Memorandum by Michael MacWhite
(E.A. 247) (Copy)

DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

The question of disarmament and security will present itself in a new light at the next Assembly on account of the initiative taken by the United States Government in presenting a multilateral treaty for the outlawry of war to the principal world powers. This treaty is undoubtedly the most important from the point of view of international law since the Treaty of Versailles as it covers much more ground than the Locarno agreements which, so far as they go, serve a very useful purpose.

Up to the present, however, the greatest obstacle in the development of European security was the uncertainty of the position of the United States. This uncertainty had very serious consequences for Europe and for the League of Nations as well. In the first place it weakened the preventative effects of Article 16 of the Covenant as there was no guarantee that the United States would accept the views of the Council of the League if the latter had to face the eventuality of designating an aggressor. In the second place the sanction to be applied by the League once the aggressor was denominated should take the form of a blockade which could only be efficacious on sea. Consequently, it is the naval forces that would have to be called upon in the first instance to apply the sanctions. This represented no risk for Great Britain or France when the Covenant was signed, as it was understood that the U.S.A. was to be a Member of the League of Nations. The situation was profoundly modified the day the United States refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The risk was then apparent that in case of a blockade the United States fleet might not be found in the same camp as those belonging to the Members of the League.

The problem of disarmament and world peace has, therefore, been at a standstill during the past ten years as no formula could be found giving a reasonable guarantee in case of a possible aggression that the United States would not be found in the opposite camp to that of the League of Nations. It was not necessary that the United States should recognise the decision of the League in naming the aggressor, but it was absolutely indispensable that the possible aggressor should receive no active assistance from the United States.

The Kellogg treaty appears to have solved this difficulty. It does not say so much in plain words. Nevertheless, the day a signatory would have violated that agreement, the United States Government would not necessarily be obliged to combat him, but would be morally bound not to support him. That, in itself, would be sufficient. So, the day the Kellogg treaty has been accepted, the problem of security will have been solved and the road to disarmament open.

It appears, therefore, necessary that the Kellogg treaty should become general in order to serve its purpose and that as a consequence all the Members of the League should be invited to adhere to it at the earliest moment. If the Saorstát takes the initiative in the matter, or effectively supports any proposition to that effect, during the next Assembly, she would not only enhance her prestige as a Member of the League, but would add considerably to her credit in the United States as well.