Memorandum by Frank Aiken

After the conclusion of the Coal Talks yesterday I saw Mr. Gordon Walker, Minister for Commonwealth Relations. Mr. Boland had requested the interview.¹

I opened by saying that I wanted to let him know that our attitude in the coming war, if it came, would be the same as in the last war; that we would not allow our country to be used as a base for attack against England. I pointed out that Mr. de Valera had stated this would be our policy in 1935 and that we had kept strictly to it during the war, even though it had been very embarrassing for us politically. We bitterly regretted the necessity of having to deal severely with those attacking England during that time for we agreed with their objective although we disagreed with their means. Having (had) stated our policy well ahead of time when it had passed almost unnoticed, we had gradually educated the great majority of our people to accept the position that we would not join forces with Britain’s enemies to end Partition.

I said the policy of our Government was to build up and equip our armed forces to a point where we could rapidly expand in case of war to defend ourselves against attack. In the last war I had believed, following the German seizure of France, that two acute moments of danger would arrive; (1) that fearing a direct assault on England the Germans might make an early attempt to seize Ireland to cut British communication, (2) as a last desperate throw. In the next war we could not rely on the Russians repeating the German mistake of getting down on the Channel if they overran Europe. Assuming the worst that nothing would be done about Partition, I wanted his help to get arms so that we could defend ourselves.

He asked me whether we had applied for arms and said that naturally the NATO countries were given priority.

I said I believed we had an application in. We would strongly urge we be given the right to purchase a reasonable amount of modern equipment so that we could train the army and build up its morale, thus making recruitment more attractive and facilitating rapid expansion. It would be foolish for Britain and the United States to leave a vacuum in Ireland when it could be a well-trained Irish Army. I had been surprised that neither side had lifted a division until the British attack on the Rhine. I felt sure the Germans would have attacked Ireland by several airborne divisions immediately after Dunkirk if Hitler had not calculated upon peace with England after the fall of France. The Russians must have spent the last five years in studying Hitler’s mistakes. If they came our way we could not guarantee to wipe them out, but we could slow them down very effectively provided our men were trained and reasonably equipped.

I wanted to warn him also that the NATO powers should not calculate on being able to occupy Ireland as a precautionary measure against a Russian attack. Any such attempt would be resisted by us with all our strength and they would be wise to discount any hopes they might have or any information they might get to the contrary.

I wanted to admit, of course, that there might be a greater number of our people wanting to fight the Russians than the Germans. But they would still be a negligible proportion and could not change our decision. The great majority had been strongly opposed to the Nazi system, but even so they remained determined to the end not to fight on Britain’s side unless attacked. There would be, of course, in the next war a junction of forces in Ireland, north and south, between Communists and the new IRA. We would be able to handle the situation on our side even though it would create some difficulties for us.

I urged Mr. Gordon Walker to get some member of the British Government to make a public statement to the effect that it was a British interest that Partition should come to an end. He interjected that a somewhat similar statement had already been made. I said that though I had been following the British Ministers’ statements very carefully, all I saw was where Mr. Attlee and others had said that they would like to see Partition coming to an end. Such a statement was of no use and in the last analysis it did not matter whether British Ministers were personally in favour of the unity of Ireland, so long as they recognised and openly stated that it was a British interest. Mr. Gordon Walker then said that he was doubtful as to the wisdom of a member of the Labour Government making such a declaration, as it might draw Tory opposition, and it would not be in Irish interests that the ending of Partition should become an acute controversial political issue in England. I agreed that we did not want it to become a question of party politics in Britain, but that I felt that if the time were properly chosen the statement could be made without exciting any particular notice, but that once it was made, even in the quietest way, it would change the whole outlook on the Partition question in both parts of Ireland and in England. Mr. Gordon Walker promised me that he would speak to the Prime Minister on the question.