No. 190 NAI DT S1801D
Dublin, 28 January 1924
RE. NORTH-EASTERN POSITION
With regard to the President's notes of 17th January in this matter and Mr. Stephens letter of the 18th January in reply,1 the following points occur to me.
On the other hand, we were careful to regard the contest as a purely British affair and no persons spoke during the election in our name.
The Government has no cause to regret that it deliberately delayed the discussion of the Boundary clause until the chaotic conditions that existed in the country were removed. A year ago an appalling condition of affairs obtained in the Saorstát. The country was in a chronic state of commotion and disorder. Murders, assassinations, ambushes and the wholesale ruthless destruction of property were the order of the day. Pessimism was in the ascendant and in London most of our friends had made up their minds that what they termed 'the experiment of the Free State' was a calamitous failure. The 'prophecies' that had been so lavishly made by our enemies - that we were a 'bankrupt State' and 'an unstable people' ruled by 'inculpable and unprincipled' rulers were being gradually accepted by the bulk of British people as accurate, and in even friendly quarters we were being admonished to 'take a leaf out of 'Ulster's' book' and to make ourselves worthy of 'Ulster', etc., etc.
It is enough here to say that everything that was thought and said about us and our Government has been completely falsified, and, mainly due to the enormous efforts of the Government, our national position - political and financial - was never so strong as it is today. Tory Diehardism, a very vital and powerful influence, has been largely swept out of British politics and with it the significance and domination of Northern Orange ascendancy. The old order can be said to have vanished and we have now got to face a new order of things.
Taking the worst view first, it is possible to conclude from the responsible statements of their leaders during the past four or five important years that they are not likely to turn out very much better than the other British Parties. It must be remembered that during the pre-Truce days British Labour defined its attitude towards us and declared its policy to be a grant of Dominion Home Rule which is identical with the policy of the Liberals and the progressive Conservatives. They were never called upon to elaborate the details of such a policy and hence we have no official record of how the Party intended to deal with the North-Eastern Question. The new Colonial Secretary (the Cabinet Minister who will have most to do with us) Mr. J.H. Thomas, has never shown himself conspicuously friendly to us. If my memory is correct, he came across to Ireland at the time of the Railway strike, organised against the transport of British military and munitions of war, and did his best to wreck it. At any rate no funds during that episode were forthcoming from his Union (the N.U.R.) for Railwaymen in Ireland who had suffered because of their action. During the debates in the House of Commons on the Treaty, he supported the Treaty but I have a recollection that he expressed himself particularly pleased with regard to the special treatment of 'Ulster'.
Thomas has always been regarded in England as a moderate Labour man. He is a 'trades-unionist' as distinct from a 'socialist and his actions and his speeches have frequently brought forth praise from his ultra Die-hard organs. He is not an idol of the rank and file of British labour and they have frequently accused him of pandering too much to the 'bosses'.
He has the reputation of being very clever and shrewd with a good deal of the wiliness of his distinguished countryman Lloyd George.
The new Premier, Ramsay MacDonald has the reputation of being an honest politician but as far as we are concerned he is a dark horse. He should be well acquainted with Orangeism as it is by no means insignificant in his part of Scotland. If we are to judge from his statement issued since he has become Prime Minister, on India, he cannot be considered very advanced as in that statement he deprecated the activities of Indian nationalists and told them pretty plainly in words that might have been used by a member of the late Government that if Indian Nationalists did not renounce unconstitutional methods, whether active or passive, they would find they would be met.
On the whole, however, I think we can assume that the new British Government as a body will be inclined to deal fairly with us in this matter of the Boundaries if for no other reason than that its main support in many parts of Britain are Irish people, as are many of its best and ablest organisers.
As against this the one thing we may expect to be up against from this on is a strong and united Tory opposition to any scheme that would seem to 'let Ulster down'. Whether this will have the same effect on the Labour Government as the Tory opposition had on the Liberal Government in 1912 remains to be seen.
(a) that the present British Government has not a very secure footing and is liable to be thrown out of office at any moment, and
(b) that we should see to it that the Local Government Board elections in the Six Counties that are due to take place in May, should not take place before this question is definitely decided. Owing to the gerrymandering that has been going on we can take it that great changes in favour of the Partitionists will result from these elections which will be fought on the new register.
Another thing to remember is that whatever happens to British Governments the civil servants remain intact and will certainly endeavour to carry on the old tradition.
The danger lies in what precise form this economic union will take. Few things have caused greater uneasiness to the British than our determination to exercise our fiscal independence and the resultant necessity of a Customs barrier. It has frequently been suggested that we should, in view of the North's acceptance of some form of union, agree to 'bring all Ireland within the United Kingdom fiscal unit'. I think the cause of this uneasiness is more at the prospect of possible developments of independent fiscal policy rather than at any immediate fears. We are, however, almost certain to be faced with this suggestion at some stage or another, which of course would be utterly impossible from our standpoint.
To such a plan I would make one addition, namely, the acceptance of all-Ireland as a distinct economic unit, power being given to the 'Council of Ireland' or whatever central body is set up to regulate the details involved. Of course I do not mean by this suggestion that we should do anything to limit our own sovereign fiscal powers, which are amongst the most valuable powers we possess and which we should be very careful to preserve intact.
We can point out that we have endeavoured to meet the North-East but it has quite plainly on several occasions ruled out all prospect of affiliation with us. The plan in the Treaty, had they not opted out, met them, we thought very generously.
It is no harm at all if we appear at first a little 'difficult' as there is a danger of our being taken for granted across the water as being 'very accommodating', creating thereby the preconception in the minds of British arbitrators that whatever compromise is made for settlement purposes must be made by us, the North-East on the other hand being taken for granted as being constitutionally static and unbending.
We can blame public opinion in the Saorstát for our attitude. We can point out that the Government and people of the Saorstát fought a trying civil war in which hundreds of excellent lives (including General Collins) were lost, and put a debt of many millions on the country in order to maintain the Treaty.
The result is that the people of the Saorstát, having suffered for the Treaty position, are now keener than ever on seeing that the Treaty is honoured to the letter. What they would consider as a 'letting down' on the part of the Government over Article 12 would certainly not consolidate the existing state of peace in the country and might lead to further commotion with the Irregulars coming out on top and proceeding to 'purge' the Constitution.
The Government has to satisfy the Oireachtas on any scheme that may be forthcoming from the Conference and it will take a very good scheme to satisfy the legislature that the Boundary Commission could be waived, etc.
THE MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
The forthcoming Conference will probably only be a preliminary affair to lead up to a more serious meeting. That being so it would be a fitting occasion for us to urge the matter of the treatment of the minority in the Six Counties, e.g., the 'Argenta'3 and the incarceration of Cahir Healy which Sir John Simon has declared to be an affront to the House of Commons. We should ask for the release of the 'Argenta' prisoners as a way of creating a more favourable conference attitude (incidentally the release of those men on our initiative would have an excellent home effect).
GERRYMANDERING OF CONSTITUENCIES, THE ABOLITION OF P.R. AND THE RESTITUTION OF 'PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS' FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTORS IN THE SIX COUNTIES:
We should protest very strongly against these interferences with minority rights. The restitution of 'property qualifications' should have a telling effect on Labour mentality. There is the notorious fact too of the establishment of a Special policeman's Orange Lodge to be called the 'Peel Loyal Orange Lodge'.
The Bureau, I understand has prepared a dossier on the treatment of Minorities by the Belfast Government.
In conclusion, it is my belief that we should be able to hold out, under the prevailing conditions, for a good hard bargain.
The Royal Irish Academy's Documents on Irish Foreign Policy series has published an eBook of confidential correspondence on the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations.
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