Report from Joseph D. Brennan to John J. Hearne (Washington DC)¹

In accordance with instructions I went to New York on Wednesday, the 22nd September, to meet Congressman John Fogarty prior to his reception by the Secretary of State to discuss with him the possibility of a new approach to the problem of Partition in Ireland. In that connection I can do no better than to attach herewith a copy of the brief which John Fogarty had made up for presentation to the Secretary.² I saw Mr. Fogarty at the Biltmore Hotel on Thursday in the morning. I discussed with Mr. Fogarty the brief or document which had been made up and also another document which was divided into several parts, each part to be used by a single member of the delegation during the discussion. A copy of that document embodying all these points in one statement is also attached.³ I spent several hours with Mr. Fogarty previous to the conference. I must say that he was very conscious of the importance of the occasion as it was the first time that a Secretary of State had consented to listen to a parliamentary delegation interested in the subject. While slightly awed, I must confess, by the prospect of the responsibility which he had taken on himself, Congressman Fogarty was nevertheless determined, he told me, to leave no point uncovered during his discussion.

I left him about 2.30 p.m. and he made his way to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel to meet the other members of the delegation. It had originally been proposed that five members should comprise the deputation but on second thoughts Mr. Fogarty had reduced the number to three – Congressman John Rooney and Congresswoman Edna Kelly. There was a particular reason in each case. John Rooney is the ranking Democratic member on the Committee for State Department Appropriations and may well be Chairman of that Committee in the next Congress. Congresswoman Edna Kelly is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Democratic side. She has served that Committee for several years.

The meeting with the Secretary of State was arranged for 5.15 p.m. in his suite at the Waldorf Astoria. Previous to the meeting Mr. Fogarty’s assistant in these matters, Mr. David Doyle, telephoned to Mr. Roderic O’Connor,⁴ the Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State, and requested that arrangements be made so that no publicity should ensue as a result of the delegation’s visit. Mr. Fogarty considered that an important point because it would indicate to the Secretary that the visit of the delegation was not a political manoeuvre but an attempt by serious earnest-minded members to seek, in co-operation with the Secretary, a solution or a new approach to a long-standing problem. He was assured by Mr. O’Connor that that would be the Secretary’s wish also and as a result I learned afterwards that the press was completely excluded and kept unaware of the visit.

When Mr. Fogarty was meeting with members of his delegation and briefing them as to the course he expected them to follow I went to the United Nations to hear Mr. Dulles speak. While it is irrelevant to this report, I observed that Mr. Dulles immediately after his speech which concluded about 4.45 p.m. left the Assembly hall without delay. I concluded, therefore, that he was in time for his meeting.

I did not succeed in seeing Mr. Fogarty again until about 9 o’clock though I was available in my hotel room in the interval. We had dinner together and he then told me that he had given the most solemn undertaking to the Secretary that nothing of the discussions would be divulged. Each member of the delegation had given a similar undertaking. I was somewhat taken aback by this attitude as I had concluded, and thought with a certain amount of reason, that the substance of the discussion would be given to me. However, I accepted the situation as revealed by Mr. Fogarty but nevertheless arrived at certain conclusions as a result of our conversation.

The Secretary received them alone in his suite at the Waldorf Astoria. When he received them he was actually looking at television and at a film picture of himself delivering the speech at the United Nations that afternoon. His reception was cordial and when Mr. Fogarty informed him first of all that they desired no publicity as a result of the discussions and would be glad if care was taken that no mention of them be made, the Secretary expressed his approval of that and consequently the discussion which followed was an easy and relaxed one. They were detained for almost an hour. The delegation of their own accord broke off the interview. According to what I learned or could deduce Mr. Dulles would have kept them longer but they concluded that their points being made it would be better for them to depart.

Mr. Fogarty stated that he had covered every point in the two documents attached: that he had left with the Secretary the document marked A; that the members of his delegation had left their copies of the various points raised in document B. In other words, all the kites which they flew or all the possibilities of action under various lines were covered in the course of the discussion. I could not, however, ascertain in any precise fashion what line was most favoured or what suggestion that was raised was most in accord with the Secretary’s own thinking. I formulated certain ideas of the discussion in my own mind and from something that was dropped came to the conclusion that the Secretary would on a high level explore the possibility of a solution on defence lines. At any rate from something I was told I gathered that the Secretary proposed to discuss the question in the defence context with the British Board of Strategy which I had never heard of and I am not sure that the title I give is the correct one. It may be that the term was used roughly to describe the American committee which deals with the defence of Great Britain and the Atlantic area. I can speak with no precision on that point. I did also have the impression that the members of the delegation were greatly gratified by the reception given to them by Mr. Dulles. They also seemed a little surprised that the Secretary showed a fairly intimate knowledge of the partition problem though he had no brief in front of him. I am under the impression that the Secretary proposes to raise this issue next week at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London. I concluded that he would hardly raise it in an open meeting and I formulated the idea that he might use the case of Ireland as a stick to beat the British in reaching agreement on other measures.

I was assured by Mr. Fogarty that all the points mentioned in the document marked ‘B’ were discussed in some form or another even those which might be unacceptable to us. I was also told by Mr. Fogarty that the delegation took the line and emphasised it that the situation in Ireland was one which ought to be solved on the basis of American interest just as they had reached an agreement with Spain on that similar basis. They emphasized that the views they expressed and the suggestions they raised would not necessarily be acceptable to the Irish Government but they thought that consideration should be given to any possibility which could be accepted as a new approach to a long standing problem. I gathered that on the religious issue the Secretary was well informed. I also gathered as I before stated that the line of approach to a solution was thought to be in the defence channel. What precisely that line was I could not ascertain and much of what I have stated is merely deduction though I should think it is not too far away from the fact.

According again to my deduction the Secretary will pursue some intimate discussion with the top level British authorities and he was agreeable to the suggestion that there should be another meeting. I cannot ascertain if the delegation were to take any action pending the next meeting but it was left I gathered to John Fogarty to fix the date and the date suggested is the 15th January, or thereabouts, 1955. Mr. Fogarty is to get in touch with Mr. Morton,⁵ the Assistant-Secretary of State, whenever he desires to see the Secretary and an appointment will be arranged.

As I have before stated I was disappointed in the failure of Mr. Fogarty to be more on-coming in affording me information but he several times reiterated that he could not depart from his pledged word as to the secrecy of which was to be maintained concerning the interview and discussions. It might be well, however, to advise our Ambassador in London of such information as is contained in this report, much more meagre than I had hoped, so that on his side he might be able to ascertain if Mr. Dulles takes the matter up in one form or another.⁶ I should say that I was given to understand that Mr. Dulles attached considerable importance to the meeting not only because the delegation represented a very substantial bloc in Congress on whose votes the Administration might have to depend in the coming Congress but also I would infer that there may be a desire on Mr. Dulles’ part to add to his own prestige by seeking and obtaining the solution to a question which was never found by any of his predecessors in office. I am inclined to believe that Mr. Dulles possibly is measuring himself with his predecessor Mr. Dean Acheson and would be anxious to set a record of achievement much higher than that attained by Mr. Acheson. He emphasised however again, I gathered, that this was a matter outside the range of party politics and was gratified by the view point of the delegation in that respect. One point I think that I obtained the exact information on was that of the parallel between Cyprus and Ireland. He stated that that morning the question of Cyprus had been brought up by the Committee dealing with the Agenda for the United Nations Assembly and that despite great pressure by the British authorities on the United States, the United States had refrained from voting on the proposal that the status of Cyprus be considered by the Committee dealing with the Agenda for the United Nations Assembly. As a result the proposal was carried by nine to three. Apparently the Secretary mentioned this as indicating that American policy was not so completely in British pockets as might have been suggested possibly by some of those present.