No. 557  NAI DFA Secretary's Files A2

Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera (Dublin)
(Secret)

DUBLIN, 29 March 1945

Taoiseach, Minister for External Affairs.
The Polish Consul General, M. Dobrzynski, came to see me today. He said he wanted to talk very confidentially about a matter which he had very much at heart. He was afraid that there might be a serious crisis concerning his Government in London very soon. It was possible that one or two unimportan and less representative members of his Government might yield to British persuasion and join the new Government in Warsaw. The Consul General hadbeen positively informed that Moscow was determined to make the existing so-called Lublin Government the real nucleus of the new Government. No British or American persuasion would change the Russian decision. He felt it was his duty, though he had not received any instructions concerning the matter, to approach the Irish Government in order to ascertain the attitude which would be adopted if a request for asylum here were made by the Polish Government in London.

I told him I would ascertain what your views were. I said, however, that it was naturally a very delicate matter. If the members of the Polish Government came here as a group of individuals without describing themselves collectively as the Polish Government, and if their purpose was to await a more favourable opportunity in order to begin again as a unit the diplomatic struggle for the independence of their country, I felt sure that you would be very glad to grant them asylum. You had the greatest possible sympathy for the Poles and you were following their present trials with anxiety.

He would understand that our relations with the United States and Britain were of such a character that the interests of our people made it a matter of vital importance that they should be friendly and cordial. If either of them decided to regard our sheltering of the members of the Polish Government as a major incident calling for e.g. repressive economic measures, it would be difficult for us to accede to the request. But I had no doubt whatever that the situation would not be so bad as all that. In the first place, the members of his Government could not come to Ireland without a British exit visa. If that visa were granted, it would in itself be an indication of goodwill. But was not it much more likely that the British would ask his Ministers to remain on in London for some considerable time until the Russians' real attitude towards Europe in general had become more crystallised. It was already clear that a great many people in Great Britain did not agree with the official attitude of the British Government towards the Polish Government in London, and public opinion was beginning to show grave anxiety at the continuing concessions to Russian demands. Some day soon, Russia would go too far and the British Government would be very glad, in its own interests, to return to the support of the Polish Government. Russia's recent denunciation of her Treaty with Turkey1 was a prelude to other events in which Britain's prestige was bound to be involved.

The Consul General fully realised the difficulties inherent in his request if it ever became actual. He was very glad to learn once more from me of your deep sympathy for Poland and your desire to help her in every way possible.

I asked him to let me know if and when his Government gave him an instruction in the sense of his request.

We could hardly give asylum to the members of the Polish Government, even though they were described as a group of private Polish citizens, without ascertaining whether such a gesture had the goodwill of, or at least was not opposed by, Great Britain and the United States, because, whatever we might say to the Poles on their first arrival here, it is quite obvious and natural that they would spend all their time doing propaganda from Ireland for the restoration of their country's freedom. We should also have to consider, even granted British and American goodwill, whether Russian friendship at any time in the calculable future would be worth having. The Russians seem to be a very vindictive people and they would not forgive us for sheltering their enemies here.

There is no doubt in anybody's mind in England, and no member of the Government has ever contested, that the Polish Government in London is the legitimate Govt. fully recognised by the great majority of the Polish people. The present tactics of the Russians are to secure from the underground groups in Poland a certain number of people who are willing to attach themselves to the Lublin Government and thus to give it a more national appearance. The present Lublin Government is mainly composed of men with several aliases, Polish by birth but Russian by upbringing and revolutionary training. Most of them (like Tito in Yugoslavia) have been employed in different countries in stirring up Communistic revolution.

[initialled] J.P.W. 29/3/45

1 At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin put the revision of the Montreux Convention (1936), which allowed Turkey to militarise the Turkish Straits if under threat, on the agenda. Turkey remained neutral during the Second World War and believed such a revision would infringe its security; in this they were supported by the United States and Great Britain.


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