Memorandum by Conor Cruise O'Brien¹
'The policy of Sinn Féin'

The anti-partition policy of the revived Sinn Féin – IRA movement is simply expressed in the October issue of The United Irishman. It is: Drive England out by force.

In view of the obviously increasing importance of this movement, and the degree of popular support it is beginning to obtain, it is well to examine what chances of success – i.e. of ending partition – such a policy may have.

From a straightforward comparison of military strength it would seem an impossible programme. Britain is still one of the Great Powers and with modern weapons (jet aircraft, atomic artillery, etc.) the gap between a Great Power and a small nation which must rely on obsolete weapons has grown very wide.

However it seems – according to the writer of the recent articles in the Daily Herald – that Sinn Féin believes, or affects to believe, that Britain would ‘stand aside’ and leave the Dublin and Belfast governments to fight it out. There are no obvious grounds for this belief: Northern Ireland, in British eyes, is an integral part of the United Kingdom, and it is inconceivable that any British Government should stand meekly by and let it be annexed against the will of the majority of its own inhabitants and by a much weaker country.

However, even if, per absurdum, Britain should stand aside we should still have to reckon with a determined population of nearly a million, already possessing a para-military force (the ‘Specials’) equipped with modern light weapons. Much more important, this area possesses, as we do not, modern heavy industry, which is already producing jet-aircraft and aircraft carriers, can produce artillery and tanks, and is at least carrying out experiments in the production of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Stormont, even if abandoned by a British government, could enlist, if it needed it, powerful financial and commercial support in Britain, Canada etc. To put it mildly our chances, with our resources, of subduing this area against its will are not bright. It may be said that the Unionists have not the will to put up a serious resistance. No one who knows these people honestly believes that. To add the theory of ‘non-resistant Unionists’ to that of ‘non-intervening England’ is to pile improbability on improbability.

But the stock Sinn Féin argument does not refer itself to the realities of the present. It consists of an analogy with the past: ‘We were outnumbered in 1919-20 and inferior in weapons. Yet we drove England out. We can do the same thing to-day if we show the same courage as the men of that time’.

This is a plausible argument which appeals – as we can see – to the young. It therefore deserves to be examined closely.

In 1919-20 the partial victory of the insurrection was based on three factors:

1. The courage and self-sacrifice of a determined minority of the population. That factor still exists to-day and is the strength of the modern IRA.
2. The moral support of the majority of the population in the areas for which independence was won.

   The comparable factor does not exist to-day. The population in the area concerned would be, in the majority, bitterly opposed to us. It is worth noting that in 1919-20 the Irish efforts were successful only in those parts of the country where they were supported by a heavy preponderance of the local population.

3. The moral support of outside public opinion, and in particular of American opinion.

   This factor, which may well have been the decisive one in 1919-21, would be almost wholly lacking in present conditions. In 1919-21 we appeared as a small nation struggling to be free. This time we would appear as a small nation struggling to coerce an even smaller population. The difference, to an outside observer, is a decisive one. In the case of America, not only would that general objection apply but there would also be the following particular objections:

   1. The Six Counties helped America in World War II. The Twenty-Six Counties did not. It is generally agreed that this did much to cool ‘pro-Irish’ sentiment in the United States.
   2. The Six Counties (as part of the UK) are part of the Atlantic Alliance, cornerstone of American foreign policy. The Twenty-Six have refused to join that alliance.
   3. Britain is American’s principal ally; not, as in 1919, an ex-ally with whom she was on rather bad terms.
   4. The ‘invasion of the North’ would appear to all outsiders as a religious war, Catholic v. Protestant. As most Americans are Protestants, most Americans would be strongly on the Protestant side. This factor did not operate to any serious extent in 1919-21, when the ‘small nations’ issue was predominant.

It seems virtually certain that the American influence, which helped us in the earlier struggle, would tell against us now, and that opinion in the West would be generally against us. In that context Britain – so far from standing outside – could apply her military superiority much more ruthlessly than she did in 1919. Dublin and Cork, and our railroads and airports, could be heavily bombed in advance of a general invasion. Our attempt to end partition could only end, in such military and political conditions, by the re-occupation of the entire country, at least for a time, after heavy loss of life. Even when Britain withdrew, as she probably eventually would, from the Twenty-Six Counties, she would probably retain, as NATO bases (with the approval of her NATO allies) the old treaty ports. We can hardly count on a new Chamberlain arising to give them back.

If this analysis is correct – and the facts are plain enough – it follows that the more ‘successful’ Sinn Féin is in rallying support to its policy of violence the greater the disasters which it will eventually bring on the country.

It is hard to say how far the Sinn Féin leaders are aware of these facts: how far they are governed by emotion and tradition; and how far they (or some of them) may have long-term, undivulged, plans for introducing a new factor in their favour. The only ‘new factor’ that could be introduced, as far as one can see, would be Soviet military aid, and it does seem likely that the idea of emulating Casement (in changed conditions) may have occurred to some of the more reckless people in a very reckless organization. It seems rather unlikely, however, that this could lead, at least at present, to anything serious. Ireland, from Russia’s point of view, would be an unfavourable terrain on which to start a World War. Admittedly, if the third World War had broken out, Ireland might suit Russia well enough for a diversion campaign, backed by paratroops or otherwise. This could lead to the physical destruction of most, or all, of the country; British permanent re-occupation if the allies won the war; or Communisation and de-Christianisation if the Russians won it. Such things are always possibilities in the present world-situation. They are rendered more likely, by the foolhardy activities of a body which is living on ill-understood historical analogies.

Nothing has been said in this memorandum of the moral and social aspects of the coercion of the Ulster Protestants. It may be questioned however whether Ireland would really be better off if, through the success of the ‘invasion of the North’, it included a sullen and hostile population beaten into acquiescence. Certainly it is hardly the ideal for which Davis² lived. Yet, for the reasons set out above, that is not the consummation we need fear – not that but the ending of partition by the re-occupation of the Twenty-Six Counties.