No. 95 UCDA P104/5831

Memorandum by Frank Aiken

Dublin, 13 February 1952

Mr. Matthews came to see me at 12 o’clock today and stayed for about half an hour. He told me that he had seen the President in Washington twice – when he arrived and when he was coming away – and had found him sympathetic towards Ireland. He told the President that he felt that we could get assistance under the Act without complying with the full terms. The President promised to look into that matter.

In relation to the publication of the Notes, later in the conversation Mr. Matthews said that it would be as well if we could keep the situation fluid, not to have any complications for ten days or so, until we would get the result of his representations to the President.

Mr. Matthews told me that he had seen Mr. Acheson, General Bradley,1 General Collins and a number of other senior Army and Navy men and that he had found them all sympathetic, the least sympathetic being General Collins. He told them about the attitude of our Government and said that they might be very glad to have us well armed under certain conditions, as he felt sure that the Irish people would not allow Communism to overrun Ireland or overrun Europe. I said to Mr. Matthews on this that, of course, we had decided our policy regarding the war and that it would not change, that it was foolish because our interests were not identical not to recognise that they ran a very long way in parallel, that even though we could not join in the war, it was very important that we should be able to defend ourselves here. I pointed out that during the last war up to 1941 it was hard to get Britain interested in arming us here, but that in 1940 when she had her back to the wall and was down to stark reality, they gave us 20,000 of the quarter of a million rifles with which the Americans had supplied them, and they did this even though some of their own people were armed only with shot-guns, because they realized the importance of this part of the country being defended. I reminded him that at that time we could not get rifles from America. I pointed out to Mr. Matthews also that the British held five divisions in the Six Counties all through the war and that if we had not been well mobilised and reasonably armed, they would have had to keep ten divisions there; that during the North African campaign and at other times the British were often put to the pin of their collar to get an extra division and that it must be remembered that often in war as in politics it is the marginal force that counts.

I reiterated what I had told him many times before, that although Sweden and Switzerland were not joining in the war the western powers would have to put a couple of extra army corps in Norway and a couple in France if Sweden and Switzerland were not prepared to defend themselves.

I told Mr. Matthews that, if it were at all possible, I would try to avoid committing myself in the Dáil to publishing the Notes. I said that Mr. Huston had already informed us that they had no objection but that they were not very keen on it. I said that I might be asked whether we had made a formal request for arms and that if so I would allude to our request in the Note of the 24th December2 for the right to purchase arms but would point out that we had not given a detailed list but that we would do so.

1 General Omar Bradley (1893-1981), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Army (1949-53), Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1949-51).

2 See No. 72.


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