No. 453 NAI DFA/5/305/173/Pt II
Report from William P. Fay to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'The Israeli-Egyptian Conflict and the Anglo-French Ultimatum'
(111/16:580/56) (Confidential)
Paris, 31 October 19561
- The news that Israeli troops had crossed the Egyptian frontier arrived in Paris, by a strange and unfortunate coincidence, a few hours before the inauguration of a monument to the Jewish martyrs of the Concentration Camps on a site given by the Municipal Council (a ceremony which, as you know, I attended). The coincidence led to the absence of the British Ambassador (who was afraid to be thought to take sides) and of the President and Cabinet of France who were engaged at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers. Shortly after the meeting, Guy Mollet and his Foreign Minister flew to London to concert policy in the light of this new and very dangerous development. They succeeded in their task and, as you know, Sir Anthony Eden made a statement in the House of Commons, the substance of which was later repeated to the National Assembly by Guy Mollet.
- Although the substance of the statement was the same insofar as it repeated the ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, the tone of the French Prime Minister’s speech was very different to that of his British colleague. If the British Ambassador had feared, earlier in the day, to appear to take sides, no such fear inhibited Guy Mollet. What struck all those of us who were present for this speech in the Diplomatic box was not so much the hostile tone towards Egypt, – which was expected – but the extremely friendly line adopted towards Israel. You will recollect that in my report of the 19th January, 1956,2 it was suggested early this year by one of the best informed of Quai d’Orsay officials that a Socialist Government would tend to favour Israel against the Arabs. Intervening events have undoubtedly made this course more attractive to the majority of Centre and Right Wing deputies who are all now convinced that Col. Nasser is France’s enemy No. 1., and there have been various hints in speeches and newspaper articles that, this being so, France should draw the necessary conclusions in respect of her ‘only real friend in the Middle East’, as Israel has been called. But Guy Mollet’s statement is the first official endorsement of this attitude.
- He opened his speech by referring to the events of the day and asked how they should be regarded. On the one hand, he said, they knew the courage and resolution of the Israeli people, which had been shown in their remarkable internal achievements and their facing of hostile neighbours to maintain their independence. They knew too Israel’s attachment to human rights and fundamental democratic principles for which, indeed, they had paid more than most people. They recognised finally the provocation to which Israel had been submitted by the Arab States under the instigation of Egypt. Having said so much in favour of Israel, Mr. Mollet turned to regard Col. Nasser. He referred to his violation of International Law by his refusal to allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal and his nationalisation of that canal. Only recently the French had a proof of his interference in Algeria when they captured the ship Athos. Although, said Mr. Mollet, this summing up would seem to show that Israel acted in legitimate self-defence, it was not the desire of the French Government to pronounce a condemnation or an approbation of action. They were respectful of the Charter of the United Nations and had supported the American request to bring the matter before the Security Council, but could the matter be allowed to rest there? In the interest of freedom of traffic through the Suez Canal, the British and French Governments had come to a common determination. Mr. Mollet then announced the terms of the Franco-British ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, of which you will no doubt have the text. He mentioned that he hoped for the support of the United States Government in this Franco-British action. He had addressed a personal message to President Eisenhower for this purpose. He ended by saying that the French Government was conscious of the gravity of the decision which it had taken, but it was equally conscious of the grave consequences which would ensue, from an absence of decision, for the balance of the Middle East and the peace of the world.
- This speech was clapped to the echo. So far as could be judged, there was no dissidence on any benches, except the Communist ones. Never, apparently, has the National Assembly been more united behind Government action. This unity was later borne out by the Assembly’s vote. Guy Mollet had asked that the Government’s policy should be sanctioned by the confidence of the National Assembly. When the vote took place in the early hours of Wednesday morning, he received it by an overwhelming majority of 368 votes against 182 in the National Assembly; 289 votes against only 19 in the Senate. This massive support showed that the Government have in their present action the backing of all Parties from the Socialists to the extreme Right. So powerful indeed is the Government’s appeal that even Mendès-France could not induce the Radical Ministers in the Government or more than 10 other members of the Radical Party to follow him into abstention. Nevertheless, the opposition or abstention included not merely the Communists and fellow-travellers but nearly all the Overseas Deputies. This has led the editor of ‘La Croix’ to draw the serious conclusion that, if the Government has obtained the comfortable majority that it wished, ‘it knows nevertheless with what apprehension a large number of votes were accorded it by many Deputies who understand the utter dismay of the Moslem population (expressed by the abstention of a large proportion of African Deputies)’. This warning and a quizzical leader in ‘Le Monde’, which nevertheless stopped short of opposition, are the only signs of criticism in the majority of the French press. Only the press of the extreme left ‘France-Observateur’, ‘Libération’ and of course ‘Humanité’ openly oppose the Government’s action. Even ‘Express’, while very critical, appears to be so principally because the Prime Minister, as they see it, has placed France’s future in jeopardy.
- The quasi-unanimity of French opinion behind the Government – so unlike the situation in England – can be understood if it is seen in the light of two predominant considerations. In the first place, and covering everything else, is the matter of the Suez canal. Since the nationalisation of the canal by Col. Nasser, the great majority of centre and right wing deputies, reflecting the overwhelming majority of the country, have been spoiling for a show-down with the Egyptian dictator and would have supported unanimously a forceful action in the early weeks of August, a reaction which only the firm pressure of American diplomacy and their own military unpreparedness prevented. In this, they are supported also by the great majority of the Prime Minister’s own Party even if a considerable minority have doubts and hesitations which, nevertheless, have never yielded open opposition. Even the socialist newspaper ‘Le Populaire’ supports the Government unconditionally. The Franco-British ultimatum is thus seen as, to some extent, the reply by France and Britain to Col. Nasser. It has been remarked throughout the last two months that the Prime Minister and Mr. Pineau have both maintained a continuous and, in the circumstances, somewhat surprising optimism about the outcome of the Suez canal affair. In his speech on the vote of confidence referred to in my report of the 23rd of October,3 Guy Mollet affirmed that Nasser knew that he could not win and that he might even lose. He made a mysterious reference to a ‘diplomatic secret’ which France still holds and which would be revealed in due time; and during the same debate Mr. Pineau made covert references to the fact that the game had not been won or lost and that France still held a card in reserve. This has led some to think, in the events which have occurred, that there has been collusion between France and Britain on the one hand and Israel on the other and it is reported in Paris that this view is widely held in Washington and indeed in the corridors of the United Nations. It seems to me highly unlikely that any open collusion could have existed. Israel unfortunately has been placed in a situation of such constant peril in the midst of a hostile Arab world that preventive action by Israeli forces may well have seemed the only way to avoid annihilation. A preventive war by Israel has indeed been feared as the really dangerous issue in the Middle East for several years past and it seems probable that she has hitherto been prevented from taking this course only by a firm indication on the part of the Western Powers that any such action by Israeli forces would leave her isolated and might even lead to armed intervention on foot of a condemnation by the United Nations. What is possible, therefore, is not so much collusion between Britain and France on the one hand and Israel on the other but some indication which may have been given to the Government of Tel Aviv that if Israel took action in present circumstances she would have nothing to fear from them.
- A second and most important element which has led to the massing of French opinion behind the Government in its present action is a general feeling of irritation in France with the United States. Almost without exception, French opinion has blamed the United States as the party apparently responsible for the Suez crisis. In the first place, it was the provocative American decision to withdraw her offer of assistance for the Aswan Dam which was the immediate and proximate cause of Col. Nasser’s speech announcing the nationalisation of the canal. Having, as the French think, precipitated the crisis by this action, Mr. Dulles is then seen as the principal opponent of a forceful action on the part of Britain and France intended to deprive Col. Nasser of the fruit of his act. Throughout the crisis, French opinion has been hag-ridden by the thought of Munich and comparison with Hitler’s methods, and they see the United States in the role of a Chamberlain, anxious to preserve the peace at all costs even, as they feel, at the cost of justice and respect for international engagements. Mr. Dulles has never held a high reputation in Paris but his diplomatic activity over the Suez affair has irritated French people to the point of open anger. This anger and irritation is not reduced by the thought that America has been going through a pre-electoral period during which it has been exceptionally difficult for the President and his Secretary of State to take a firm line on the principal international issues. French critics of America tend merely to shrug their shoulders and remark that a great country which every four years goes through a six months period of pre-electoral impotence is no sure ally and may even lead the Western Alliance into positions of irreparable weakness. There is no doubt that, so far as France is concerned, the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance has never been at a lower ebb, despite the firm assurance contained in Guy Mollet’s declaration of investiture that it formed one of the key points of his programme. So far, therefore, from dampening French ardour or their support for the Government’s present action in Egypt, American disapproval already firmly voiced by President Eisenhower, will unfortunately only tend to confirm their disappointment with United States’ policy in general.
- The most disturbing feature of the Anglo-French ultimatum and its execution by military action in Egypt, would appear to be the open rebuff to the authority of the United Nations given by the two countries which have hitherto been its strongest supporters. In his able and forceful speech in the House of Commons yesterday (a speech with most of which it is difficult to disagree), Mr. Gaitskell referred to the British action, assuming it was carried out by forceful intervention in Egypt, as prejudicing the three main pillars of Britain’s policy; the solidarity of the British Commonwealth, the Anglo-American alliance and unconditional support for the United Nations. In French terms, it is clear that the first of these factors is of concern only to their English ally and, as has already been suggested, they are not apparently – at least at the moment, much concerned about the second, although the Atlantic Alliance forms a keystone also of French policy. What must, however, upset friends of France and thoughtful people everywhere, is the apparent unconcern with which the French Government and Parliament are prepared, it would seem, to take action outside and in despite of the only international Authority having the juridical and moral right to pronounce on the issue. This is especially surprising from a Socialist Prime Minister and a mainly Socialist Government which have always placed at the centre of their international programme respect for the authority of the United Nations. Respect for that authority, however, has been declining rapidly in France, more especially since the General Assembly voted twelve months ago to place the Algerian issue on its Agenda. It reached its nadir when the Security Council was prevented, by the Russian veto, from adopting the Anglo-French plan for a negotiated settlement of the Suez canal issue. When Mr. Pierre Cot,4 the leader of the Progressist (fellow-travelling) Party rose in the debate two days ago to ask the Government not to use the slogan of Charles Maurras ‘La France seule’ but to listen to the appeal of President Eisenhower since, if they did not, the situation might become irreparable, and drew attention to the fact that the Charter of the United Nations and the jurisprudence of the International Court at The Hague had both excluded the right of any country to take the law into its own hands, Guy Mollet replied as follows:
‘Mr. Pierre Cot has recommended us to bring the case before the Court at The Hague, before which the whole world should bow. What a magnificent international morality it is which secures that one is always sure to lose if a democrat and to gain if a dictator!’
This intervention of the Prime Minister is a clear indication of the existing state of a large part of French opinion vis-á-vis the United Nations.
Apart from this, the Franco-British action is calculated to do much harm, not merely to the Atlantic Alliance, but to the whole Western position. Just at the very moment when the remarkable news from Hungary would appear to show that the Soviet empire has begun to crack and when every Communist Party in the world is faced with an agonising choice, the Communists are given a wonderful talking point and the opportunity to pose as defenders of international authority and international law. The Communist spokesman, who was the only opposition speaker in the National Assembly after the Prime Minister had made his statement on Tuesday evening, made it clear that the international Communist line will, at least in the immediate future, be to support the Arab States against Israel. Through a haze of Communist slogans and pretended concern for the rights of nations, he referred sarcastically to the fact that the actions of the French Government over the last few months might now be seen as covering a hidden design to assist Israel in her struggle with her Arab neighbours.
It only remains to complete this sombre picture, to point out that the invasion of Egyptian territory by French and British forces will make it extremely difficult for France to face the Arab world in the future, and in particular that of North Africa, otherwise than in terms of open hostility. The chances of a fruitful outcome to the policy of pacification in Algeria seem now to be greatly reduced, particularly since the Governments of Tunis and Morocco, having already been humiliated by the arrest of the Algerian nationalist leaders, have now expressed their indignation and protested formally against ‘the Franco-British aggression against Egypt’, and the Moroccan communiqué adds a reference to the ‘collusion’ between France, Britain and Israel. It is nevertheless apparently the official view of the Resident General and his staff in Algiers, that much will depend on the military success of the venture. The Arab world has, they believe, traditionally been inclined to submit to the verdict of arms, and to regard military success (or failure) as a sign of God’s will. If the present operations have for effect the elimination of Nasser (presumably one of their principal objectives) and the reduction of Egyptian prestige, this would of course work in France’s favour in North Africa, – but not necessarily towards pacification!
The danger that the action in Egypt might degenerate and spread into a general war has already been seen and remarked upon by Mendès-France, who has called upon the Government to take the initiative of convening a conference of the Four great Powers. His proposal was coldly received even by his own Party and has been powerfully rejected in a public statement issued by Maurice Schumann, who no doubt expresses also the views of the Government. Whatever may be thought of Mendès-France’s idea, there are few thinking people who will disagree with Paul Reynaud5 who, while supporting the Government, has expressed the fear that no one can say where the fire, once illuminated, may spread.
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