, for example, American troops came to the Six Counties, talk of boycotting American goods might have very harmful results nationally. Perhaps the case would not be so difficult if it were, say, the Canadians or the French; but even then would we not be simply playing the game of our enemies, if we allowed ourselves to become embroiled with the various countries of N.A.T.O., one by one, by reason of a dispute which really exists only between ourselves and Britain. What we want, it seems to me, is some set policy for dealing with this problem in future which while focussing and steadying our own public opinion, would avoid bringing us into too sharp conflict with countries other than Britain with which we are otherwise on good terms.

It might help in this direction if the Minister would consider making a statement on the resumption of the Dáil, in reply to a Parliamentary question, describing our action in the Dutch case and the reasons for it: pointing out the undesirability of allowing the use by Britain of the Six County area for N.A.T.O. purposes to become a bone of contention between ourselves and countries with which we have no quarrel; and asking the Dáil to agree to a carefully worded resolution, setting out our claim to national unity and our objections to the use of any part of our territory by Britain for her own purposes, on the understanding that the text of this resolution, expressing the national position, would be communicated by the Minister for External Affairs to any foreign government whose troops Britain might invite to the Six Counties in future. I feel something of this kind is worth considering as a means of minimising possible frictions between ourselves and countries other than Britain, while at the same time keeping our moral claim to our national unity intact.