Extracts from a memorandum from William P. Fay
to Frederick H. Boland (New York)
'Algeria'
(Copy)

[matter omitted]

C. Conclusions

What conclusions should be drawn from this summary analysis of the present state of Algerian affairs, and what line should we take when faced with the issue in the United Nations? The delegation will no doubt have already advised the Minister on this, as on the other grave questions facing the present Assembly session. It may perhaps be helpful to them, however, if I offer some views supplementary to those expressed in my confidential letter of 28th June;² these views will be mainly in the nature of glosses, based on further reflection and the information which has become available in the interval, since on the whole I continue to maintain the substance of the opinion expressed in that letter.

1. In favour of the Algerian nationalists, it seems fair to allow for a greater feeling of specifically Algerian nationality than I then conceded although a free Algeria is never conceived as ‘going it alone’ but as associated, in some way, with Tunis and Morocco as well as with France. Bourguiba and the Sultan have always maintained that their ‘Algerian brothers’ were part of the North African community, and if properly dealt with – that is if their ‘right to independence’ were recognised – they would forget any pan-Arabic dreams they might nourish in favour of that Federation of the Maghreb, in association with France, which both rulers favour.
2. Nevertheless, the fact that the FLN³ Headquarters have been in Cairo for some years – (Ben Bella,⁴ after his escape from an Algerian prison, went there in 1952) – naturally leads to the assumption that they have not escaped the influence there dominant, more especially as they are indebted to Nasser, not only for asylum, but for arms and ammunition. It is the French view, and is very probable, that without Egyptian support, the Algerian military revolt would have collapsed long ago. It is certainly true that their association with Egypt and Arab nationalism has led the FLN to promote barbarities strongly tainted with racial and religious fanaticism which no reasonable man can approve.
3. In June, I expressed doubts as to the staying power of French determination to carry through the Government’s policy to its conclusion. In the interval, French will has notably stiffened and the popularity of the Government’s action has greatly increased. The great majority of the nation (united as rarely before behind the Government of Guy Mollet) have applauded the forceful handling of North African affairs already described in this report, even if there is now a tendency to disappointment and frustration at the outcome of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. The morale of the people and the troops appears to be high and there is even an atmosphere of jingoism about (symbolised by Maurice Schumann dramatically deciding to join the Anglo-French forces before Port Said, but as it turned out, on the eve of the cease-fire). The voices of opposition are rare and of no apparent influence. Even Mauriac⁵ and Jean-Marie Domenach⁶ (of Esprit) admitted that their first reaction to the capture of the FLN leader was to shout ‘bien joué!’. The Arab world had got used to spitting upon French prestige with impunity for so long, that it surprised (and gratified) everybody to see that the old girl could react so vigorously. Even Ben Bella was heard to murmur ‘Voilá un beau coup!’ as the handcuffs were snapped on his wrists. (Of course, the expression is open to more than one interpretation).
4. This lively spirit of French nationalism, now revived, is however a distinct disadvantage for the Government, when it comes to accepting the inevitable compromise with Algerian nationalism. There is, of course, no question of any Frenchman accepting the nationalist demand for an Algerian Republic but, even apart from the European population in Algeria, there are very few deputies of the Centre or Right who would now be prepared for a ‘political solution’ giving the Algerians anything more than a very restricted Home Rule; even this, if it involved a local legislature, really representative of all Algerians with a majority for the Moslems, would hardly be accepted by the European Algerians. And yet, clearly, if the Government are to make the most of their capture of the Nationalist leaders, now is the time for a dramatic announcement as to their future intentions on the political plane.
5. True, Guy Mollet has always insisted that he will not impose any ‘unilateral’ solution on Algeria, and that the institutions to give effect to what he calls Algerian ‘personality’ must be worked out with ‘responsible spokesmen’ for Algeria elected as a result of free elections. He has recently re-affirmed his Government’s intention to hold these elections as soon as possible, after the Nationalists agree to a cease-fire. In a generously worded and conciliatory appeal made a few nights ago on Radio & Television (three copies of the text of which I attach for convenience of reference),⁷ the Prime Minister promised an amnesty for all who laid down their arms in response to this appeal and, in addition to free elections for an Algerian legislature, guaranteed to spend as much on raising the Algerian standard of living as the present military effort cost them. Already an important leader of the Aurès guerilleros, with his band of 400, has decided to accept this offer and advised others to do so. Unfortunately, however, during the last few days, there are reports of widespread acts of sporadic and indiscriminate terrorism. The ‘pacification’ never purported to be able to eliminate this completely.
6. I have no hesitation, nevertheless, in standing over the recommendation I made in June to the effect that on the issue of substance we should support France. In all the circumstances of the case, even if the Algerian revolt is accepted as a genuine movement for ‘self-determination’, Guy Mollet’s appeal, with a formal promise of free elections, is a reasonable one; there is no reason why France should accept the self-constituted leaders of the revolt as necessarily being ‘valid spokesmen’ of Algerian national aspirations. It is easier for us to take this line now that France has agreed to waive the point of procedure as to the competence of UNO. We could, of course, if it was thought fit, add to our support a strong appeal for French comprehension of Algerian nationalism, an appeal more likely to be heard because of our support.