Extracts from a letter from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(Confidential)

ITALO-ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE

[matter omitted]

I learn here from a member of the Information Section, who has it from a colleague who has just been to London, that there are serious differences in the British Cabinet on the question of taking a definite stand against Italy in this matter. The Foreign Secretary¹ is credited with a desire that action should be taken and Mr. Eden is said to have threatened resignation if the Covenant is not upheld. Lord Cecil is said to have remarked that the Government would lose the general election on an issue of this kind, i.e. if it failed to uphold the Covenant. I mention this for what it is worth. A slight change is remarked at the moment in the French attitude, which does not appear to be so definitely favourable to Italy as previously, and a hardening of the British attitude.

Here, feeling appears to be almost wholly against the Italian adventure, both from the point of view of the injustice of the thing itself and its effects on the League, as well as its disastrous possibilities on the general European situation. It is feared, for example, that Italian difficulties and new interests may result in Germany having a free hand in Austria, notwithstanding the present Italian assertions in this matter, and it is even considered possible that Japan may take advantage of troubled conditions in Europe to proceed with her designs against China, or even against Russia. I am trying to obtain some indication of the attitude of the different groups. The Little Entente's attitude is definitely unfavourable to Italy, and I am told that the Balkan group, containing the Turks, would even be more unfavourable, as the Turks are again remembering Signor Mussolini's statement of some years ago that Italian expansion would be towards Asia Minor. Most of the states appear to be pursuing a waiting policy, and to be looking to Great Britain and France for a lead. This is the case even with the U.S.S.R. which was most outspoken officially in regard to the necessity for maintaining the principles of the Covenant in connection with the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute, but is much more cautious now that a great European Power, and its relations with that Power and its allies, are involved. The Soviet Press is however beginning to be exercised in regard to the situation. M. Litvinoff,² as you are aware, is President of the Council.

The Japanese reaction to M. Sugimura's³ alleged assurance to the Italian Government that Japan was not concerned, is causing great interest here as an example of the varied interests which are gradually assuming shape against Italy. Japan, of course, has trade interests in Abyssinia, and there is also the colour question which she evidently intends to exploit.

There is a good deal of criticism at Geneva of those States which have bowed to Italy's demand for an embargo on the supplies of arms to Abyssinia. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark and France, for example, are stated to have prohibited the export of arms to that country. It is recalled that in connection with the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute, Italy invariably maintained her reservation that an embargo was a form of sanction that could only be applied against a party which had been found to be the aggressor.

[matter omitted]

It is clear, if the attack on Abyssinia is not averted, that there will be much criticism here of the removal of this question from the open diplomacy of the Chancelleries. One of the main ideas of the League was that disputes between nations should be thrashed out as openly as possible in order that public opinion might be aware of the actual causes of disputes and of the real designs of the states concerned. It has always been argued that, if the Council of the League had existed in 1914, the delay which would have resulted from consultation at the Council table, and the open discussion on the consequences of war, would have sufficed to prevent the outbreak. It seems now open to doubt whether the existence of the League would have prevented the clash, as states which are bent on causing trouble decline to use the safe-guards, and there is not sufficient cohesion amongst the other Members to impose in time their authority on the aggressive State.

[postscript omitted]