Memorandum from Joseph D. Brennan to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
'Review of the Anti-Partition Campaign in the United States of America'

The war ended in Europe in May, 1945, and during the year or so immediately following there was no organized co-ordinated anti-Partition movement in the United States. It is true that the Ancient Order of Hibernians had an anti-Partition plank in its yearly statement of aims and objects and that throughout the country Irish societies continued sporadically to interest themselves in the subject but it could not be said that there was an effective, organized movement with a considered plan of campaign in existence. In Congress representatives with Irish sympathies were making desultory efforts to bring the subject forward. One of the members most prominent in this activity was Congressman Thomas Lane¹ of Massachusetts who is a past official of the AOH.

This was the position until November, 1947, when arising out of a race convention held in New York, the American League for an Undivided Ireland was formed. This was to be the national body which would co-ordinate the efforts of the various societies and groups throughout the country. Mr. Joseph Scott² of Los Angeles, a man whose age alone would have commanded respect, not to mention his manifold achievements in political and legal circles, was elected President. The first aim of the organization was to arrange for branches to be set up wherever possible.

The League’s plan of campaign was to support vigorously the presentation to Congress of resolutions dealing with the Partition of Ireland and to indoctrinate as effectively as possible members of Congress and all others who might be interested in ensuring that Ireland’s case for unity got a fair hearing. To this end the ALUI appointed a Washington representative, Mr. John M. Costello,³ a former Congressman and a lawyer by profession. They also chose as the spearhead of the movement in the Congress itself an energetic young Congressman who had been outspoken and unflinching in his support of the anti-Partition movement for several years. This Congressman was John E. Fogarty of Rhode Island. Mr. Fogarty presented a resolution in the House of Representatives which was referred, as such resolutions always are to the Foreign Affairs Committee. At that time the Congress was considering appropriations for Marshall Aid to European countries. Mr. Fogarty chose the opportunity when the House was considering these appropriations, to offer an amendment suggesting that no aid be given to Britain unless it had restored the Six Counties to its rightful ownership. He had no success with his proffered amendment on its first introduction. Indeed he was taken to task in many quarters for what was called his impertinence.

It must not be forgotten that Ireland had been neutral during the war and that there was and is a large section of American opinion unsympathetic and even antagonistic towards Ireland’s aims as a result of that neutrality. To convert this antagonistic feeling to one of sympathy for Irish aims or at least to toleration was the task of the ALUI and indeed of the Department’s officers in this country. The efforts to do so were not without success. The Washington representative of the ALUI was assiduous in educating Congressmen to the fact that Ireland’s attitude was a reasonable one, and the Department’s officers gave every assistance consistent with their positions. Advantage was taken of every opportunity by the ALUI to appear before Congressional Committees to explain Ireland’s case for the abolition of Partition and sometimes to enlighten the Committees on the reasons for Ireland’s stand during the war. The campaign was conducted with vigour during 1949 and local bodies were organized to put pressure on their Congressmen to support any measure in Congress which might publicize the Partition question.

A substantial success was achieved in March of 1950 when in a snap division an amendment by Congressman Fogarty to the Foreign Aid Bill to the effect that no aid be granted to Britain while Partition lasted resulted in a majority for the Fogarty forces. This startling development commanded the front pages in every paper in the United States and, it might be said, throughout the world and for three days the amendment was allowed to stand while the Administration rallied its votes for re-consideration. On re-consideration, of course, the amendment was defeated but it was a tactical success which brought to the notice of the American people that the Irish question was still a live one and that it still might prove an embarrassment to Great Britain in her relations with the United States.

A concession was made, however, as a result of this action in Congress. The Foreign Affairs Committee, which hitherto had declined to hold hearings on the various resolutions concerning Partition put forward by Congressmen, agreed to have public hearings and consider the evidence presented. These hearings were held during 1950 over a period of two days. Every Irish organization with an interest in the anti-Partition movement sent witnesses and the hearings were eventually published in report form. During the following year pressure was continued on the House Foreign Affairs Committee to vote out an agreed resolution for consideration by the House. This was eventually done. The resolution was referred to the Rules Committee and that Committee appointed a day for a House debate. This took place on September 27, 1951. The debate took place not on the merits of the resolution but on a technicality as to whether the rule should be accepted by the House. It was a bitter debate in which the neutrality issue and indeed the religious issue too were factors and the rule was voted down.

These activities in Congress, despite their apparently discouraging outcome, did in fact accomplish their immediate realizable object which was to bring Ireland’s case before the American people, thereby encouraging our supporters at home as well as abroad, gaining new sympathizers and bringing home to many others the idea that possibly the Partition of Ireland was not necessarily permanent. Those of our supporters, who had any real understanding of the American scene, had always realized of course that the agitation in Congress and elsewhere in the US was mainly intended to produce valuable propaganda results. They had had little hope of its ever being powerful enough to change the Administration’s policy over night but they were confident that over the long distance they could acquire such a nuisance value and become such a potential irritant in the United States-British relations that the State Department and the President would find it politic seriously to explore the possibilities of a solution of the problem of the re-unification of Ireland. They hoped – and I think the events justified this hope – that they could make it clear to all and sundry that the sympathy which exists for our case in the USA is something to be reckoned with even though confined to a minority of the over-all population.

Not all of our people took this viewpoint; some of them had been over-sanguine as to the possible fruits of parliamentary agitation, and became extremely discouraged by what they styled ‘reverses’ in Congress and ceased to support parliamentary action. Some switched their allegiance to organizations which expounded the theory that physical force would be the only effective method of restoring Irish unity. Their defections were sufficiently important to cause a certain amount of pessimism and perhaps apathy in certain circles of the ALUI.

In the beginning of the next Congress in 1953 Congressman Fogarty and others presented their resolutions once more for consideration by the Foreign Affairs Committee. That body has up to the present taken no action. As it seemed certain by the middle of 1953 that no action was likely, Congressman Fogarty offered to the House a discharge petition for signature by members. Under this procedure if a majority of the House signs the discharge petition, a resolution or bill held in Committee is released for consideration on the House floor. The discharge petition method of bringing legislation to the floor is frowned on as a matter of principle by a large proportion of House members because it short-circuits the Committee and belittles in their opinion the authority and rights of the Committee Chairmen who are jealous of their position and privileges. However, up to this date 142 members of the House have signed the discharge petition. In addition there are, I am reliably informed, probably another fifty who are in sympathy with the Fogarty resolution but who disagree with the discharge petition procedure. That is to say, that in this whole House of Representatives there is a substantial bloc of members who support in principle the idea that the unity of Ireland ought to be restored. Before the House adjourns there may possibly be another attempt to insert an amendment in the Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill on the lines of that which secured a snap majority in 1950. If that device fails, I am given to understand another line of action is being considered. It has been suggested that a brief statement endorsing the re-unification of Ireland should be signed by sympathetic members of the House and Senate and presented to the President with the suggestion that executive action be initiated through the Department of State in regard to the matter, but I think it more likely that a delegation of Congressmen headed by John Fogarty will seek to discuss the question with John Foster Dulles before Congress adjourns.

Meantime, it is understood that attempts have been made to obtain the President’s ear on this Irish question through Vice-President Nixon⁴ and through General Patrick J. Hurley,⁵ former Ambassador to China and former Secretary for War in the Hoover Cabinet. Some of the members of the ALUI are of the opinion that if Ireland undertook to join in a bi-lateral Defence Treaty with the United States apart altogether from NATO, American public opinion and administrative action might be strongly influenced towards obtaining a solution of the long standing problem from its ally, Great Britain. In that connection Mr. John M. Costello, the ALUI representative in Washington suggested to me that a visit by President Sean T. O’Ceallaigh to the United States as a guest of President Eisenhower might have an important effect. I had no comment to offer in regard to that suggestion.

As regards the prognosis concerning the degree of success likely to be obtained by the anti-Partition movement in the United States, the only success to my mind achievable will be along the line of publicity for the question. The practical results of this publicity will depend largely on the actual form of the resolution voted out of Congress if it be voted. In its present form it is merely a pious aspiration which will be cheerfully noted by the State Department without necessity for action. The State Department’s policy has been and is that the question of Partition is one for solution between Great Britain and Ireland and not one in which they could properly intervene. If the resolution contained a directive which would have legal effect, then it might be possible to secure the setting up of a commission to inquire into the matter and to make representations in the appropriate quarters accordingly. I see little prospect of that situation arising. It might be said that in the present alleged breach in the friendship between Great Britain and the United States there might be an opportunity for imposing a hitherto unpopular policy on the State Department. That breach of which so much is made in the newspapers, exists largely in that sphere. There is a difference of opinion as to policy procedure between the United States and Great Britain but the difference is more apparent than real. On every level the co-ordination of policy between the United States and Great Britain is a very close one and few steps are taken by the one which are not agreeable to the other.

At this point I might mention that we have not found the Republican Administration to be in any slight degree inclined to be sympathetic towards us on the Partition question. It is probably true to say that the average Republican executive or legislator hews more closely to the British line than did his Democratic fellow. I might say that we have felt the loss of these Irish-American friends we had in the Democratic Cabinet and even in the White House. At one time we could feel sure at any rate that our viewpoint was brought to the highest quarters. We have not that assurance now.

I have not in the course of this report made much reference to the activities of the Embassy but I think it only fitting that at this stage I should say something of the active part played by the officers of the Embassy from the Ambassador down. Advantage has been taken of every opportunity offered and there have been many, as references to the Annual Reports will show, to speak at dinners, luncheons, on the radio, on television, on the problem of Partition. The Ambassador has in the course of his period here spoken to distinguished gatherings in every part of this huge country. Invitations for him have been promoted and occasion made for him to deliver addresses at every suitable function. The resultant publicity has been encouraging and rewarding.

To refer to the day to day operation of the Embassy on the program we are bound to claim credit for alerting the news agencies and newspapers to any story or gesture which might form useful publicity. Not only does the Embassy provide material for speeches for members of the legislature and other public figures but through the liaison maintained with sympathetic members of the House and Senate speeches, articles and new reports in any way relevant to the subject are inserted in the Congressional Record so that those who read that important publication cannot avoid seeing from time to time references which bear cogently on the issue.

In a sense the most important activity of the Embassy in relation to the anti-Partition campaign is its role as an unobtrusive co-ordinator and director of the various forces working in our favour in the USA. The people working for us in Congress, the ALUI and the other organizations supporting our cause have no direct official link with Ireland and there is no established procedure for keeping them au courant with the policy of the Irish Government and in line with that policy. The absence of formal Irish control apart from the fact that control might conflict with US law is, of course, an advantage for such groups in a country so sensitive to foreign ‘interference’. However, it could obviously prove a handicap for us if the activities here were completely divorced from the considerations which the Irish Government must bear in mind. In actual fact, the Embassy endeavours to steer the policy and has been reasonably effective in so doing. Such steering lies almost exclusively in the Embassy’s influence on the leaders of the groups in question. For example, as the Department is aware, the Embassy has not been entirely a passive spectator of the Congressional activity described in this report but its place in it naturally has been designedly and happily unpublicised.

The work of the Consuls too, situated as they are in strategic areas in the country, cannot be minimized. Each Consul and I include in that term the Consul General of New York has been indefatigable in utilizing every suitable occasion to bring home to those with whom he comes in contact that there is still an Irish question and that it is still unsolved.

Recommendations as to future support of the anti-Partition Movement in the United States

1. More effective work could be done for Ireland and for the anti-Partition movement by the establishment of additional Consulates in various parts of the country than by any other method I can think of. Here we ought to take a leaf out of the British book. During the war I reported to the Department that the British had established Consulates in places such as Kansas City, St. Louis, Missouri, Dallas, Texas, and Galveston, Texas, and other spots where they had no Consulates before. These Consuls were not appointed primarily for trade purposes. They were appointed primarily as public relations officers with the duty of presenting Britain’s case favourably to the people of these particular areas. It would be expensive to set up career Consuls in all the places where Great Britain is represented but if it could be done I would most seriously recommend that consuls be established in the following places: (1) Philadelphia (2) New Orleans (3) Miami, Florida (4) Detroit, Michigan (5) Kansas City, Missouri (6) Cleveland, Ohio (7) Los Angeles, California (8) Seattle, Washington (9) Houston, Texas or Galveston, Texas.

   While I make this recommendation I, nevertheless, have very seriously in mind that it would be impossible to obtain agreement at home for the expenditure involved but it might be possible to obtain sanction for the establishment of at least four posts. If I had the choice of four such posts I would allot one to Los Angeles which is a very news-conscious City and which because of its connection with the moving picture industry is kept constantly in the limelight. My second choice would be St. Louis, Missouri, or Kansas City. These places are in the deep heart of the United States. They have significant Irish populations and there is an untapped well of sympathy and understanding in that area which if opened would spread throughout the Middle West. My third choice would be Miami, Florida. My reason for choosing that area is that thousands of well-to-do and influential people from all parts of the United States troop to Florida every year. The Church there is staffed mostly by Irishmen who are warm in their expressions of devotion to their native land and who would in my opinion be only too eager to assist any representative of Ireland established in that area. The proper person and the proper set up through these connections would have the ear of most important personages who holiday in Florida during the year. My fourth choice would be Philadelphia. We undoubtedly have a large Irish population in Philadelphia. We also have a few very active people who have been unswerving in their devotion to the cause of anti-Partition for many years. Time and time again they have made representations for the establishment of a career Consulate and I know of no City in the United States where speedier results could be obtained by the establishment of a Consulate than Philadelphia.

2. Another suggestion I might offer in regard to this anti-Partition campaign is that contact should be established between the ALUI and the anti-Partition movements which I understand are growing steadily in other countries. It has seemed to me from time to time that the movement in the United States functions as it were in a vacuum without reference to the activities being pursued for example in Great Britain. Liaison may exist between these two movements but if so it has not come to my attention. It would I suggest probably be fruitful for both movements if there could be now and again an interchange of personnel. It would be for the encouragement of the British movement I think if some of the leaders of the American movement were to visit Great Britain and speak at various centers under the auspices of the British organization. Similarly it would be helpful, I believe, and encouraging if leaders of the British movement could visit the United States and tell people here of their activities and progress in Great Britain. I confine myself to these two countries.
3. Wholesale extension of our circulation list for the Bulletin.
4. Government sponsorship of lecture tours by persons noted in their particular fields.
5. Encouragement of radio and TV programmes on Ireland by the provision of gramophone records and films on a scale beyond our present limited resources.
6. A long-term effort to influence the youth of this country by a series of essay contests for school children which could cover the entire USA, State by State, at comparatively little expense.
7. An increase in the supply of suitable information material to the Embassy, in particular, regular supplies of ‘Ireland – An Introduction’ which was found extremely useful (we have no stocks now). A continued expansion of the ‘Documents on Ireland’ series would be helpful, if possible, provision of a small cheaply-produced pamphlet giving basic facts on Ireland, which could be sent to the many school children and teachers who write for material from all parts of the USA.

All of these proposals would involve increased expenditure but, I think, the amounts involved would not be prohibitive. Additional staff might at some stage be necessary if an expansion of this scale took place but at present it would seem that we could manage any extra work arising with our present staff.

As the Department is of course aware the secret of public relations work in the USA is the ability to meet and cultivate personal relationships with persons influential in various fields. That can only be done effectively by the frequent expenditure of funds on hospitality however modest. Personal contacts are all important in the impersonal atmosphere which naturally prevails, for example, in the huge United States Government Departments and in the great television and radio networks and newspapers. Outstanding people in every sphere naturally incline towards co-operation with those they meet as hosts in pleasant social surroundings. We do our best but the competition is keen and we find ourselves somewhat handicapped by lack of funds.

To sum up under the headings mentioned in the Department’s letter of the 20th June (305/14/135/5)⁶ I would say (1) that the progress made in arousing sympathy has been much more than could possibly have been anticipated at the time the ALUI was established (2) action on the parliamentary level has been effective and at times so encouraging as to lead the uninformed to believe that final action leading to a complete solution was but a brief span away. To my thinking its success has been much greater than that visualised in the early days. It would have been even more successful if the organization had had more funds at its disposal, but its fund raising campaigns have never yielded sufficient cash so that operations have had of necessity to be on a shoe string basis. (3) The utmost that could be hoped for from parliamentary action would be the passing of the Fogarty Resolution or one akin to it through both Houses of Congress. I anticipate no early success of this nature. (4) The conditions for such success lie in nationwide agitation organized and directed by one central body with sufficient funds at its disposal to arrange for pressure groups in every constituency. (5) The time required for such success depends entirely on the degree of enthusiasm which can be fostered by the organization and this again largely depends on its monetary support. I am not advocating physical force but I am given to understand that every incident which occurs in the Six Counties savouring of direct action arouses more interest here and receives more publicity than any other activity and makes fund raising easier.⁷ (6) My recommendations in regard to the future are set forth at some length in this report. They can be summarized briefly as follows: (a) Appointment of additional Consuls (b) liaison between ALUI and similar organizations in other countries (c) Increased distribution of literature (d) Provision of canned radio programs and television films (e) a long-term essay contest (f) Intensification of public relations work by the Department’s officers with due regard to the considerations set forth previously concerning costs.

In conclusion I would add that it would be well that we should keep clear in our minds the highly valuable but still limited potential of the campaign here and continue to expand our activities on that basis. It would be unrealistic and eventually frustrating if we allow ourselves to be misled by too optimistic reports – often our own propaganda – that either the executive or legislative branch of the US Government might take firm action to end Partition in the immediate future. Nevertheless, our efforts can achieve a satisfactory result if we increase gradually and substantially the body of public opinion already inclined to our viewpoint. That body’s outlook if vocal enough and large enough would have to be taken into account by any Administration in considering policy affecting Ireland.