Extracts from a memorandum by Frederick H. Boland
of a meeting with Frank Pakenham
(Secret) (Copy)

1. Lord Pakenham and I lunched together on the 29th November with the idea of having a chat about the present relations between the two countries, particularly as regards Partition.

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5. Turning to the main subject of our talk, I began by giving Lord Pakenham an account of our present attitude and policy. I said that Partition was so wrong morally that it was hard for people in Ireland to think of it as a political problem which had to be approached tactically. But mere venting of moral indignation was no policy for anyone who was really sincere in his desire to achieve a solution and bring Partition to an end. That was how the Taoiseach and the Minister felt; they would relate every proposal to the end in mind and subject it to the test: ‘Does this conduce to the ending of Partition or does it not?’. I went on to refer to the speech made by the Taoiseach on the 19th July when introducing his estimate, and particularly to the Taoiseach’s statement that neither he nor anyone else had an immediate solution to Partition – that all that could be done was to choose the methods most likely to bring it to an end and use to the best advantage any opportunities of finally securing our aim which might present themselves.¹ I recalled the Taoiseach’s statement that, if it were possible, the most satisfactory way of solving the problem would be to win to our side the people opposed to us at present. What all this meant was that, although no early solution of Partition was at present in sight, the whole aim of the Taoiseach’s policy was to bring about the political circumstances, and the climate of opinion, which would make the ending of Partition easier and more feasible when the kind of opportunity referred to by the Taoiseach presented itself.
6. I suggested that, although it might be a mistake to exaggerate their importance, there were elements in the situation which encouraged hope – or, at least, didn’t discourage it. Direct dealings between Dublin and Belfast – in connection with the Erne development, the Foyle Fisheries and the Great Northern Railway – had produced some positive results. The tone of Sir Basil Brooke’s reply to a reference to the Six Counties made by the Taoiseach in a public speech shortly after his election had been more conciliatory than Sir Basil’s utterances usually are.² The ‘Ulster Unionist’ organisation in the Six Counties had gone out of its way to condemn and disown the insulting reference to the Pope made by Mr. Minford³ during the Election campaign. Mr. McKibbin⁴ had struck a new note in the debate on the Home Guard Bill. These and other indications suggested that the psychological bases of Partition were weakening somewhat, and that the final coming together of the two parts of Ireland, on a basis of agreement, was not a complete impossibility. What was wanted now more than anything else was a constructive contribution to this development from the British side; and the contribution which would be more valuable than anything else would be a clear statement from the British Government that a settlement – or, if they wished to put it that way, a settlement agreed to by the six counties – of Partition would be in the interest of Britain and the Commonwealth as a whole and that, so far as they were concerned, the British Government would welcome it.
7. Lord Pakenham said that this fitted in appropriately with what he wanted to say to me. As I knew, there was nothing he wanted more than to be of some use in connection with the settlement of the Partition problem. Recently, a number of other Labour Peers in the House of Lords – particularly Lord Stansgate⁵ and Lord Strabolgi⁶ – had come to him and told him that they felt that it was about time the House of Lords began to take an interest in the question, and that they were prepared to take it up if he thought any useful purpose would be served by so doing. Lord Pakenham said that, apart from this, he had been thinking of putting down a motion in the Lords about Partition himself but he was anxious, before doing so, to know what we thought of the idea.
8. I said I could not give him an official answer without taking the Minister’s instructions, but that, prima facie, I thought the debate would be well worth doing if there were any chance of eliciting a helpful declaration from the Government on the lines I had indicated. There might well be a better chance of securing this now than at any time in the past because, apart from other reasons, official circles here probably realised that the Taoiseach’s attitude towards Britain and the Commonwealth was not an unfriendly one and that, indeed, far from being hostile, the Taoiseach was inclined to maximise what remained to us of our former association with the Commonwealth rather than to minimise it. At this point, I gave Lord Pakenham, for his confidential information, an account of our policy in this regard based on conversations I had had with the Minister. Lord Pakenham said that this information (the confidential nature of which he realised) helped him greatly; he was certain that the attitude I described would do a good deal to abate the hostile feelings towards us which the Repeal of the External Relations Act had created. At the same time, to be perfectly frank, the question of our relationship to the Commonwealth was, in his view, not the only – or even the main – obstacle, so far as Britain was concerned, in the way of a settlement of Partition. The main difficulty – as he knew only too well from his experience in the Admiralty – was the question of defence. In the British official mind, this aspect of the Partition question surpassed all others in importance. So important was it that, if he were Prime Minister of England responsible for safeguarding British interests, he would feel bound in conscience to oppose and prevent the reunification of Ireland unless some arrangement existed under which Britain was assured of the continued use of facilities in Ireland in the defence of her North Atlantic communications. It was not necessary, of course, that there should be a bilateral alliance of defence agreement between Britain and Ireland; the object could probably be equally well secured by our adhesion to the North Atlantic Pact; but, in his considered view, the chances of getting any British Government to adopt any attitude towards Partition other than one of ‘holding on’, and trying to preserve things as they are, were very slight so long as the defence question remained unanswered.
9. I said that this aspect of the matter presented as big a problem for us as it did for Britain. Irish leaders, including the Taoiseach, had frequently said that a free and united Ireland would be naturally friendly to Britain, and naturally inclined to see in the preservation of Britain’s freedom and security the best guarantee of its own safety. The likelihood was, therefore, that, if Ireland were once free and united, there would be no insuperable obstacle to a satisfactory defence understanding between the two countries. But to suggest that, while Ireland was still divided, the 26 Counties should enter into a defence pact and undertake to fight for the rights of freedom and self-determination which they themselves do not possess, was to ask something that was simply impossible. Furthermore, although the possibility of a defence understanding with Britain once Ireland were united had never been excluded, the idea of making the ending of Partition conditional or dependent on a defence understanding was something which the Taoiseach had always opposed for reasons which, I was sure, Lord Pakenham himself would appreciate.
10. Lord Pakenham said that he realised the force of this and most of what I said was familiar to him. The problem was to find some way out of the impasse. He agreed that considerable play could be made with the argument that the natural tendency of a free and united Ireland would be to stand with Britain, but that was not strong enough to convince people here. What he would like, if it were possible, is that the Taoiseach should start now – entirely on his own initiative, so that no question of the imposition of conditions by Britain could arise – to state, as specifically as he felt it politically possible for him to do, what he thought Ireland should be prepared to do towards the common defence of these islands and their essential North Atlantic communications, if she were once free and united.

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