No. 257 NAI DT S4363

Extracts from a report by John A. Costello (Geneva) on the Optional Clause, with covering letter from Joseph P. Walshe to Diarmuid O'Hegarty (Dublin)
(L.N. 11/23)

Dublin, 12 September 1929

I attach three copies of a report received from the Delegation at Geneva on the situation regarding the Optional Clause. Will you please be good enough to request the President and Mr. FitzGerald to read the report immediately so that they may be ready to give their views when the Minister asks for them by wire? I have given a copy to our acting Minister.

[signed] J.P. WALSHE
Secretary

 

[matter omitted]

The next point taken by Mr. MacDonald was the acceptance of the Optional Clause. He said that it would be remembered that shortly after the Labour Government assumed office they had considered the acceptance of this clause and communicated their views to the British Commonwealth and had received from the latter their comments on the proposal. He said that at the meeting held in London on the previous Tuesday it was generally agreed that the Optional Clause should be signed on behalf of all parts of the 'British Empire', and though some difference of view was expressed as to the form this declaration should take it was finally 'decided' that efforts would be made in further discussions to be held at Geneva to find a text within the framework of 'H. M. Government proposal' which would be acceptable to all parties concerned. He felt that at a meeting such as this it would be inadvisable to go into detail, and he would suggest that a small commission of representatives of the 'British Empire Delegation' should consider the question and report back to this 'plenary meeting' the result of its deliberations.

[matter omitted]

Mr. McGilligan said he assumed that Mr. MacDonald was not using precise language when he spoke of the decisions reached at the London meeting. As far as the Irish Free State was concerned, they could not regard the London conference as competent to make any decisions on this question. He would of course regard the whole question as completely open. Mr. MacDonald explained that he did not mean to convey that any decision had been reached and that the matter was of course completely open. The New Zealand delegate stated that he would regard the question as open and that he would have to put certain views before the commission. Professor O'Sullivan said he would like to be clear as to what Mr. MacDonald meant by referring back the result of the commission's discussions to this 'plenary meeting'. He quite understood that it would be necessary for the various delegations to report the result to their Governments, but he did not see how a gathering such as this could be regarded as competent to arrive at decisions. Mr. MacDonald agreed that this was so, but that what he meant was that the members of the 'British Empire Delegation' on the Commission would consult with their other colleagues and that he was sure the delegations had sufficient instructions to enable them to come to an agreement. Mr. MacDonald suggested that the Commission should consist of one or two members of each delegation. It was agreed that there should be two representatives of each. Mr. McGilligan assumed that there would be two representatives only and that no officials would be present. After a short discussion this was agreed to.

[matter omitted]

The Australian delegate announced that he was instructed to state that his Government had under consideration the candidature of Australia as member of the Council when Canada retired in 1930. Mr. McGilligan stated that his Government had considered and had decided to put forward the candidature of the Irish Free State for this vacancy. Mr. MacDonald said that he took the statement of the Irish Free State and Australia as merely a communication of their intentions for next year.

[matter omitted]

The British Prime Minister opened the proceedings by requesting authority to make a statement the following day at the meeting of the Assembly of the League to the effect that Great Britain and all the Dominions had decided to adhere to the Optional Clause. He expressed his desire that the statement would be in such a form as would cover both his own Government and the various Governments of the Dominions. His statement, he said, would on this occasion be in such a form that we would all be in it, but that of course a time would come when no one would speak for anyone else. He suggested that there should be a common declaration of policy in large outline followed by individual declarations on the part of each Dominion. He said his desire was to make a big declaration which would cover the whole group, not as an integral political entity but merely as an international declaration. He said that such a declaration made on the part of Great Britain and the Dominions would have a tremendous moral and psychological effect and that the value of the declaration would be multiplied a thousandfold if it were made on behalf of all. If it could not be conveyed to the world that we were acting as a group there would be a weakening of the effect. He appeared to be tremendously anxious to create somewhat of a stir by his announcement of the intention of Great Britain to adhere to the Optional Clause.

     Our Minister for External Affairs, at the conclusion of the Prime Minister's statement, pointed out that he feared that if Mr. MacDonald's intentions were carried out the international position of the Dominions might be obscured. In illustration of his meaning he referred to an account of an interview with Mr. MacDonald which appeared in 'La Suisse', during the course of which Mr. MacDonald referred to a meeting of the 'Imperial Delegation'. Mr. McGilligan went on to point out that no more effect would be produced by one declaration than would be produced by a number of individual declarations made by each Dominion on its own part. Lord Cecil then stated that the Prime Minister's suggestion was that the whole group of seven Nations should make a joint blow for peace. [matter omitted] The Prime Minister said that the form of declaration he had in his mind was to the following effect:

  'My Government has decided to sign the Optional Clause, and the formula of signature is now being prepared. It will be affixed by the Government and the Dominions as members of the League during this Assembly.'

Various expressions of views were then put forward as to the form proposed, and it became apparent that the precise form suggested by the Prime Minister was generally unacceptable, and various suggestions were put forward for the amendment of the formula. In particular, our Minister for External Affairs pointed out that the formula proposed seemed to suggest that the British Government were signing on our behalf and that we were committed to a formula as if we had a sort of corporate existence. Prime Minister said that he was prepared to agree to any form of words which would leave no doubt in the mind of the outsider that Great Britain and the Dominions had acted on their own individual judgment. The Minister for External Affairs said that we should stress the fact that we had acted independently by inserting some words to the effect that the Dominions in this, as in all other matters, had acted as they were entitled to do on their own independent judgment. He said that it should be made clear that we had reached a common accord to sign the Optional Clause but that such accord had been reached by each individual member of the British Commonwealth of Nations separately and independently. The British Prime Minister said he was prepared to adopt this suggestion.

     After various drafts had been put forward and considered it was agreed that the Prime Minister might make the following declaration:

  'My Government has decided to sign the Optional Clause, and the form of our declaration is now being prepared. It will be completed and signed during the present Assembly. I have consulted H.M. Governments of the other members of the British Commonwealth, who are also members of the League, and I find that each of them has instructed its representatives at the Assembly to sign the Clause during the Assembly. They will make their own statements on the subject.'

We endeavoured to secure the use of the expression 'The States of the British Commonwealth' instead of the expression 'Members of the British Commonwealth'. The Prime Minister and Lord Cecil were agreeable to do so, but the representatives of Australia objected to the use of the word 'State' and the purpose of their objection of course became apparent at the next meeting when the British formula for adhesion to the Optional Clause was being discussed.

[matter omitted]

On Tuesday afternoon a further meeting of the Commission took place, at which the same persons were present. British Prime Minister opened the proceedings by suggesting that they should examine the British formula of the acceptance of the Optional Clause as set forth in circular telegram BI08 dated 1st August, 1929. First matter that came up for consideration was the period during which the acceptance should be effective. The British were anxious to have a long period inserted in the formula, Lord Robert Cecil being of the opinion that, from an international point of view and from the point of view of the maintenance of world peace, it was very desirable that the Optional Clause should be accepted for as long a period as possible. Australia considered that a shorter period was desirable as they had accepted the idea of adhering to the Optional Clause with considerable reluctance. Sir James Parr, on behalf of New Zealand, stated that his Government desired an even shorter period, and suggested a period of two years. The other representatives appeared to be in favour of the longer period, India expressing no opinion. It was finally decided to defer until the end the question of the period during which the Optional Clause would be binding.

    Mr. MacDonald then proposed the consideration of the sentence reading: 'In relation to any other State accepting the same obligation'. He said that he thought there was nothing in that phrase and that he would take it that everybody agreed. Our Minister for External Affairs immediately intervened and drew attention to the peculiar use of the word 'State' and the omission of the words 'member or' and suggested that there was some significance in the omission. Both Lord Cecil and the Prime Minister said that they thought there was no significance in the omission, and if it was felt desirable they would insert the words and were quite agreeable to do so. Mr. McGilligan explained that it appeared to us that the words were omitted for the express purpose of founding an argument that the Dominions were not States. The Prime Minister was rather surprised at this and said he did not think that was the intention. Lord Robert Cecil also did not think it was the intention and suggested that it was merely a drafting error. He also said that if it was feared that the international status of the Dominions would be prejudiced by the use of the word 'States' that it should be considered also whether the insertion of the words 'members or' would not rather tend to that direction because it would be said that the words were inserted merely to cover the Dominions because they were not States. That argument had, of course, considerable force, but, unfortunately for Lord Cecil, Sir William Harrison Moore took up the discussion and stated definitely that in his view the word was inserted with a view to insuring that no Inter-Dominion disputes should be taken to the Court. This was, of course, a confirmation of our interpretation and appeared to come as a complete surprise to the Prime Minister and Lord Cecil. It was then pointed out by Mr. McGilligan that the word 'State' had to be read also in the context and that the expression 'International dispute' used in the next paragraph was also purposely used with a view to excluding Inter-Dominion disputes. [matter omitted] At this stage the British delegates were obviously in a state of perplexity, and the Prime Minister appealed to the meeting to allow him to call in Sir Cecil Hurst for the purpose of enabling him to tell the Commission what was in the minds of the draftsmen of the declaration but not to take any other part in the discussion or express any views. We agreed to the Prime Minister's suggestion as it was obvious that the Prime Minister was completely innocent of the true intention of the proposed declaration.

    Sir Cecil Hurst was sent for, and on arriving stated bluntly and frankly that the word 'State' and the expression 'International dispute' were inserted deliberately and for the express purpose of securing that no Inter-Dominion dispute should be referable to the Permanent Court.

[matter omitted]

Our position was put very clearly before the meeting that it was essential from the point of view of our status, and from the point of view of our political situation at home, that we should at least have the theoretic right of bringing Great Britain or any Dominion before the Court. The representative of South Africa stated that according to his instructions General Hertzog desired that the international position of South Africa should not be impaired, but that once that position was made clear he was perfectly prepared to enter into an agreement never to refer Inter-Dominion disputes to the Permanent Court. We were asked our views on this matter, and it was pointed out to the Commission that we had a peculiar situation at home which did not exist in any other part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. An extraordinary interest is taken at home in questions affecting our status, and matters which appear to others to be matters of mere theory or mere form were regarded as matters of great political importance and matters of substance. It was emphasised that Great Britain and the other Dominions should fully appreciate our position and our difficulties. The present Government of the Irish Free State had persuaded the majority of the Irish people that they had attained, or that they could attain by virtue of the Treaty full national status as a member of the Comity of Nations. We were subjected to criticism at home in reference to our constitutional position, and if we were to give away even a mere theoretic right of resort to the Permanent Court in case of a dispute with Great Britain it would be held that we had surrendered a fundamental principle of national sovereignty. Mr. McGilligan emphasised the fact that we were not wedded to the Court as a Court, that we really did not know a great deal about it, and he referred to his statement during a recent debate in our Senate on the proposed adherence of the Irish Free State to the Optional Clause. He recalled that he had there stated that the policy of the Government in the matter was that they had and would maintain the right of the Irish Free State to bring before the Permanent Court any dispute with Great Britain, or any other Dominion, but that before resorting to the Court for a settlement of the dispute they would be prepared to exhaust every other method of settling the dispute and that they would only go to the Court in the very last extremity. Senator Dandurand intervened and asked would it facilitate the Government of the Irish Free State in accepting the idea of an Inter-Commonwealth agreement not to refer to disputes to the Court if it were to be made definitely clear that such disputes would not be referable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Mr. McGilligan replied that this would undoubtedly help, and there appeared to be general agreement to exclude any idea that Commonwealth disputes should be tried by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Mr. McGilligan also said that the matter was one that required consideration, but of course it would help him that the suggestion for an agreement not to refer Commonwealth disputes to the International Court came from the representative of South Africa and that it was supported by Canada who had also suggested the definite exclusion of the Privy Council. The Prime Minister stated that perhaps it would be well if the South African suggestion should be considered and that the meeting should be adjourned till the next day for that purpose and so that we might communicate with our Government on the subject. Mr. McGilligan agreed to this, and the final observations of the Prime Minister were to the effect that if no agreement were come to it would, while such a course of action would rend his heart, be necessary for him in adopting the Optional Clause to make it clear by the use of such expressions as were thought necessary that the Dominions could not bring Inter-Dominion disputes to the Permanent Court. Mr. McGilligan retorted that if such a declaration were made it would be necessary for him to make his position clear and to announce that in the view of the Government of the Irish Free State the adherence by Great Britain to Article 36 of the Statute in such a form would really not be an acceptance of the Optional Clause at all. He also stated that such a statement would definitely apply not merely to the Irish Free State but to Canada and South Africa as well, and that such a statement would have implications for those and other Dominions in reference to the International status which they would be obliged carefully to consider.

[matter omitted]

At 5.30 on Wednesday afternoon Mr. McGilligan had a private interview with the British Prime Minister. Mr. McGilligan opened the interview by some general remarks designed to create an atmosphere. He said that his object in seeking the interview was that unless Mr. MacDonald thoroughly appreciated the attitude that had been taken up by the Irish Free State representatives he might feel that we were being merely truculent. He said that we were breast high with the Optional Clause. The British Government had shown strength with reference to the matter, and were with them on it and desirous of co-operating with them. The whole question, however, that poisoned our relations was the question that was much debated in our country as to whether we really got a Treaty at all or something merely that was given in a generous mood and that could be withdrawn at any time. The British Prime Minister appeared surprised at that, lifted his eyes and said 'Could anybody suggest such a thing'. Mr. McGilligan said that his Government had managed to persuade the majority of the Irish people that in the Irish Treaty we had really a good measure, that the Imperial Conference had strengthened and clarified the position and that we had been met with in our efforts to improve our status by goodwill, that we had got from the Imperial Conference Report of 1926 a good declaration, but that immediately after the Conference the Foreign Office had endeavoured to eat into the position that had been achieved. The Prime Minister asked 'Wasn't it quite clear that, if Great Britain signed the Optional Clause unconditionally, a Dominion could bring Great Britain before the Permanent Court?' Mr. McGilligan said that this point of view was shared by a number of people, but other people took a different view, and instanced the fact that a member of the present British Delegation, Professor Baker,1 had recently written a book on the Dominion position and examined the question of the international position of the Dominions, and had arrived at conclusions denying to the Dominions full international personality. Mr. McGilligan then outlined the history of the transaction with reference to the registration of our Treaty with the League of Nations and the British Government's Note of November, 1924,2 subsequent to the registration of the Treaty, and emphasised the fact that the British had made a general declaration applicable to all the Dominions and not merely to the question whether our Treaty was really a Treaty or not. Mr. MacDonald stopped our Minister at this point and said: 'I would like to hear that again'. Mr. McGilligan said that, though the occasion for the writing of the British letter of November, 1924, was the registration of the Irish Treaty, the phraseology used covered every Dominion, and said that that declaration was circulated and brought to the notice of all the Nations in the League of Nations; that, on the other hand, such nations had really no official notice of the declaration of status contained in the report of the Imperial Conference. He also said that before the registration of the Treaty, the Irish Free State had intimated to the British Government their intention to register the Treaty. The Prime Minister again stopped Mr. McGilligan and said he wished to have this matter quite clear, and showed that he was under the impression that we had registered the Treaty really behind the backs of the British and by means of a sort of a trick and that the British Government had then merely hit back. He asked Mr. McGilligan to repeat the history of the transaction, which he did. The Prime Minister then said that it was quite clear that the letter of November, 1924, was directed, not merely against the Irish Free State, but against all the other Dominions, but, he asked, 'Did not the report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 override that letter?' Mr. McGilligan said 'If that is so, then the matter was satisfactory, but there were arguments against such a contention'. The British Prime Minister then said ' Does not a later document always override an earlier one?' and he said that the implication of the 1926 report was that Dominions are autonomous in all their international relations, not merely with Great Britain, but with all the world. Mr. McGilligan said that a precise statement of that would clear the air, that there was a point of view in our country, which was not shared by us, that we were not full international persons. The British Prime Minister inquired, 'How could a statement making the position of the Dominions clear be made an authoritative document?' Mr. McGilligan said that as long as the old Letter of 1924 is still operative, the situation is unsatisfactory. The British Prime Minister said that our meetings were not Imperial Conferences. He went on to say that he was desirous before Parliament met to do some big things. He also said that the Irish Free State was the touchstone by which everything they did would be tried, and he would be challenged with the question 'What did you give to the Irish?' His position would be that, if he did anything that is not justified by the Imperial Conference of 1926 and the declaration contained in it, or something which is not the logical conclusion of that Report and those declarations, he could be arraigned by his opponents, but in no other circumstances. Mr. McGilligan said he understood from that that Mr. MacDonald's point of view was to give effect to the declarations in the Imperial Conference Report of 1926, or anything that was the logical deduction of that Report, and the British Prime Minister agreed. The British Prime Minister also said that he did not know of the difficulties which were contained in the proposed formula of adherence to the Optional Clause. He also said that if there was anything that was not clear in our position it would be cleared up at the Imperial Conference, and asked did we know our own strength, that if Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State demanded anything at an Imperial Conference they would get it from any Government.

    Mr. McGilligan then went on to refer to the difficulty he would be in on his return home if he abandoned the right to go to the Court. He told him of the speech he had made in the Senate and gave him a copy of the report of the debate initiated by Senator Johnston3 with reference to the Optional Clause. He said that we could not preclude ourselves from going to the Hague, but that we were not anxious to go there. We did not know anything about the Hague Court. It was simply a Court, in our view, that would give us a fair hearing. The British Prime Minister said, 'We will give you such a Court', but that it was not part of his function to suggest the nature of such a Court. He went on to say that if we made a declaration excluding the possibility of going to the Court he was wondering if we could get such a document registered or declared to the world. Mr. McGilligan put it to him, 'Was the British Government ready to clear up whatever doubts there were with reference to our full international position and, in particular, to clear up the mess caused by the Letter of November, 1924? Whatever was done in the past, were the British Government prepared to give the full application to the declaration contained in the 1926 Report, to implement that Report and to risk the political consequences that might ensue from doing that?' He said this was not an Imperial Conference and that he might be condemned for doing it by a side wind, but that he had stated his views.

    Mr. McGilligan also referred to the ambiguous nature of the despatches which had passed with reference to our contentions, and to the lack of frankness in the telegrams in dealing with the real meaning of the proposed formula. The other members of the Commission arrived for the 6 o'clock meeting, and further conversation was impossible. The British Prime Minister did not appear to welcome the interruption.

    On the assembly of the representatives on the Sub-Commission, the Prime Minister presided and referred to the position existing at the conclusion of the previous meeting. Our Minister said that he had not got any instructions as yet from his Government, but that he had found great difficulty in framing a telegram to his Government which would accurately set forth what the alternatives were before us. On the one side there was the position set forth in the declaration referred to in Circular Telegram 108 the wording of which, as we now definitely knew, was framed expressly with the view to preclude the possibility of one Dominion bringing another before the Permanent Court. On the other hand, there was a suggestion to use some form of language which would make the position clear from an international point of view. His difficulty was that the insertion of the words 'Members or' before the word 'State' and the dropping of the word 'International' from the expression 'International dispute' did not make the international position clear, and yet, in face of that fact, we were asked to make an agreement definitely excluding recourse to the Court. He found great difficulty in explaining to his Government what was the consideration for the making of such an agreement.

    He also referred to the point raised by the Indian Delegation on Article 14 and to the Letter of the British Government of November, 1924, from which it would appear to be clear that, even if the British Government adhered in the words of Article 36, it would still be open to them to argue that disputes between Dominions were not international disputes. Lord Cecil said that he understood we came here to discuss one or two practical points and yet Mr. McGilligan was trying to drag the discussion back to whether or not the Dominions could go to the Permanent Court. Mr. McGilligan said he was merely trying to explain that he had got no instructions from his Government because he found it hard to tell his Government what consideration he was getting for entering into the agreement ousting the jurisdiction of the Court. The position was not that they were getting no consideration, but only slight consideration.

    Lord Cecil appeared to be perturbed when the Letter of 1924 was read out, and Senator Dandurand also appeared disturbed. Senator Dandurand said that we ought to start from the Report of 1926, but Mr. McGilligan insisted that we must clear up the old rubbish. He said that the Letter of November, 1924, had become an international document while the Imperial Conference Report was being regarded as something domestic.

[matter omitted]

Lord Robert Cecil then said that he was disappointed at the Free State attitude, and he would endeavour to make a resumé of the position. The British Government, he said, had agreed to the suggestion to drop out the words complained of. They had agreed to insert the words 'Member or' before the word 'State' and to delete the word 'International'. They had accepted in full the Free State's suggestion and given the Irish Free State representatives all they had asked. In return the British Government asked for an agreement not to refer Inter-Dominion disputes to the Permanent Court. The British Government was only asking for a slight thing from the Irish Free State representatives, to give up a technical right, as it was clear that the Free State representatives were prepared in practice to exhaust every other means of settlement without going to the Court. Mr. McGilligan pointed out that if Lord Cecil's resumé of the position were correct the Free State representatives would seem to be intractable, but he said that Lord Cecil's statement of our position was not a correct statement. We admitted that we knew nothing about The Hague Court, that we were not keenly anxious to bring the British Government before the Court of the Hague in any dispute we might have with that Government, but that our people wanted the ultimate or even the theoretic right to bring the British Government to The Hague Court, and he referred to the statement that had been made at the previous meeting with reference to the importance in our country of theoretical matters affecting our status. Mr. McGilligan said that Lord Robert appeared to suggest that we were discussing an agreed document, but the document we were discussing emanated from the British Government and was circulated for consideration by the Dominions. It was a purely British document, not even drafted after consultation with the Dominions. In reply to the letter containing the formula in question the Irish Free State Government wrote a dispatch pointing out that the wording of the proposed formula of adherence brought about a bad situation which we could not have. We objected not only to the phrases used but to the situation created by those phrases. Lord Robert Cecil suggested that by dropping the phrases our points had been made, but the situation created by those phrases remains the same, notwithstanding the deletion of the phrases because the Letter of November 1924 remains on record. Mr. McGilligan then suggested that while we were awaiting instructions from home no harm would be done by considering what form an agreement, if agreement were arrived at, would take, what sort of a Tribunal would be set up instead of the Permanent Court, what law would that Court administer, how would it be established and how would the obligations of the agreement become binding. Reference was made to the fact that even where fully recognised International States accepted the Optional Clause it was the policy of the League to encourage such States to make agreements for the settlement of their disputes without recourse to the Permanent Court, and the suggestion was thrown out that perhaps following such lines agreement might be reached on the present question. It was finally agreed that a sort of sub-committee composed of Sir Cecil Hurst, Mr. Louw4 and myself should examine the matter with a view to having put down on paper for examination and consideration any suggestions that would be forthcoming as to the form of declaration of adhesion, the form of the proposed agreement, the nature of the Tribunal etc. The meeting thereupon terminated, and no meeting has since been held.

[matter omitted]

It will be obvious from the foregoing account of the discussion so far that we are faced with difficulties which cannot be resolved merely by our refusal to enter into the proposed agreement to refer inter-Dominion disputes to a tribunal or body which would not be either the Permanent Court of International Justice nor the Privy Council. We have in the first place to consider how far our international status and prestige would be prejudicially affected by the making of such an agreement. Leaving the question of status out of account for the moment, there are some very substantial advantages which would or might accrue to us from the agreement. The chief of these is that in future the danger of the Privy Council ever deciding or purporting to decide issues between ourselves and Great Britain arising out of our Treaty would be definitely ended. Connected with this consideration is the consideration that if such a tribunal were constituted the arguments usually advanced for the retention of the Privy Council would cease to have any weight. As a consequence of the foregoing, our task of abolishing the Privy Council would be greatly facilitated. At the forthcoming October Conference,5 it must be realised that we will have the utmost difficulty in carrying our contention that the Privy Council must be abolished. If the present agreement were made, we would be in a stronger position to face the contest by reason of the fact that the real reasons for maintaining the Privy Council will no longer exist. We will also be in a better position to conduct the general campaign because if we enter the agreement we will have created for ourselves a favourable impression while refusal to enter into the agreement, followed as it must necessarily be by recriminations and heated arguments, must render the present British government less sympathetic towards our difficulties and our points of view. The British Prime Minister has stated publicly that he intends to adhere to the Optional Clause before the end of the Assembly. If he can only do so amidst the accusations which we will have to hurl at him that he has not really properly adhered and that his actions are hypocritical, neither he nor his Government will be disposed to thank us for increasing his home and international difficulties. Furthermore it is clear from our Minister's interview with the British Prime Minister that he is in general favourable towards our ideas and desires for improving our status, and failure to reach an agreement now would tend to alienate his sympathies for us. Again, it is clear that Canada and South Africa are not merely anxious for the agreement but determined to make it and they will not thank us for increasing their difficulties and perhaps assisting the British officials to depreciate their status. In this connection I may mention that Mr. McGilligan had an informal talk with Henderson recently and Mr. Henderson made use of the same old cryptic phrase that we ought not so to act as to play into the hands of Bruce6 of Australia.

    The making of the Agreement might also by implication be held to recognise the fact that if the agreement had not been made the inter-se doctrine would not have applied and so the British contention of the non-application between the Dominions of International Conventions might be held to have been abrogated.

    I need not stress the disadvantages of the proposed Agreement. Such an agreement, if made, would create political difficulties at home, particularly in view of the Minister's recent statement in the Senate. The agreement would also be regarded from an international point of view as an additional indication of our inferiority in the Comity of Nations. There is, I conceive, also the consideration that even with the agreement, there is no certainty that the Privy Council would be abolished. It would perhaps only help in the campaign toward its abolition. The agreement might also tend to perpetuate the inter se doctrine.

    It cannot be taken that the arguments for and against the proposed compromise are in any sense comprehensive.

[matter omitted]

Declaration of agreement reached

On behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and subject to ratification, I accept as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention of reciprocity the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, for a period of fifteen years and thereafter until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the said ratification, other than disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement and subject to the proviso that His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve the right to require that proceedings in the Court shall be suspended in respect of any dispute which has been submitted to, and is under consideration by, the Council of the League of Nations.

1 Philip Noel-Baker (1889-1982), Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of International Relations, London University (1924-29), Labour MP, (1929-31, 1936-70), Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1947-50).

2 See DIFP Volume II, No. 290 and No. 292, for the immediate Irish response to this note.

 

3 Thomas Johnston (1872-1963), trade unionist and politician (Labour), founder member of Irish Labour Party (1912), Labour TD (1922-Sept 1927), Senator (1928-36), founder member of the Labour Court (1946).

4 Eric Louw, High Commissioner of South Africa.

5 The Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation.

6 Stanley M. Bruce.


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