No. 133 NAI DFA/5/305/57/275/Pt III

'Comments on Report of July 11th from Embassy in Washington
about the MSA Act, 1952'
by Frank Biggar

Dublin, July 1952

  1. Mr. McCann’s report1 is based on conversations with Mr. George Woodbridge, Chief of the North Europe and Sterling Area Branch, in the European Programme Division of MSA, and Mr. Harry Clement, formerly Deputy Chief of the ECA Mission in Dublin and now attached to MSA Washington. Both these officials expressed the view (in separate conversations with Mr. McCann) that –
    1. the possibility of our being granted aid for the purchase of arms from the funds provided under Section 7(i) – the Special Funds Section – was extremely remote, and
    2. that there was some possibility of our being granted aid for the purpose of continuing the Technical Assistance Programme.
  2. MSA’s opinion is that Section 7(i) is intended for countries bordering on Communist areas who might be afraid to sign the undertaking required by the MSA Acts generally.

  1. While Mr. McCann points out in his Report that both Mr. Woodbridge and Mr. Clement are far below the policy-making level in MSA, there seems to be no reason for assuming that their views do not represent in fact the general thinking both of MSA and the State Department. To make grants to Ireland from the Special Funds for the purpose of arms, would be to treat Ireland more favourably than other European countries, who receive assistance only on condition that they subscribe to the aims and purposes of the MSA Acts (in effect, membership of NATO). There is no reason why MSA or the State Department should favour Ireland as compared with other European countries and experience has shown that they have never done so. It therefore follows that if we are to obtain assistance from the Special Fund provision for the purchase of arms, we shall have to influence the American Government at the highest level.
  2. The prospects of doing so seem remote. Although this is a Presidential Election year and the Irish-American vote is therefore of importance to the Democratic Party, we know from experience that the Irish-Americans vote as Americans and that Irish considerations are no longer paramount with them. The Democratic Party know this as well as we do and we may therefore discount the Irish-American vote as a factor which might operate in our favour.
  3. It seems highly improbable that the American Ambassador here would be prepared to help us to obtain arms assistance from the Special Fund. It is well known that he regards the primary purpose of his mission here as being to induce us to join NATO. If America were to give us arms unconditionally – or the means to purchase them – an important reason for our joining NATO would have disappeared.
  4. There is no evidence to support the view that the American military authorities would be in favour of helping to arm Ireland outside NATO. While they must undoubtedly regard the Irish ports and possibilities for air bases as of some importance, they have never, so far as we are aware, exerted any influence on the American Government to endeavour to secure these facilities for them. It is highly significant in this regard that there has never been the slightest reference in public by the military authorities to the need for US bases in Ireland while for years past they have been agitating publicly for bases in Spain.
  5. The argument which we had in mind that the use of the Special Funds to purchase arms in Europe for Irish defence purposes, would be a contribution to the solution of the dollar gap problem has not been invalidated by Mr. Woodbridge’s statement that off-shore purchasing is effected by the US military authorities and not by the receiving countries. Nevertheless, it is now an argument that is hardly worth putting in view of the fact that it does not overcome the primary American objections to supplying us with arms.
  6. The foregoing considerations point to only one conclusion, namely, that there is virtually no hope of persuading the US Government to grant us assistance under the present MSA Act to obtain arms. To approach the American authorities with such a proposal would, in these circumstances, be simply to invite a rebuff.
  7. As regards seeking to obtain aid from the Special Fund for Technical Assistance, the amount we could reasonably ask for would be relatively small, probably not more than $1,000,000. We might well have considerable difficulty in proving to the Americans that we really need this money and, if we did obtain the grant, we would have to submit again to the presence of a Mission here – this, to put it mildly, is far from desirable. Finally, and this is perhaps the decisive consideration, the idea of going hat in hand to the Americans for a mere $1,000,000 after they had stopped aid only last January is repugnant in the extreme.
  8. In the light of the foregoing it seems clear that we should take no initiative whatsoever with a view to obtaining assistance under this year’s MSA Act.

1 Not printed.


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