Memorandum by the Council of Defence on Irish Defence Policy
(Secret)

EACH MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

Re: DEFENCE POLICY.

We have the honour to invite your attention to the urgent and absolute necessity for placing us in possession of at least the outlines of the Defence Policy of the Government, and to bring under notice matters which we respectfully submit are factors in the Defence of the Country on which the members of the Executive Council should have the full and complete views of your responsible military chiefs.

NECESSITY FOR DEFINITION OF POLICY.

1. To point out the necessity for a Defence Policy in accordance with which we will organise the Defence of the Nation is to emphasize the obvious. Our Policy since the formation of the Army has been the establishment of forces for the suppression of the Irregulars and the education of our regular officers and men in the A B C of their profession.

2. The Government and the Taxpayers must be satisfied that the Nation will benefit as a result of the existence and functioning of an Army to such an extent as to justify the expenditure of the amount represented by the Army Vote. It follows that they must have in mind the particular functions which they expect the Army to perform. If they are to be performed they must be clearly defined by the Government with full knowledge of the implications and commitments involved.

3. In the absence of this definition of policy it is impossible to organise and equip the Forces to any very useful purpose. We must indicate to our officers the particular functions which they must be prepared to perform under various conditions and circumstances (as far as these can be foreseen) if they are to be in a position to meet these eventualities.

It is impossible to have the most effective organisation with a minimum of expense if the object in view is not clearly understood and if every man, organism or particle of material which does not contribute towards the achievement of that objective is not eliminated.

NECESSITY FOR APPRECIATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MILITARY FACTORS IN OUR DEFENCE POLICY AND FOR APPRECIATION BY MILITARY CHIEFS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS.

4. We of course appreciate the fact that the Executive Council collectively, and the Minister for Defence in particular, can alone pronounce authoritatively, fully and finally on this matter of Policy, and that the Military heads of the Army are merely concerned in implementing the Policy so given to them. We feel, however, that we would be lacking in our duty if we did not lay before you frankly our unanimous opinion on this most important and involved matter, even at the risk of going somewhat outside the scope of our responsibilities.

5. We will put before you in the following paragraphs considerations which we urge upon your attention as matters regarding which the Supreme Executive Authority must be fully informed and which we suggest demand the formulation and promulgation of a deliberate policy.

These are matters on which the complete Government attitude should be made clear (secretly) to those who like ourselves are charged with responsibility, of the weight of which we are duly conscious; and matters too upon which public pronouncement may be desirable according as may seem politic to you. We labour this point because we feel strongly that only when we and our immediate advisors are in possession of your views, and of the political, economic and other information which is available to you and not to us, can we be assured that we can lay before the Executive Council the full, reasoned and candid opinions and information which it is our duty to provide, and which is necessary to you for the proper conduct of the affairs of the Nation in regard to Defence. We feel bound to say that without this complete understanding our advice and assistance cannot be at all as useful or intimate as it should be. We would be in the invidious position of having to advise on matters which we might not have the spirit as well as the letter of the Government's intention, and of having to endeavour to meet its military needs without the fullest possible appreciation of those needs and an assurance that the Government understood fully the Military implications and commitments of its directions and the extent to which we could carry them into effect.

PROBABLE NATURE OF AGGRESSION AND IDENTITY OF AGGRESSORS AGAINST WHOM WE MUST DEFEND OUR COUNTRY.

6. The necessity for a Defence Policy and for an organisation to carry out that policy arises only from the obligation of preserving our country and our people from exploitation by nations or internal parties who may endeavour to enforce their will upon us. This being so we must attempt to visualize the nature and circumstances of the aggression and the identity of the aggressors before we can prepare our defence against them.

We may consider the matter as exhibiting two main aspects[,] which are External aggression and Internal aggression. In regard to the former the following facts and probabilities must be borne in mind.

7. The very recent development of warfare has been such as to make Aerial Forces, Submarines, Radio Telegraphy and Chemical warfare cardinal factors in war. These agencies in themselves are considered to be sufficient to completely defeat any adversary no matter how powerful, who does not get the opponent in a vicelike grip in the opening stages of conflict. They are the weapons and agencies with which a powerful nation would endeavour to smash its enemy within a few weeks, or even days, of the declaration of war. They are essentially the weapons on which any power attacking England would rely. There are at least three, and probably four, great powers who could bring overwhelming forces of this nature into play without any appreciable delay. Developments in all these four agencies of combat and destruction are reported day by day.

8. Ireland by reason of her geographical position may be said to be the Aerial and Submarine key to England. For the operation of the four agencies mentioned above, either in attack or defence, England must consider Ireland as a dangerously vulnerable point and one of her most important lines of Defence. It is only natural that England's enemies would look upon this country in the same light, and while they would direct their main destructive efforts against the vital industrial and administrative centres in Britain, they would pay due attention to the destruction of British forces here. They would also consider very carefully the use of Ireland as a temporary base for Aerial raids on an immense scale, and probably find such a project feasible. They would of course attempt to exploit us to their advantage in every way possible.

9. We have the authority of several great figures on both sides in the recent great war, including Ludendorff, 'the brain of the German Armies', that propaganda was one of the most effective, if not the most effective weapon which the Western nations used against Germany. There is every reason to believe that it will play an equally important part in any great war which may come upon us. The great Irish populations abroad make it a weapon of importance to us. It could be used to bring us into war against our will, and it could be used with even greater effect in our defence.

10. The fact that Ireland supplies in a great measure England's imported food, and that our imports of food and other necessities are carried in English bottoms would be a vital matter during a war in which she became involved.

11. Our Defence Forces such as they are depend entirely for their existence on supplies of war material from England.

12. They are not capable, as at present constituted, of taking any really effective part in the Defence of the country against a modern army, navy or air force.

13. In view of all these and many similar and relative factors, Ireland is as likely to become a cockpit for the belligerents in a war between England and any other power, as Belgium was before the Great War, if not to the same extent.

14. In any such eventuality, British troops, the British Air Force and the British Navy would assume control of the country. They would insist on unity of command. That means that any troops we put in the field would be under the orders of the Imperial General Staff from 'Somewhere in England', instead of the Irish Government, and would be supplied with material only when and how that Staff pleased.

15. Happily our people have not experienced the horrors of modern war. They do not, therefore, appreciate the appalling destruction with which we would be almost certain to be visited if England went to war with any first class power. Their slight experience has, however, made them alive to the blessings of peace and the necessity for taking effective steps to maintain our neutrality.

16. Apart entirely from the case of a war in which England is involved, we must consider the possibility of a war between the U.S.A. and France, Germany or Russia, or any war in which the belligerents would have vital interests or communication by Sea, Aeroplane, Airship or Wireless in or around Ireland, or in which they would endeavour to exploit Irish resources and populations in their individual interests. In such an eventuality there would be several matters which might involve us in serious international complications, if not in war, if the Nations have not reason to respect our ability to maintain our neutrality, or if our weapons of defence are not sufficiently organised to prevent exploitation by interested parties.

17. The second or Internal aspect of Defence is one with which we are all familiar and we need not dwell upon it longer than to say that we have to consider the following three possibilities:

(a) Serious disturbances in the North East.

(b) An outbreak by the Irregulars.

(c) A serious riot or disturbance by any body such as the Association of ex-Army men, The Communists, etc.

We must, we presume, have machinery to protect the State against these and similar disturbances.

THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES AND SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND FACTS IN WAR AND DEFENCE.

18. There appear to be three alternative policies which might possibly be pursued by the Government in the matter of Defence. They are:

(a) The development of our individuality as a Nation; the gradual assumption of responsibility for Defence, and the development and organisation of our resources into a complete Defensive machine.

(b) The organisation and maintenance of Defence Forces which would be an integral part of the British Imperial forces and would, in the event of war, be controlled by the Imperial General Staff.¹ and

(c) The abandonment to England of responsibility for Defence against external enemies, and the formation of a force to deal with internal disorders.²

19. It is axiomatic that the Defence Policy of the State should conform with its general position and development, and more particularly with its Foreign, Agricultural, Industrial and Commercial policies and development.

20. It is also axiomatic that expenditure on National Defence should be so applied as to contribute to the greatest possible extent to the general well being, the cultural, industrial and economic good of the country, and that the expenditure which does not bring some direct return in those respects should be mainly on the organization of our resources in men and material, and the training of the men who[,] should the necessity arise, will control and direct this organisation in the prosecution of war or the preservation of neutrality.

21. In National security more than in any other matter, efficiency must be paramount. It would be much better to have no Defence Organisation than to have an inefficient one.

22. Modern war is not a war of Armies; it is a conflict of peoples. The Nation as a whole, our industrial, administrative and agricultural activities, and our unarmed citizens are as much subject to attack as our Defence Forces if such attack suits the ends of our opponents, and our Defence must be the Defence of the entire population and our vital activities. If the occasion demands we must be prepared to employ all our resources in our Defence. Defence as thus visualized is more than actual combat; it is the struggle for the continuance of the National life, the preservation of our populations, our resources, our institutions and our international position.

23. The maintenance and effective preservation of the National life side by side with the exertion of the necessary force (it may be the maximum force of which we are capable) necessitates the establishment of an organisation that can utilise all our resources and power to this end. This organisation must be subject to one authority, the Minister for Defence. One of the fundamental principles in the successful conduct of war is unity of command.

THE POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

24. It would be foolish for Ireland to endeavour to become a Military force or to indulge in militaristic adventures as the ally of England or any other power. On the other hand it is obvious that we will be used by powerful nations because of our unique geographical position if those nations find it profitable to so use us.

25. It would certainly be possible to organize our defence in such a manner that it would not be profitable for any power to interfere with us in any way. Without being aggressive we can be sufficient of a hornet's nest to any outsider to make him keep his hands off in his own interests. It would not be worth the while of France or any nation attacking England to use this country if such a step involved the commitment of any considerable amount of force and energy against us. Similarly England will be quite content to know that we will keep out her enemies, and she will be secure in the knowledge that it would not be in our interest to attack her.

26. In our general relations England will be more circumspect if she finds that she cannot control us militarily without an expenditure of force which would not be worth the result.

27. As previously mentioned, our Defence Policy is an integral part of the general policy of the State, is dependent on our economic position and is bound up with our Foreign, Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural policies. Therefore, if the policy dealt with in these paragraphs is adopted the aims should be

(a) to develop our individuality as a Nation;

(b) to establish friendly and intimate relations with U.S.A., France and Germany, all of whose interests would be served by an independent Ireland.³

(c) to make the country as self-supporting as possible, particularly in the matter of food and other necessaries of life;

(d) to develop and foster those industrial resources which would enable us to equip ourselves in our defence;

(e) to organise our weapons of defence and offence with a view to ensuring that the people of this country would suffer as little as possible in the event of a war in which England would be involved and in which we might find it desirable to join her (We are of course assuming that we will not or could not take part in a big war otherwise) and with a view to being sufficiently dangerous to possible aggressors that we will be able to maintain our neutrality at will.

28. Our weapons of Defence and Offence appear to be:

(a) Propaganda and Diplomacy. The Irish in America and elsewhere make these particularly powerful weapons for such a small State, always provided that there is a united front at home.

The adroit use of these weapons will help to prevent either England or any other Nation from encroaching on our rights or liberties.

(b) An Irish Air Force, which could be built up by the development of Civil aviation so as to provide a maximum number of Airmen and Machines which would perform commercial and other work in peace time and be formed into a fighting force by organisation as a reserve. Our geographical positionas a suitable and likely European base for a transatlantic Air Serviceshould compensate for other drawbacks in the development of aviation in this country.

(c) A Chemical Warfare Service which could be organised and developed in conjunction with Medical, Industrial and Agricultural research. Our State laboratories, educational establishments and laboratories connected with industrial concerns should all be subject to the co-ordinating and animating influence of the Defence Council.

As in the case of our Air Force, a reserve corps of officers could be formed which would perform the ordinary duties of their calling in peace time and be available for service in war with the experience, discipline, understanding and esprit de corps necessary to success in Army organisation.

(d) A Coastal Defence System built up in the progress of the years by the development of our fishing industry and Irish Mercantile Marine, and Dockyards for the repair, and, as far as possible, the construction of surface craft.

By close attention on the part of the Defence Council our nautical activities could be brought in line with our Defence Scheme and our seafaring population organised into a branch of the reserve.

The construction of Submarines is not feasible in the immediate future but there is no reason why we should not keep the matter in mind.

Defence against surface craft and submarines could be organised by nets, sunken ships, mines, etc.

The question of the Coast Defences in the hands of the British Government, which is due to come up for consideration next year, is a matter for consideration in the light of this aspect of our Defence Policy.

(e) Attack by means of mining operations on enemy nerve centres, such as Dockyards, Railway termini, Aerodromes, Industrial Plant, etc. etc. This could be effected by the organisation of Irish populations which exist in almost every country and could be considered for execution by way of reprisal or otherwise. Our activities during the Anglo-Irish war, and those of Germany and England during the world war, furnish a headline, and

(f) A standing Army of Infantry supported by Artillery, Armoured cars, Tanks, Mounted Infantry, Engineers, etc., strong enough to form the nucleus of a force to be raised in war and so highly organized as to be able to train a very much larger reserve or territorial force.

The available man power of the country not otherwise absorbed into the Defence Scheme, i.e. those not earmarked for employment in activities mentioned in (a) to (e) above, or not engaged in work vital to the life of the Nation, should be organised into a reserve or territorial unit of the Army and trained as far as possible in their warlike duties.

In the preceding paragraphs we have dealt with Defence Policy in regard to foreign aggression as we think it should develop if the form now under consideration be adopted. We recognise of course that this is a matter for Government decision and definition, and we also recognise that the immediate need is to concentrate on those means of Defence which are at hand and which are not likely to involve us in international or Imperial difficulties.

The production at home of sufficient food and other essentials to enable the nation to exist through a period of blockade; the production at home of weapons and materials of defence including mechanical transport, wireless apparatus, clothing, power alcohol, etc. etc., and the planning of an organisation that will control and co-ordinate all vital national activities in time of war to whatever degree is found necessary, are three big questions of National Defence which should command immediate attention.

The organisation and development of each weapon of offence and defence can at least be begun. Our Army, the most important weapon, can be organised with due regard to the fact that it is only one of a number of weapons of defence and organised so as to harmonise with each other weapon in the whole scheme.

We must also keep before us the relative strengths of ourselves and other countries, the position of Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark, in regard to defence matters; the development of warfare and the tendencies towards alliances or towards a spirit of enmity of States in whose actions we are interested. It is also most important that we fully realise the extent of our comparative weakness.

DEFENCE AS A PART OF THE DEFENCE SCHEME OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

29. If the policy of organising forces dependent upon England for the supplies vital to their existence and capable only of acting in conjunction with England is adopted, we should, in order to conform to the principles of economy and efficiency, face the implications of this policy squarely and carry it into effect as thoroughly as possible.

30. Our whole Defence organisation should be complementary to the Imperial Forces. We should be trained, equipped, organised, etc. in accordance with the Imperial scheme. Our position would not, in the carrying into effect of this policy, be that of Canada, but more nearly related to that of the British Territorial Army in relation to the Imperial General staff. Money spent on Defence would largely be spent in England on war material. We should conform to the methods and standards of Britain; our officers should be educated by British Staff officers either in England or here; the spirit of the British Army should and would pervade our forces.

31. We cannot go into the manner in which this policy could or should be adopted, as we have no information regarding the decisions taken at the Imperial Defence Conference held some years ago, and we have not had any opportunity of being in touch with the communications, if any, which have passed between our Government and the British on the subject of Defence.

32. We must, however, remark that the forces created in accordance with this policy would not be effective in the suppression of internal disorders.

From the military point of view we have also to put on record the fact that this policy would not, in our opinion, be the most effective means of economically organising our resources for defence purposes. As mentioned above, but in other words, the only effective Army is that which is the expression of the Nation's fighting capabilities. The morale of the Army is a most vital matter, and it would be difficult to maintain a high state of morale under the conditions which the adoption of this policy would create. These and other matters could not be as satisfactorily dealt with in accordance with the policy now under consideration as they could be by adopting a national policy which would have for its primary objective the general well being of the State.

THE POLICY OF ABANDONING TO ENGLAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

34.⁴ The only other Policy which appears open to the Government is that of entrusting the entire responsibility for our Defence to the British Government. This is the policy adopted in Northern Ireland, and could be put into effect here in a similar manner.

35. If it is considered necessary to maintain home forces for the suppression of internal disorders this end could be best achieved by the abolition of the Defence Forces as at present constituted, and the formation of a special Constabulary on the model of North East Ulster, with the augmentation of the Detective Division of the Police, somewhat after the manner of the Danish precedent.

36. Our present Army is not by any means an economical or effective machine for the suppression of internal disorders, and there does not appear to be any justification for its existence in its present form if this is its only function.

NORTH EAST ULSTER

37. We have avoided any reference to the position created by partition for two reasons:

(a) The fact that we have no information on the National position in this respect other than that which we obtain through Army machinery, and what is available to the ordinary man in the street, makes it impossible for us to deal adequately with a matter which is the subject of very delicate political negotiations and which in view of the functioning of the Boundary Commission, may be said to be sub judice.

(b) The Ulster position does not affect the matter at issue from a military point of view, i.e. the selection of one of the three alternative policies mentioned above. The inherent weakness of partition in regard to security is recognised, but this does not affect the necessity for taking the best possible steps to secure the Defence of the Area under the jurisdiction of our Government.

In conclusion we wish to observe that we have only laid the outlines of the alternative schemes of Defence before you, that we will be happy to elaborate any particular suggestion or observation, and that the necessity for an early decision is most acutely felt.