Memorandum by Frederick H. Boland
(Top Secret) (Copy)

I saw the Lord Privy Seal (Captain Crookshank)¹ by appointment on the morning of the 14th September. Sir Saville Garner was present during the interview and made notes of the conversation.

I told Captain Crookshank that I had come to talk about the recent revival of IRA activity. Ministers in Dublin had been giving the matter a good deal of consideration, both generally and in the context of the recent British note. I had been in Dublin the previous week and had had the benefit of hearing the views of the Taoiseach and the Ministers concerned. They thought it would be a good thing – and that it would be in keeping with the spirit of the British note, the tone of which had been appreciated – if, on my return to London, I were to come in and give the British Government – not necessarily as an official reply to the note or in any formal way (because I was not speaking from any official text and, therefore, couldn’t tie myself to particular terms) – a picture of present official thinking in Dublin with regard to the problem. Our Ministers felt, and I was sure he would agree, that good relations and mutual understanding would best be served by candid and objective explanation of respective points of view.

It was a grievous experience for our Government to have to face a further revival of IRA activity at this stage. The present campaign, of course, had its roots in the Partition problem and derived its impetus from the resentment and impatience which the continuance of Partition created. The melancholy fact had to be faced and the British or anyone else would be foolish to try to blind themselves to it – that, as long as Partition lasts, IRA activity is bound to be a constantly recurring problem. The Lord Privy Seal intervened about this point to enquire how numerous the IRA were thought to be. I said that no one could tell for certain. The number of active members in the Twenty-Six Counties might be no more than 600. But too much should not be deduced from so relatively low a figure. Secret organisations were not to be measured by the number of their active members (which they often had an interest in restricting). What had to be borne in mind, in addition to the number of men in the IRA, was the volume of public opinion sympathetic or indulgent to the organisation’s methods and aims.

On this latter point – I went on to say – it had to be borne in mind that, while IRA activity presented certain problems for the British government and the government of the Six Counties, it presented a serious problem of internal public opinion for the Irish government. The spread of IRA activity was helped not only, as I had said, by the feeling of resentment and impatience caused by the continuance of Partition. It also derived support from the conviction, which I thought existed in other parts of the world as well as Ireland, that in dealing with the British in connection with problems such as Partition, constructive and statesmanlike policies were no use and the only hope of progress lies in the use of force. British policy in Ireland had left a lot of Irish people with that conviction and it was a great embarrassment to the Irish government.

The Irish government had made it plain that they were opposed to the use of force to solve Partition. The Taoiseach spoke to this effect in his speech on the 28th October, 1954,² and the Minister for External Affairs had spoken clearly in the same general sense the previous week.³ The attitude of the Irish Government was, therefore, not in doubt, and there was some evidence that the official statements of that attitude which had been made had not been without their effect. The government had to be careful, however, that it didn’t alienate public support and swing sympathy over towards the IRA by prematurely taking repressive measures which people might regard as unnecessary or even provocative. Repression had never been a popular or very successful policy in Ireland. When it had succeeded, it was only when people were absolutely convinced of its justice and necessity.

Other considerations had to be borne in mind. Unlike some of its recent predecessors, the present IRA movement was not a purely military one; it had a political as well as a military arm. Moreover, its campaign was directed, not primarily against the Irish government, or even against the Six County government, but against the presence of British troops in the Six Counties. The British troops in the Six Counties were the target of their operations to the point at which they seemed disinclined to clash with Six County police or even the B Specials. Finally, the aims of the new movement were probably not primarily military at all but propagandist. It hoped by means of the publicity given to arrests, trials, prison sentences, etc., to rouse public opinion and sympathy in Ireland and abroad.

The Irish Government had been considering the whole question in the light of the foregoing and other relevant considerations. They were sincerely convinced that for them to initiate anything like a policy of repression would be a grave mistake. Public opinion in Ireland would not see any necessity for such a move. The firm stand taken by the Government had already had an effect and the vital objective of steadying public opinion behind sound, long-term, democratic policies would certainly not be served by anything which tended to throw public sympathy to the other side.

The task of the government was, however, not made easier by the statements made from time to time by political leaders in the Six Counties, especially by speeches which urged the Irish government to action in terms which sometimes went almost as far as to suggest that the Irish government were indifferent, if not secretly indulgent, to the new developments. Only harm was done by this. An example of it was the demand that the Irish government should agree to extradite members of the IRA to the Six Counties – a demand which was not only absurd in the light of universal international practice but positively mischievous as implying that there was something which the Irish government could quite properly do but which it wouldn’t do either out of ill-will or indulgence to the IRA. If the Six County people could be induced to drop that particular item in their propaganda, it would be a good thing.

The Irish government thought that there was one step which the British government could take which would represent a major contribution towards the solution of the present difficulties. As I had said, the avowed aims of the present movement were focussed on the presence of British troops in the Six Counties. From the practical point of view, their presence must serve very little purpose. The Six County people were well able to protect themselves against IRA attacks without them. From the political point of view, however, their presence was a major irritant. While recognising that the suggestion was not without difficulties, we thought that it would contribute enormously towards the easement of the present situation if steps were taken to withdraw the British troops from the Six Counties entirely. Nothing would do so much to reduce the risks of violent outbreaks because even IRA spokesmen had said that the movement was opposed to any fighting between Irishmen in Ireland. Sir Saville Garner enquired whether, when I spoke about withdrawing British troops entirely, I meant to include troops stationed at Derry which under NATO arrangements was really an international base. I said that the more complete the withdrawal the better, although I recognised that an international base like Derry stood on a somewhat different footing from purely British military establishments throughout the Six County area.

Finally, I said, the Irish government had considered the request for co-operation made in the recent British note. While I was not actually making an official reply to the request, I thought that I could give an idea of the Irish government’s present thinking on the point by saying, firstly, that in no circumstances could they agree to furnish information about Irish citizens actually apprehended or being actively sought in connection with IRA offences; secondly, that, as the IRA was of its nature a secret organisation, no one outside it could ever be sure in advance what their plans were and, therefore, the Irish government could not in any circumstances accept any responsibility or commitment in that regard; but, thirdly, if in any particular case it did come to the knowledge of the Irish government that preparations were being made in Ireland for operations in this country likely to involve the risk of bloodshed or similar serious consequences, the government would consider what practical steps it could itself take in Ireland to obviate the risk and prevent the attempt being made. The Lord Privy Seal asked whether the Irish government had powers to act in such a case. I said I was not in a position to discuss what the powers were, but I took it that the government were satisfied that, in the case envisaged, it would have the necessary powers to enable it to act if it decided to do so. The Lord Privy Seal asked if this meant that if we had knowledge of some attempted coup in England not involving any preparations in Ireland, we would not be prepared to pass along the information. I said that the three principles I had stated gave, I thought, a fair picture of the government’s present thinking on the matter; but personally I didn’t feel qualified to construe their application to particular cases.