Confidential report from John J. Hearne to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
'Conversation with Secretary Matthews'
(Secret) (3/7/1) (Copy)

I called on Secretary Matthews at his request at the Pentagon yesterday afternoon. Mr. Matthews desired me to hear from him the reasons why President Truman had offered him the post of Ambassador to Ireland and his own reasons for accepting it.

The Navy Secretary informed me that he had had a two-hour conversation with President Truman on Tuesday the 19th June. In the course of the conversation they discussed the general international situation, the internal political situation in the United States, and so on. The chief topic of their conversation, however, was Mr. Truman’s offer of the Dublin post to Mr. Matthews. The President told Mr. Matthews that he wished to put no pressure whatever upon him to accept the post and asked him to feel absolutely free to accept or not to accept it having in mind always ‘what is best with Frank Matthews’. The President said that he would have no desire in the matter which would differ from Mr. Matthews’ own. The President gave two reasons for his having offered the Dublin appointment to the Navy Secretary: (1) because he knew that that was the post abroad which Mr. Matthews had always ambitioned; (2) because of the importance which the President attaches to that particular assignment at the present time. The President said that in his view the importance of the American Embassy in Dublin was only less than that of the American Embassy in London.

Mr. Matthews, in reply to the President’s remarks, thanked him for having twice offered him the Dublin assignment and said that, notwithstanding his wish to stay a little longer with the Navy, he would now very gladly accept the post. The fact that he was going from the Secretaryship of the Navy to the post of Ambassador in Dublin would emphasise to the Irish Government the importance which the President attached to the American Embassy in Ireland at the present time.

The President had added that he had understood that the Irish Government wanted somebody to head the United States Embassy in Dublin who was a close friend of his own; and he had no closer friend than Frank Matthews. No one could interpret the President’s mind to the President and the Government of Ireland more faithfully.

Mr. Matthews went on to say that the President’s main desire with regard to Ireland at the present time was to bring her back into her appropriate and normal relationship with the other Nations of Western Europe. Mr. Matthews put the point more specifically as he turned to me and said eagerly, ‘We want you in the Atlantic Pact. How am I to go about that?’

I asked Mr. Matthews whether he had seen the report in the New York Times the day before (19th June) of the Taoiseach’s first press conference since he became head of the new Irish Government.¹ Mr. Matthews said he had not seen it. I summarised the interview mentioning the Taoiseach’s references to the British Commonwealth, the likely attitude of our people in the event of another World War and the national policy with regard to joining the Atlantic Pact.

I asked Mr. Matthews whether he had seen our White Paper containing the correspondence on the subject of our entry into NATO.² He said he had not seen it. (Mr. Brennan informs me that copies were sent to all members of the Administration at the time the White Paper was issued and that the Navy Secretary must have forgotten he had received a copy.) I promised to send him a copy of the White Paper that evening and that was done.

I said that if the partition problem were out of the way that would be the longest step forward that could be taken towards bringing about the realisation of the President’s desire to restore Ireland to an appropriate and normal relationship with her neighbours of the Atlantic community. I recalled President Truman’s conversation with Mr. MacBride at the White House on Good Friday. Mr. Truman had, I said, made it clear to Mr. MacBride that although he could not directly intervene, nevertheless he would be very happy indeed to see the unity of Ireland restored and hoped that that would be done to the satisfaction of all concerned. Mr. MacBride had regarded that as the official Department of State attitude but he realised at the same time the value of the good wishes of the President of the United States for a settlement of the problem.

Mr. Matthews asked me whether if unity were restored Ireland would join the Pact. I said that the answer to that question had been given in very precise language both by Mr. Costello when he was Prime Minister and by Mr. de Valera when Leader of the Opposition. The answer was that no Irish Government would barter sovereignty for unity; that is they could not say before unity was restored what decision a united Irish Nation would make with regard to entering or not entering any particular Pact or Treaty. The furthest they had gone was to say that when unity was restored a national Government or Parliament would decide the course to be taken.

‘What is your personal opinion if partition were out of the way tomorrow? Would your people decide to join the Atlantic Pact?’

‘My personal opinion is that if partition were out of the way our people would by a great majority decide to enter the Atlantic Pact. If I am right in that then the re-union of Ireland is the direct route and the quickest route to President Truman’s goal and the realisation of his hope. What a splendid thing it would be if the very beginning of your mission to Ireland should synchronise with a new approach to the solution of the partition problem in the context both of our relations with Britain and that of our relations with other countries of the Atlantic community. We never were vouchsafed even a discussion with the NATO Governments on the subject of unity in the context of the Pact. When we raised the matter we were brushed aside and told that the question of unity had no relevance in the matter of our joining or not joining the Atlantic Treaty.’

Mr. Matthews asked me to state briefly the reasons for our not joining the Pact. I went over familiar ground, why partition was not an obstacle to our joining the League of Nations, why it was not an obstacle to our seeking membership of the United Nations and why it is an obstacle to our joining a military alliance, one of the objectives of which is to protect the independence and the territorial integrity of free Nations. I referred to Article IV of the Atlantic Pact and our interpretation of it. This ground is as familiar to the Navy Secretary as it is to ourselves. On a previous occasion when I had summarised our position in regard to the Pact (we have discussed it many times) he said ‘I think you are right’, but in the conversation now recorded he simply said ‘Your attitude is clear and logical’.

I asked Mr. Matthews whether he was aware of Ambassador Garrett’s³ report to the Department of State requesting the United States to take the initiative with a view to removing the border. He said that he was aware of that report.

In the course of this part of the conversation I referred to the Taoiseach’s statement to his press conference that the new Government would push national defence preparations and expand local and civil defence forces. Mr. Matthews said that he would study Mr. de Valera’s interview very carefully and that he was glad that the new Government would push defence preparations. He said that the United States would give us arms. I understood this to mean that we would receive arms from the United States if and when we joined the Atlantic Treaty. ‘What about bases’, Secretary Matthews said, at this stage. Again I understood this to mean to be a question arising out of our membership of the Pact. I replied that if we were in the Pact the question of our role would be one for discussion. I made it clear to Mr. Matthews that I had no instructions on these matters and that I was answering his questions as best I could in a purely personal way.

The Navy Secretary expressed great interest in the appointment of Mr. Aiken as Minister for External Affairs. He asked me whether it had some special significance. I said that I thought that it had. I remarked that Mr. Aiken more than any other member of Mr. de Valera’s Cabinet represented Mr. de Valera’s own mind and attitude on our international problems and relations.

I asked Mr. Matthews how the United States Government felt about the present international situation. He replied that the Iran affair was a new disturbing element in the situation which might result in general war any day at all.⁴ It was a new danger spot and there were already too many danger spots which might flame up at any moment. He went on to say that the great assurance which the American Government had of American security was their now fantastic preponderance in the matter of atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. ‘The stockpile,’ he said, ‘of these armaments has increased unbelievably in the past twelve months’. I said ‘I hope you will never have to use them’. ‘The fact that we have them’, he replied, ‘in such preponderance is some assurance that we will not have to use them. But I hope that if the necessity arises we will not hesitate to use them’.

Mr. Matthews’ plans are as follows:-

When your agrément to accept Mr. Matthews as Ambassador is received he will resign at once from his post as Secretary of the Navy. He will go to his home in Omaha, Nebraska, a few days later to attend to his private affairs and he will spend many weeks there. He told President Truman that he would be ready to take up duty in Dublin by the 1st September.