Confidential report from John W. Dulanty to Frederick H. Boland (Dublin)¹
(Secret Report No.23)

Mr. Clement Davies,² M.P., Leader of the Liberal Party in the British House of Commons, had lunch with me today.

Of all the various people, politicians and journalists, whom I have talked to within the last few days, he was the one man who showed a real understanding of our position because, unlike the rest, he based his argument for us on the principle of the oneness of Ireland. (Over here in Parliament, in the Press, and in general conversation, the complete unawareness of this aspect of the problem is almost beyond belief).

The Northern Ireland section in the Bill, he considered, was not only unnecessary, but also illogical, and he intended to ask his Party to consider action in the Committee Stage to ensure the safeguarding of civil liberties in the North.

Unfortunately, he cannot himself take part in the debate, but his place will be taken by Professor Gruffydd.³ I suggested Mr. Wilfred Roberts,⁴ but the Party had already arranged for Professor Gruffydd to speak. He will try and arrange for the Professor and myself to meet and in the meantime I am sending further information to them both at the House of Commons.

He told me after our passing of the Republic of Ireland Act, Attlee asked Churchill and him to go to No. 10 Downing Street where he gave them a full account of the conversations at Chequers and in Paris, as well as the other discussions which he had had with Dominion Prime Ministers alone.

Davies said there was only one thing for the British to do and that was to give full and unqualified recognition to the Republic.

Churchill referred at length to the serious losses the British had suffered in the last war through our refusal to cede the Ports. There was also the constant irritant of the German and Japanese Legations in Dublin yet, he concluded 'We must never forget how the Southern Irish fought for us with all their famous military valour. But a greater help even than that was that although they knew all about D. Day, they kept the most absolute secrecy'.

Davies said that this point about D. Day weighed very considerably in Churchill's mind when he agreed with Attlee about the recognition of the Republic. (Churchill and he had had long talks previously with Attlee about India when Churchill was much more difficult and far more unresponsive to the Government's Indian policy than he had been on the question of the recognition of our Republic).

The⁵ conversation, he said, had concluded and just as they were leaving, Churchill said to Attlee 'But you will have to give some assurance to Northern Ireland?' Prior to that remark, Northern Ireland had not been mentioned and Davies surmised that Attlee was so pleased to get Churchill's concurrence - especially after their tussles over India - that he said they would certainly see what could be done to allay any fears of Stormont.

After a close friendship of more than twenty years, Davies, whilst not unmindful of certain qualities - the good Chairman type - of Attlee, regards him as not nearly big enough for the Premiership and nowhere near the intellectual and personal stature of his predecessors in the last thirty or forty years. 'I find him so unforthcoming', Davies remarked, 'When I put a case to him supported, as I and my friends think, by sound evidence, all I get in return is a curt "No". If you inquire as to the grounds for this inadequate reply, you elicit only an evasive reference to "other considerations"'.