Department of the President to each member of the Executive Council enclosing schedule on Defence Policy (Secret)

DEFENCE POLICY

A chara,

With reference to the Secret document of the 22nd July last¹ on the above subject, circulated to each member of the Executive Council, with Form F. 1. Cabinet, on 27th idem, and considered by the Council on the 17th August, I am directed by the President to transmit herewith for consideration by the Council a draft memo based on notes of the discussion and decision at the meeting in question.

The memo purports to be a statement of the Government's Defence Policy, and is intended, if approved, for transmission to the Department of Defence for the guidance of the Army Authorities.

S C H E D U L E I.²

DEFENCE POLICY

The policy of the Executive Council with regard to the Military Forces of the State may be summed up as follows:-

(a) The size of the standing Army to be retained in normal times should not exceed 10,000 to 12,000 all ranks.

(b) The organisation of this force should be such that it would be capable of rapid and efficient expansion in time of need to the maximum strength of the country's manpower. This will necessitate the training of all ranks in duties of a more advanced nature than those normally associated with each rank.

(c) The Army must be an independent national Force capable of assuming responsibility for the defence of the territory of Saorstát Éireann against invasion, or internal disruptive agencies; but it must also be so organised, trained and equipped as to render it capable, should the necessity arise, of full and complete co-ordination with the forces of the British Government in the defence of Saorstát territory whether against actual hostilities or against violation of neutrality on the part of a common enemy.

In laying down this policy for the Army, the Executive Council are conscious that expenditure on the Army is bound to be subjected year after year to very critical examination. In times of peace, there is a tendency to overlook the necessity for the maintenance of a force trained in arms which will be ready to repel attack. The present international situation does not, in the opinion of the Council, justify the hope that recourse to arms will in future be rendered impossible. The internal situation on the other hand which renders it necessary to keep in existence a force which will act as a deterrent to the disaffected element in the community does not justify the substitution of the present Army by a militia force. The Council is of opinion that a standing Army 10,000 to 12,000 strong should suffice both as a deterrent against internal disorder and as the nucleus of a defensive force against external attack.

It is impossible to forecast what international combinations may from time to time develop or what disturbances may arise between Nations. Events which at the time of occurrence may appear trivial have been the occasion of wars of world magnitude. The earnest desire of the Executive Council is to avoid participation in any international struggle, but it might happen that the occasion would arise when by reason of an attempt by some foreign Power to utilise our geographical position either as a base for an offensive against Great Britain or against sea-borne traffic between ports in Saorstát Éireann and other countries, we would be forced into taking action. At the moment the defence by sea of both Great Britain and Ireland is undertaken by British Forces. The Article of the Treaty which contains this provision is due to be reviewed towards the close of 1926 with a view to our undertaking a share of our own coastal defence. Until this review has taken place it is not practicable to take any special steps other than to ensure that if co-operation with British Forces should become necessary at any time, the personnel of the Irish Army would be capable of efficient co-operative action, and that our officers would be capable of assuming control, if necessary, of mixed forces of all arms when operating in Irish Territory.

In general the Executive Council consider that the equipment and training of the Army should be directed towards the defence of Irish territory which involves specialised preparation of plans to resist invasion from any quarter - a study of likely landing places and of the tactical problems which would arise in offering resistance to Forces attempting to land or effecting a landing at such points.

In so far as the international aspect of the matter is concerned, the Minister for Defence in his capacity as a Member of the Executive Council, will be kept in touch with situations as they arise by the Minister for External Affairs and the policy in each particular emergency will be decided by the Council as a whole.