Memorandum by Con Cremin of a meeting
between Frank Aiken and Douglas MacArthur
(Secret)

1. The Minister was anxious to have a word with a member of the American staff of SHAPE¹ with a view to urging in that quarter the desirability of our being able to obtain arms from the USA. I accordingly arranged for Mr. Douglas MacArthur,² whom I have known for years and who is political adviser to General Eisenhower, to come to see the Minister this afternoon.

2. The Minister explained to Mr. MacArthur the policy of the Government in the matter of the defence of our territory and the Government’s desire to this end to increase the armed forces, add to and improve their equipment, and provide them with intensive training in modern weapons. He recalled that during the last war we had a standing force of about 60,000 men and local defence forces of about 250,000. He said that he would like to see every soldier in the forces a potential NCO so as to permit rapid expansion in a crisis, and he mentioned that we have an excellent corps of officers and an efficient system of training: the American and British military authorities would be able to confirm this. There is, however, a difficulty in regard to equipment which reacts not only directly on our military strength but is detrimental to the morale of the troops, who have not the satisfaction of knowing that they are being trained to handle the most modern weapons.

3. The Minister went on to say that although we are not in NATO our defensive strength is nevertheless a matter of importance to everyone interested in the defence of Western Europe and in particular to the USA. An Ireland inadequately armed and defended by her own men is a serious vacuum in the defence structure of the West. The USA, he thought, admits this fact and should therefore be prepared to enable us to obtain supplies of modern arms. In 1935 the Taoiseach, Mr. de Valera, had stated in public that we would not allow our country to be used as a base of attack against Britain. There was a grave danger in the early thirties that people might feel that if war came we should take advantage of Britain’s difficulty to end Partition. Between 1935 and 1939, however, the policy enunciated by Mr. de Valera in 1935 came to be accepted and the result was that although a number of people objected to neutrality and it was necessary to imprison 600 to 700 men who wanted action against Britain, the Government was able to persuade the vast majority to adhere to the policy of neutrality and implemented fully the undertaking given by the Taoiseach in 1935, a fact which is well known to both the British and the American military authorities. There was always the risk in the last war, particularly in 1940 and again in ‘43-44, that the Germans would have invaded Ireland so as the more effectively to cut British communications. The Government had taken steps to ensure that we were in a state of preparedness, although many people had contended before the war that it was foolish to spend money on arms and equipment as the Germans could never reach us. The Minister was always surprised that the Germans did not in fact carry out an airlift of a division. This could have been supplied by over- and under-water support which could not have been stopped effectively. Some people were again saying nowadays that there was no point in spending money on arms and equipment, and many people were inclined to conclude that as Germany did not take this step Russia would be unlikely to do so in the next war. This, however, would be to ignore both the differences between the Russian and the German views as to the possibility of reaching a compromise with Britain and the fact that the Russians will undoubtedly have learned to avoid such mistakes as the Germans made. The present Government had decided to face its responsibilities in this matter and to ensure the maximum degree of preparation in the shortest possible time. There could on the other hand be no doubt that a country would never be so well defended as by its own people and it would take many divisions to do the job which we could do ourselves if we had the material: if, for instance, we acted as Denmark did in 1938 and decided to do nothing about defence, the defence of Ireland would require costly efforts by others.

4. For all these reasons, the Minister said, he would like to impress on the American authorities the great desirability of our being able to secure a supply of arms and equipment. While realising that the NATO countries naturally have a priority in receiving arms, he felt that the importance of our receiving supplies should not be underestimated. It is most important that we should be able to procure at least minimum quantities for training purposes.

5. Mr. MacArthur told the Minister that this particular problem was not quite new to him. He was aware of the reasons why we did not feel able to enter NATO and was familiar with the substance of certain talks on the subject of the supply of armaments which had taken place with Mr. George Garrett about a year ago. The position at the moment was that there is an insufficient quantity of arms available for the NATO countries, and according to information recently received from Mr. Charles Wilson, head of the Office of Defence Mobilisation, it is unlikely that they will be coming forth in great volume until next year. Then the volume of production will be tremendous. The NATO countries have of course, Mr. MacArthur went on, a first priority on available supplies. When, however, he was on the European Desk in the State Department (up to some months ago) and had to deal with this question of the supply of arms to European non-NATO countries, he took the line that they should be served as ‘when the Soviet balloon goes up’ they are bound to constitute a support for NATO. This applied particularly to Switzerland and Sweden. Ireland was generally in a similar position but it was only fair to say, Mr. MacArthur added, that in certain quarters some resentment was felt about our position as distinct from that of Sweden and Switzerland. This resentment was due to the feeling that Ireland, although from every aspect a member of the Atlantic community, was nevertheless not within the Atlantic organisation.

6. Mr. MacArthur seemed impressed by, and readily acknowledged the force of the Minister’s arguments. He shared his view that the possibility of a Russian airlift to Ireland would be far from excluded and fully agreed that it would be very undesirable to have Ireland as a defence vacuum on the flank of Europe. He seemed to be personally of the opinion that the request made by the Minister should be sympathetically examined, but he said that he thought that in the event of arms being made available it would be on the understanding that there would be some kind of co-ordination or exchange of views. The Minister had, he declared, pointed out one aspect of the question to which he (Mr. MacArthur) thought little or no attention had so far been paid in Washington, namely the desirability of ensuring a minimum supply of modern arms sufficient to enable the forces to become familiar with them and their use: it would obviously be a waste of valuable time if the men called upon to use the arms could not become familiar with them until they were available in the quantity required for actual use. He entirely agreed with the Minister that the most effective way to defend a country is by means of its own people, and he acknowledged that a local force well equipped for the defence of a particular country would represent a saving of a force many times greater stationed elsewhere for the defence of that country.

7. When Mr. MacArthur stated that there is not at present anything like a sufficient quantity of arms and equipment to meet NATO requirements, the Minister said that if we had the plans and the tools for the production of anti-tank material and small machine guns we could produce the weapons ourselves and suggested that the US authorities should consider making the plans and tools available to us as quickly as possible.

8. Mr. MacArthur declared that he would mention the points made by the Minister to General Eisenhower on the one side and on the other to the top men in the State Department, such as Mr. Acheson and Mr. Perkins³ who is in charge of European affairs. He did not know whether General Eisenhower would intervene actively in the matter. Strictly speaking it would not come immediately within his province (NATO), but at the same time he takes a very lively interest in the ‘periphery’ of NATO and as his opinions are valued in Washington he might well be asked to express one on the subject. Any opinion of his would be accepted in Washington as a recommendation. Mr. MacArthur is himself going to Washington towards the 8th September on his way to the NATO conference in Ottawa and he would take the opportunity of this visit to speak to the people in the State Department.

9. At various points in the discussion the Minister alluded to the problem of Partition. He mentioned the change which has taken place in the attenuation of religious bigotry in the Six Counties during the past thirty years, referred to his belief that Britain has been holding onto the Six Counties largely through the mistaken views of the British military staff as to the value of bases there, citing the war in the Atlantic during the recent conflict as proof of the fallacy of British military thinking on the subject, mentioned the fact that Partition cuts across all democratic principles which have been sacrificed to a very small minority, recalled the willingness of all parties in Ireland to allow the Six Counties to retain their present powers in a united country and the Taoiseach’s offer to buy out those in the partitioned area who would prefer not to remain in a united Ireland, and stated our desire that Britain at this late stage should declare that the unification of Ireland is a British interest. This would deprive those in power in Belfast for the last thirty years and who wish to remain in power for another thirty years of any ground on which to stand and would cause the structure to topple down. Furthermore, a declaration by the British Government on the lines suggested would provide real proof of the genuineness of the principles which the Western powers profess and would have a considerable effect in raising morale among the people of many countries. Mr. MacArthur seemed to have a certain familiarity with the problem and ventured the opinion that in the event of Partition’s being ended there would be a reasonable possibility of Ireland’s becoming a full member of the Atlantic community in time. The Minister declared that the entry of Ireland to NATO would be a matter for an All-Ireland parliament. He mentioned that the people of few countries, if any, are as anti-Communist as the Irish and that it is quite certain that they would resist Communism to the last man. On the question of a possible exchange of views between military staff in the event of arms being made available to us Mr. MacArthur expressed the purely personal opinion that it might well happen that if war came in two or three years the US and Ireland might in fact find themselves closely allied; this speculation was, he said, prompted by the fact that situations evolve in a manner often difficult to predict, e.g. the extent of American defence commitments in Europe now as compared with what anyone would have thought possible three years ago. The Minister mentioned that during the recent war, although there was bitter resentment against Britain on the question of Partition, there had been satisfactory co-operation and planning between the Irish and British military staffs against the eventuality of a German invasion.

-o-o-o-o-

Yesterday morning, prior to the meeting of the Council of the OEEC, Mr. Averell Harriman,⁴ special adviser to President Truman, who had come to the Chateau de la Muette with Mr. Porter,⁵ acting ECA Special Representative in Europe, greeted the Minister and had a few moments’ talk with him. The Minister availed himself of the occasion to tell Mr. Harriman of the keen desire of the Government to obtain arms and equipment from the USA. Mr. Harriman undertook to think about the question.