Letter from Frank Biggar to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'Suez Canal Crisis'
(Secret)

1. I had a conversation yesterday evening about the Suez Canal Conference with Mr. H.A.F. Rumbold,² one of the Assistant Under-Secretaries at the Commonwealth Relations Office. Mr. Rumbold, whose duties are primarily of an economic nature, has been handling the Suez Canal question insofar as it concerns the CRO – and Commonwealth interests are of course vitally involved. I made it clear to Mr. Rumbold that I was not acting under instructions in calling upon him but that I felt that the Irish Government would be interested in any information he might be able to let me have as to the British Government’s views concerning the prospects for the Conference. Mr. Rumbold said that he was very glad to have the opportunity of discussing the question with me.

[matter omitted]

13. Mr. Rumbold also asked me what were the views of the Irish Government on the question generally. I replied that I had no instructions whatsoever on the point – and repeated that our interview had taken place solely on my own initiative – but that I felt that, having regard to our consistent policy of supporting international organisations, my Government would be unlikely to favour military action against Egypt except under the aegis of the United Nations.
14. It is with some hesitation that I attempt to evaluate this conversation. Mr. Rumbold chose his words with great care throughout but his habitual manner of speaking is cautious and reflective. There is no doubt that his delineation of the British Government’s attitude is completely in line with the determined views which both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have publicly expressed. His reference to the British Government’s being prepared for all contingencies was said with the greatest deliberation and he was equally positive in disclaiming any intention on the part of the British Government to bring in the United Nations. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the British Government seriously contemplates attacking Egypt alone or with the sole support of France. American support would be, to say the least, doubtful and there is at the present little sign of support from other Western Governments. The Asiatic world as a whole would be vehement in opposition and the strain on what is left of Commonwealth unity might well prove intolerable. With the resources and bases available to Britain, the invasion of Egypt would be no easy undertaking and the probable results – the eruption of the Middle East with the destruction of the Canal and the vast investment in the oil industry and possibly the intervention of Russia leading to the outbreak of World War III – seem entirely disproportionate to the immediate objective.

[matter omitted]

15. In the light of these considerations, it seems a fair assumption that the real policy of the British Government is to make a display of force with a view to impressing Col. Nasser and the countries participating in the present Conference. The comparative moderation of Col. Nasser’s recent statements, the views concerning the Egyptian position expressed yesterday by the Pakistani Foreign Minister and the reported request to the Iraqi delegation to put Egypt’s viewpoint to the Conference, together with the arrival of Col. Nasser’s Chef de Cabinet in London, all suggest that British policy may be having some success in regard to its first aim. How far they may be able to maintain that policy during the Conference remains to be seen.
16. An important element in the whole situation is, no doubt, the need which Sir Anthony Eden may feel for a foreign policy success to offset the continuing criticism of his Government in domestic affairs. It is scarcely credible however that Sir Anthony would seek such a success at the enormous peril which military action against Egypt would involve.