No. 303 NAI DFA/5/313/4/B
Confidential report from Con Cremin to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
'France and German Rearmament'
(Copy)
Paris, 11 September 1954
- The question naturally arises as to where M. Mendès-France stands in the situation created by the rejection by the French Parliament of the EDC Treaty. On the basis of his statements both before and after the Assembly vote his position would seem to be roughly as follows:-
- He concedes the necessity of Germany being allowed to rearm, for three principal reasons – the dangers of a policy of ‘neutralisation’ (she might lean towards Russia), the impossibility, if she is not neutralised, of depriving her indefinitely of the right to have armed forces, and the desirability of strengthening Western defence.
- He concedes the necessity to restore sovereignty to Germany, as contemplated by Britain and the USA, but does not wish to see this step taken without safeguards in the matter of rearmament;
- While in principle favourable to further talks with Russia, he does not feel that in the absence of indications of positive goodwill on the part of Moscow (like, for instance, an undertaking about the Austrian Peace Treaty or about free elections in the two parts of Germany), the prospects of a favourable outcome to such talks are of a kind to justify postponing a search for a solution to the German rearmament problem;
- Mendès-France has not at present a cut and dried plan for the safeguards with which German rearmament is to be surrounded. Two ideas which seem to attract him are the establishment of an Armaments Pool (a scheme of this kind was put forward some time ago by the Socialist Deputy Lapie1 – see para. 10 of my report of 19th December, 1953,2 and the imposition of restrictions (common to all the countries concerned) on defence programmes. He thinks it possible that many of the dispositions of the EDC Treaty might be used to the exclusion, however, of any supra-national element;
- On the organisational side his preference would go towards a European group accepting common obligations on a non-discriminatory basis and comprising Britain – in other words, a modified EDC with Britain. He does not, however, rule out the possibility of Germany being admitted to NATO subject to the existence of safeguards on her rearmament.
- Mendès-France is not disposed to put forward, immediately at least, any proposals of his own but rather to await suggestions from other interested powers and in particular Britain and the USA. He takes the view that all the NATO powers, as well as France, have a responsibility in finding a solution to the impasse reached by the French rejection of the EDC Treaty.
- He thinks that action should be taken as rapidly as possible but that a satisfactory solution will require most careful preparatory work. This will mean time but he is anxious that the solution should be found by at the latest the end of the year.
- It must not be assumed that Mendès-France will not encounter difficulty in having Parliament approve whatever proposals he finally accepts, unless it is clear that Britain is treated on the same footing as France. In principle he must expect difficulties about any proposal to admit Germany on an equal footing to NATO as at present constituted (it is, of course, unlikely that he will agree to such a proposal): the French Government requires Parliamentary approval before it can agree to the admission of a new member to NATO.
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