Letter from John W. Dulanty to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(Secret and Confidential)

Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, invited the High Commissioners to meet him this afternoon at 4.45 in his room at the Foreign Office.

In their attempts to get the Italian Government to be more reasonable about the Abyssinian problem the British Government, he said, had found themselves against a blank wall. There had not been 'a vestige of a deal' in any of their talks with Signor Mussolini. They had said that provided the sovereignty and independence of Abyssinia was respected they, the British, were ready to do everything in their power to assist in remedying any grievance from which Italy might be suffering. But all of this, so far, had been to no purpose and Signor Mussolini had 'made no bones' about the threatened war with Abyssinia being a war of absorption. The British had then tried to secure the help of the French as a moderating influence. The French were nervous about the future of Europe and if he had to guess he would guess that the French would choose to stand by their Italian alliance rather than by the League. They were, nevertheless, doing all they could to press the French to use their influence with Italy, asking that that influence should be used to the utmost point, short of an actual break, in the endeavour to get a basis of a settlement. His latest information was that the French now seemed more alive to the danger of a war and he was not without hope that they might now make a really serious effort to help the British.

It was possible that some slight improvement might come out of the Council Meeting. The Italians he dared say would try to keep the question to the Conciliation Commission, but the British would not agree, nor did he think the French would, to such a limitation. They would do all they could to keep the question within the normal machinery of the League; they would 'cling to any straw, so long as it was a straw' in their aim to prevent so dreadful a calamity falling upon the world.

The British themselves were not very directly concerned except as regarded the upper waters of the Nile, but indirectly they were naturally apprehensive about the repercussions which might take place in those parts of the world - such as India and South Africa - where black and white peoples had to live together.

Sir Samuel Hoare said that he would be very grateful for any suggestion which any Commonwealth Government might put forward in a position which to his mind was a grim series of one distressing dilemma after another. If any Commonwealth Government wished to have further information on any given point he would be always glad to give it.

After some discussion in very vague terms it was suggested that the British Foreign Office should prepare a comprehensive summary of the position as it existed at this moment, and Mr. Bruce¹ asked that in addition to such a summary an appreciation of the position should be given, setting out particularly possible alternatives if and when the crash came. Sir Samuel Hoare said he would send a confidential note on these lines to each High Commissioner for transmission to his Government.

His own personal view was that a smash was almost unavoidable. If Signor Mussolini had been reasonably patient he could have secured in ten or fifteen years that predominance in Abyssinia which Italy desired. He was afraid that Signor Mussolini saw himself as a great conqueror and Sir Samuel Hoare was much afraid that there was scant chance of turning him aside from the pursuit of this dreadful ambition in Abyssinia.

If the smash should come, the British Government were resolved to keep it as limited in scope as possible. For this reason he was glad that President Roosevelt had asked the American Ambassador² to call on him (Sir Samuel Hoare) this morning in order that the President might be fully acquainted with the position and the latest results of their efforts to avert the calamity of war. If, for example, the Americans could be induced to give the minimum help to either side it would be useful.

Owing to the shortness of the notice for the meeting it had obviously not been possible for any High Commissioner to obtain the views of his Government. Mr. Ferguson (Canada) was afraid that the efforts of the British Government to maintain the League of Nations would prove unavailing and that the only result of these efforts would be that they would find the League left on their doorstep as a troublesome orphan.

I said that I had no instructions but I was certain that my Government would be most anxious to see the position and prestige of the League supported. It was a commonplace that it had taken centuries to get the rule of law accepted in national affairs. The wide acceptance of the same principle in international affairs clearly could not be achieved in the comparatively few years of the League's existence.

Sir Samuel Hoare said that for his part he would rather have even an orphan that might grow up to strength and usefulness than have no League at all.

He gave me the impression of being much depressed.