Confidential report from Frederick H. Boland to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
(Confidential)

The major subject of activity at the United Nations last week was again the question of Algeria. The debate in the First Committee continued throughout Monday and Tuesday, and, finally, concluded at a heated session on Wednesday evening. The matter came into the plenary session on Friday morning when a compromise resolution resulting from discussions, which went on throughout Thursday, was adopted unanimously.

As you know, we spoke relatively early in the debate in the First Committee. Although what we said seemed to be particularly popular with the Afro-Asian delegations – several of whom subsequently referred to it in the course of their own statements – it was certainly not unpalatable to the French. They felt that we went rather far in expressing sympathy with Algerian nationalism; but they appreciated the tributes we paid to France’s position in the free world and, above all, they were grateful for the view we expressed that the United Nations should not attempt to adopt any resolution purporting to impose, or suggest the lines of, an Algerian settlement. The Afro-Asian delegations seemed, for a while, to have construed our speech in the sense that we were prepared to support their point of view against that of the French Government. We were at pains to correct this impression in private conversations, making it clear that we would not be able to vote for any resolution if the French delegation decided to vote against it. This was consistent with the line we took in the speech that, while the United Nations had a right to discuss the Algerian problem and express world feeling about it, the best hope of a satisfactory settlement lay in the method of negotiation and agreement between the French authorities and the authentic leaders of Arab nationalism, and no resolution which the Assembly could adopt could provide any effective substitute for a solution reached in that way.

At the end of its debate, there were three resolutions before the First Committee – one proposed by the Afro-Asian group, the second proposed by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines, and a third put forward by Italy and certain South American delegations. The texts of these three draft resolutions are enclosed herewith.² The Afro-Asian resolution, being opposed by the European, Commonwealth and Latin-American blocs, was obviously incapable, from the beginning, of achieving the necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly. On the other hand, the resolution proposed by Italy and certain Latin-American delegations, being certain to be opposed by the Afro-Asian and Commonwealth blocs, was in the same position. The resolution proposed by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines was intended as a compromise but the vote on it in the First Committee showed that it, too, was unlikely to realise the necessary two-thirds majority in the plenary session. After the three resolutions had been voted on in the First Committee on Wednesday evening following a procedural discussion marked by considerable heat and continual sharp exchanges between the Chairman and individual members of the Committee, it was clear that a state of deadlock existed and that, unless some compromise were arrived at, there would be no decision by the Assembly on the Algerian problem at all. This, of course, was just what the French wanted, and, no doubt, the Afro-Asian bloc realised that, by sticking out for their own proposals and perpetuating the deadlock, they were creating just the situation which the French were anxious to bring about. As a result, in consequence of further discussions, a draft compromise resolution was prepared which was passed unanimously by the Assembly on Friday morning. The text is enclosed herewith.³

The conclusion of the whole matter was generally accounted a moral victory for the French. To the extent that it can be so regarded, it was principally due to the patient and reasonable way in which M. Pineau presented the French case throughout the debate. Both the manner and the matter of what he said did much to keep the temperature down and to facilitate the compromise eventually reached. The French delegation, including M. Pineau himself, told me that they were very pleased with the result and thanked us for our help and sympathy. The outcome would, perhaps, have been more valuable from the French point of view if they had not been so vocal in proclaiming it as a victory for themselves. I understand that, in the pressroom, the view was generally held that, if the French had not been so zealous in badgering the correspondents to present the result as a French victory, the messages sent out would have been more effective from the French point of view because the French success would have been presented as an opinion of the correspondents concerned rather than as a claim made by the French delegation. A rather ludicrous incident in the voting on the final compromise resolution was that the British delegation, apparently out of touch with what was happening behind the scenes, abstained from voting. When they found out that they were the only delegation abstaining, they hastily asked for permission to rectify their vote and voted in favour of the resolution.

I think there was probably some feeling among the Afro-Asian delegations that our attitude, when it came to the question of voting, was not entirely in line with the general tone of our statement. The feeling is probably confined, however, to the more extreme members of the Afro-Asian group. I think that, to a large extent, our position was soundly vindicated by the fact that, in the end, every delegation found itself voting for the kind of ‘middle of the road’ attitude which we had advocated.

[matter omitted]

We expect to intervene on three further political matters before the session comes to an end – Cyprus, West New Guinea and the Soviet Union’s complaint against the United States’ ‘unwarranted interference in the affairs of Western Europe’. As you know, we propose in our statement on Cyprus to emphasise the evils of Partition as a political expedient. In our statement on West New Guinea, we will follow the line which was discussed and decided when the Minister was here. In the debate on the Soviet Union’s complaint against the United States, we propose to take the line that what the Communist world is suffering from is not unwarranted interference by the United States or other outside countries, but its own political mistakes and the breakdown of its own philosophy as evidenced by the fact that the revolt against Communism is not confined to Eastern Europe where the United States is accused of fostering it by radio broadcasts, propaganda balloons, etc., but is becoming increasingly obvious in the Communist parties outside the Communist orbit, many of which, in public statements, are now blaming their difficulties on the policy decisions of the Kremlin.

The work of the other Committees of the Assembly is gradually coming to an end. Mr. Kennedy has played a particularly active role on the Second Committee and is a member of the Working Party set up by that Committee to try and reach a compromise resolution about the proposed United Nations Fund for Economic Development. The effectiveness of our work on the other Committees has been much handicapped in the recent past by our shortage of staff, accentuated during the past week by my own absence due to an attack of ‘flu. We are finding it increasingly difficult, at this stage of the proceedings, to play a significant role without having more personnel available for the purpose of informal discussions and contacts with other delegations.