Extracts from a letter from Joseph P. Walshe to Francis T. Cremins (Geneva)
(Secret and Confidential)

I am directed by the Minister to send you the following secret and confidential information with regard to the present relations between Italy and Abyssinia, which he has received from a variety of sources.

The Minister understands that, following urgent representations by the British Government, the French Government agreed, last week, to join the British Government in making representations to Signor Mussolini, with a view to the convocation of a meeting of the three Powers at Rome. The suggestion was that the meeting should be convened on the basis of articles 1 and 3 of the Triple Agreement of 1906,¹ and that its object should be to find a solution, especially in the economic sphere, which would obviate a recourse to hostilities. A condition of the meeting was to be that the Italian Government should agree to attend the Council meeting at Geneva 'to state their case in regard to Abyssinia within the League', and it was thought that the proposed meeting would provide the best opportunity for a definition of the respective economic interests of Italy and the United Kingdom in Abyssinia.

The Minister has no information as to how this proposal (which he has reason to believe was originally suggested by M. Avenol) was received by the Italian Government. You will be in a position to form a judgment on this point yourself from current newspaper reports.

According to the information which the Minister has received, Signor Mussolini himself recently defined his objectives in East Africa as follows: if he had to go to war to achieve his ends, his aim would be to 'wipe out the name of Abyssinia from the map'; if, on the other hand, he found a settlement without war, he would require annexation of the territories which had been conquered by Abyssinia, plus a degree of control, similar to that exercised by France in Morocco and Britain in Egypt, over Abyssinia proper.

[matter omitted]

The Minister also understands that, in the course of his recent visit to London, M. Titulesco, the present leader of the Little and Balkan Ententes, emphatically stated the view that the Little Entente was against Italy in this affair, and would rather that Italy left the League than that the League should continue an outward and visible sham with a state that had flagrantly violated the main provisions of the Covenant as one of its members. The Little Entente felt that their whole existence was at stake in the matter. If the system of collective security was repudiated, or if it broke down, the whole basis upon which the Little Entente existed would be out from under its feet, and pacts, guarantees and treaties would be regarded as waste paper. According to the Minister's information, M. Titulesco also expressed the view that, if a crisis arose in the relations between Britain and Italy, France - whose real permanent interests lay with Britain rather than with Italy - would find it difficult to avoid siding with the former in the dispute. There is some reason to believe that M. Titulesco is apt to exaggerate his own importance as spokesman for the Balkan and Little Ententes, and that it is far from certain that the views expressed above would command the support of the other members of the Little Entente.

The Minister has no special information with regard to the attitude of the Japanese Government in the Abyssinian question. He understands, however, that the official Italian explanation of the current mutual recriminations in the Japanese and Italian newspapers is as follows: M. Sugimura, the Japanese Ambassador at Rome, recently stated, in official conversation, that Japan had no political interest in Abyssinia, and that they were not likely to intervene provided that their economic interests in the country were respected. M. Sugimura was reported by the Rango correspondent in Italy, who is an Englishman, as stating that Japan had no interest in Abyssinia. When this report appeared in the Japanese newspapers, it raised the ire of Japanese ommercial and financial circles which have economic interests in Abyssinia, and which, incidentally, control the Japanese press.

In conclusion, I am to remind you that the Minister is anxious to be kept very fully informed with regard to the development of the Italo-Abyssinian question, and that he will be glad if you will report all information, expressions of opinion by authoritative persons, etc., which may reach you with regard to the question.