Extract from a letter from John J. Hearne to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'The Suez Canal'
(Personal and Confidential)

I have the honour to report as follows:-

Yesterday afternoon I called to the State Department by appointment (at my request) to obtain an official appraisal of the situation regarding the Suez Canal problem. Mr. Brennan² came with me. We were received by Mr. Stuart Wesson Rockwell, Deputy Director of Near Eastern Affairs and Mr. Arne T. Fliflet who occupies the Irish Desk in the Department. We remained thirty minutes.

I told Mr. Rockwell at the beginning of our conversation that we had not come on instructions, but that I thought our Minister would expect me to report to him on the situation as it appeared to the State Department at the end of the Cairo discussions. I referred to the great part which Mr. Secretary Dulles had played at the London Conference in his indefatigable and industrious search for a peaceful solution of the problem, and his stand against the use of force.

Mr. Rockwell outlined the proposal of the Secretary of State adopted by eighteen of the twenty-two countries represented at the London Conference. He said that Mr. Menzies and his colleagues of the five-member Committee had no instructions to negotiate with Colonel Nasser. Their instructions from the London Conference were to place the proposal of the eighteen Nations before the Egyptian President and to request his acceptance. Following acceptance, negotiations would then be opened. Mr. Rockwell said that Mr. Dulles was disappointed that the proposal had not been accepted and he handed us a press release to that effect which had just been issued.

I said that as I understood the Convention of 1888 it guaranteed freedom of navigation of the Canal to ships of commerce or of war of every flag; and that the operation and maintenance of the Canal was a matter distinct from the right of navigation.

Mr. Rockwell said that that was so. ‘Egypt’ he added ‘objects to any international responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Canal. The Egyptians do not envisage any situation in which they will not have control of the Canal. No foreign group is, so far as they are concerned, to have any responsibility for operation and maintenance. The Board of Control proposed in Mr. Dulles’ plan would be a foreign Board with Egyptian participation.’

I said that as I understood the proposal put to President Nasser its basic principle was international control of operation and maintenance.

Mr. Rockwell said that that was so.

I asked whether there was some way in which the proposal could be amended so as to recognize Egypt’s sovereignty over the Canal.

Mr. Rockwell referred to the Spanish amendment rejected by the eighteen Nations. That was an attempt to reconcile international control with Egyptian sovereignty. It proposed an Egyptian Board of Control with foreign participation.

I asked what the next step would be following the failure of the Cairo meeting.

Mr. Rockwell said that it was difficult to anticipate what would happen.

I asked whether it was thought that the matter would be placed before the United Nations.

‘No one really knows’, Mr. Rockwell replied, ‘what would happen at the United Nations. All kinds of amendments would be introduced which would water down Mr. Dulles’ proposal. Then, again, no one could say that the traffic on the Canal has stopped or even been reduced, and then it would be asked: what wrong has Egypt done?’ (Note: At a dinner party which I attended at General Romulo’s residence some evenings ago Ambassador Mohammed Ali of Pakistan told the whole company at the table that President Nasser had done nothing wrong.) Mr. Rockwell added that with some foreign Canal pilots not returning to Egypt from leave in England and France, the traffic on the Canal might slow down owing to the shortage of pilots and the strain on those who remained.

Mr. Brennan said that he had read in the press that some foreign Governments were offering inducements to pilots of their nationality to leave. He asked of what nationalities the foreign pilots on the Canal were.

Mr. Rockwell said: ‘They are mostly English and French. Their Governments are not inducing them to quit their posts. But some who have been on leave have not returned. They are still on the pay lists of the Universal Canal Company.’ He added that some foreign pilots were refusing to work on the Canal.

I asked whether Russia was behind the nationalization of the Canal.

Mr. Rockwell said that they had no evidence that Russia instigated that decision. It was Nasser’s own idea. The plan had been in preparation for two years. But Russia did everything possible to get Nasser to reject the proposal of the eighteen Nations.

‘Was the nationalization move a direct consequence of the refusal of the United States to finance the Aswan Dam’ I asked.

Mr. Rockwell said that the refusal to finance the dam was not the cause of the nationalization of the Canal. It could best be described as the occasion for it. The cause was largely psychological. Refusal to finance the dam put Nasser in the mood to carry out his long prepared plan.

‘Nasser’, Mr. Rockwell continued, ‘by his rejection of our proposal in Cairo has set forces in motion which will be to the detriment of Egyptian interests.’ He instanced the loss of ‘international confidence in Egypt’, the loss of ‘international respect’. Then he added that it remained to be seen whether Egypt could run the Canal. The Iranians had learned their lesson when they found that they could not run their refineries by themselves.

Mr. Rockwell said that even if Egypt did not sign a new Convention the users of the Canal have their rights under the Convention of 1888, the right of free passage which Egypt has not interfered with. The users of the Canal have what Mr. Dulles has called a ‘perpetual easement.’ And they can, if so minded, try alternative routes for the traffic heretofore carried through the Canal.

Mr. Rockwell repeated that Nasser’s rejection of the proposal of the eighteen Nations set forces going which would be to Egypt’s detriment. The United States had opposed a resort to force to solve the problem, (Mr. Dulles had been called ‘an appeaser’ in London) but Nasser’s attitude in Cairo last week had introduced ‘a new uncertainty into the situation’. He referred to the concentration of British and French forces on Cyprus and gave us the impression that the present situation was one of gravity and danger.

Mr. Brennan asked what the attitude of the Arab Kingdom was likely to be.

Mr. Rockwell replied that Saudi Arabia knew on which side its bread was buttered; it is the biggest oil producer. Trans-Jordan produced no oil but the pipelines ran through its territory. The British Protectorates like Bahrain on the Persian Gulf would take no part. Israel was keeping very quiet. And Iraq was opposed to Nasser. (Note: Mr. Rockwell’s statements about the attitude of Israel and Iraq are not borne out by the propaganda they are sending out from their Embassies in Washington).

I thanked Mr. Rockwell for his careful appraisal of the situation for us and expressed the hope that the skill and fortitude of Mr. Secretary Dulles’ patient diplomacy would result in a peaceful solution of the problem of the Canal. I said that everyone had admired his policy of working out solutions of complicated problems by difficult negotiations over protracted intervals.

Mr. Rockwell said that that indeed might be the method by which the problem of the Suez Canal would finally be settled.

I enclose the release of yesterday which was handed to us in the State Department. You will have read it already in the press.

[matter omitted]