No. 256 NAI DFA/5/313/30

Confidential report from Josephine McNeill to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
(26/7)

The Hague, 1 March 1954

I have the honour to report a conversation with Mr. Fahmy, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. for Egypt in the Netherlands1 regarding the political crisis in his country arising out of the fall of General Naguib2 and his replacement as Head of State and Prime Minister by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.3 The conversation took place at a party at the French Embassy on the 27th February. At that date General Naguib was still under house arrest in Cairo and Colonel Gamal Nasser had assumed his functions as Head of State.

I asked Mr. Fahmy if he was uneasy at the new turn of events in his country. Mr. Fahmy replied that he was indeed uneasy and he described to me the general situation in Egypt with regard to the crisis as follows. America, he said, had backed the revolutionary Government under General Naguib up to the Bermuda Conference.4 After the Bermuda Conference there was a notable hardening in the attitude of the powers concerned in that Conference with regard to Egypt. America backed down from her previous support of the Naguib Government and England grew stiffer in negotiation with it. It was clear, said Mr. Fahmy, that a bargain had been struck at Bermuda.

  1. The hardening of the American and British attitude to Egypt perceptible after Bermuda was markedly intensified after the Berlin Conference.5 Egypt therefore found itself confronted for the first time with a fully unified policy of USA and Great Britain in her regard. She was now in a position of isolation vis-á-vis her enemy, Britain. She could no longer play America against the latter. Hence the political crisis. General Naguib, a man of compromise was left in a position of isolation and failure. The young officers led by Gamal Nasser who were the real revolutionaries and who regarded Naguib as little more than their figurehead decided the latter’s usefulness was at an end – in fact that Naguib was ‘no good’, said Mr. Fahmy.

    Gamal Nasser and his colleagues are young, eager and impatient – they decided they must have a new policy and that ‘quickly’ said Mr. Fahmy. I asked the latter, if he anticipated that they would make overtures to the Russians. Not immediately, Mr. Fahmy replied. In the immediate future, he said, the influence to be anticipated is that of Nehru. The Gamal Nasser Government would plump for a neutralism as between east and west, said the Chargé d’Affaires – a very dangerous path, he continued, because in Egypt’s present position of isolation and weakness, a deteriorating internal situation (which would be highly likely) might well drive the new or succeeding governments to ‘making friends with the devil’. In his opinion therefore the present Egyptian situation gave cause for grave uneasiness.

  2. Mr. Fahmy went on to say that nothing is more evident since the Conferences of Bermuda and Berlin than that far-reaching decisions have been taken regarding the whole burning question of the defence of the near East.
  3. Britain and USA appear to have reached a better understanding than ever before on this matter. Recent events in Syria, Irak and Egypt must be seen as linked together in this light, said Mr. Fahmy. These events taken separately or together play directly into the hands of Britain which wants to see Egypt isolated and the countries of Syria, Jordan and the Lebanon and Irak united under the domination of the latter (Irak being favourable to Britain). The movements in Syria and neighbouring countries have been without any doubt manipulated ‘from outside’, said the Egyptian Chargé d’Affaires – indicating Britain as the provocateur and America as having abdicated from lines of policy previously pursued by her in this region – leaving Britain a clear field in the area. All this Mr. Fahmy regards as part of the bargain agreed on at Bermuda and Berlin. America’s quid pro quo is Britain’s co-operation or acquiescence in America’s arming of Pakistan. The latter and its complement, the Turko-Pakistan pact6 have become a pivotal link in the USA overall system of eastern defence. An excellent combination with this system would be a Near-East group led by Irak which has already declared its intention of working in with the new Turkey-Pakistan defence alliance.
  4. In connection with these developments I may refer to the extract circulated from a letter of our Ambassador in London dated 20th January7 in which he said he got the impression that the British Government was ‘quite pleased’ with the results of the Bermuda Conference and that policy differences between London and Washington had been ‘definitely narrowed’ as a result of it. From Mr. Fahmy’s conversation borne out by Press reports from well informed sources it appears there is good reason for Britain’s satisfaction. She has been left a clear field for her own policy in the Near East where American support has been withdrawn from political personalities and groups whose policy operated against the British and was largely inspired by anti-British motives. These groups and countries torn by internal problems and factions without American support are at the mercy of Britain whose dominance once more in the Near East is likely to become established. The natives of these countries may yet have a last word to say in this matter, but that is the position at the moment.
  5. Mr. Fahmy referring to the previous negotiations between Britain and Naguib said that while they on the Egyptian side were willing to share control of the Suez Canal with Britain – it appeared this was not the latter’s main objective. Britain insisted for the purpose of this control on the right to maintain in Egypt a number of British ‘technicians’ far in excess of the number necessary for the purpose – and insisted moreover that the ‘technicians’ should be in military uniform. What Britain really wants, said Mr. Fahmy, is not so much control of the Suez Canal (which has lost a good deal of its importance in the light of modern strategy) as ‘a base in North Africa’.

1 Abdel Làtif Fahmy El Eisy, First Secretary, Embassy of Egypt, The Hague.

2 Muhammad Naguib (1901-84), President of Egypt (1953-4), Prime Minister of Egypt (1954).

3 Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein, President of Egypt (1956-70).

4 In December 1953 Eisenhower, Churchill and French Premier Joseph Laniel met at Bermuda to discuss relations with the Soviet Union and issues relating to international security including British control of the Suez Canal.

5 An early example of détente, the United States, British, French and Soviet Foreign Ministers met at Berlin in January and February 1954 and agreed to call a wider international conference to discuss a settlement to the Korean War and the ongoing war in Indochina. The Berlin Conference led to a further conference on Korea and Indochina at Geneva in the summer of 1954, which led to a ceasefire in Korea.

6 On 2 April 1954, at United States prompting, Turkey and Pakistan concluded a security treaty which enabled the United States to give military assistance to Pakistan under the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 1954.

7 Not printed.


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