Confidential report from John A. Belton to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
(Secret)

After the failure of the Brussels Conference² and the almost complete certainty that the French Chambre des Deputés will not vote for the very modified version of the EDC proposed by M. Mendès-France, it may now be taken as granted that the original concept of EDC is as dead as the proverbial doornail.³

What has tended to be more or less overlooked in all this long controversy is the effect it will have on the political future of Dr. Adenauer. Dr. Adenauer has from the beginning nailed his colours to the mast of EDC and the failure of this idea is bound to have disastrous effects on his political standing in this country. The concept of EDC is now 4 years old and the world has listened to interminable arguments from France why this idea should or could not be put in force. In this regard, the patience of the German people is capable of exhaustion.

A large part of the youth of the Bonn Republic, who since World War II had showed little interest in being recruited for a new German national army, were inclined to the new, more democratic ‘European’ army idea.

The older generations, except for a diehard nationalist minority, were ready, even eager, to bury the hatchet with France at last and to adopt the ‘European’ road to restoring Germany as a respected member of the Western community. But now the long stalling in Paris has begun to raise havoc with these hopes.

So far, no widespread political revolt has taken place in Western Germany against Chancellor Adenauer’s ‘European’ policy. The greater part of the press is still formally supporting it, although with little of the vigour and verve of a year ago.

Likewise, the people as a whole continue to hold the Chancellor in great esteem. But cynicism and apathy have started to mount in public and private discussion of the EDC and the proposed political federation.

In part, this feeling has taken the form of an increasingly critical and sometimes contemptuous tone toward the French.

It has already gone so far that real damage has been done to the spirit that prevailed in Western Germany a year ago – regardless of whether France should still ratify the EDC pact. The let-bygones-be-bygones of the treaty has been weakened.

In the event that the French turn down the EDC, one of the more important results will be its effect on Chancellor Adenauer.

It is not expected that it would mean a sudden collapse of his prestige and political power in Western Germany. His strength is probably too great for that. Moreover, he has no first-class contender for the top leadership in West German politics.

However, it would be a grievous blow for him. He has built his foreign policy around the idea of German salvation through all-out integration with the West and above all, through a final rapprochement between Germany and France. He sold that idea to the greater part of the German people.

If they are no longer able to follow him in that direction, they may gradually again become an unpredictable factor on the European continent.

What would eventually result from that consequence is also an unpredictable factor. But the consequences for the West could be very unpleasant.

The German people are as now seems likely being forced into the feeling that the fruition of EDC is highly improbable, and that no adequate alternative can be provided by the United States and Great Britain either jointly or severally. The resulting tendency may easily be to seek some form of settlement or tie-up with Russia.