Confidential report from Leopold H. Kerney to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(S.J. 19/1) (Confidential)

The moment is perhaps opportune for examining afresh the question of our relations with Spain.

When direct diplomatic relations between Ireland and Spain were reestablished in 1935, I was sent to Madrid as Minister Plenipotentiary and accredited to the President of the Spanish Republic who was at that time the uncontested head of the Spanish State. Subsequently, civil war was let loose, with the result that, in the place of the one Spain to which I was accredited, there were now two Spains - one under Republican control recognising President Azaña (the successor of President Alcala Zamora to whom I had presented my letters of credence) as head of the State, and the other under the control of Spaniards recognising General Franco as head of the State.

Our attitude has been that it is a matter for Spaniards themselves to decide as to who shall be head of the Spanish State and that, when their choice is beyond doubt, it is to the head of the State accepted by all Spain that an Irish Minister should be accredited, but that, pending the conclusion of the struggle between the two rival candidates, no positive step should be taken which might imply intervention by the Irish Government in a war in which the combatants on each side are Spaniards.

It seemed that the temporary closing of the Legation in Madrid, the temporary transfer of the Legation to non-Spanish territory, the consequent slackening of the ties between the Irish Legation and the Republican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the continuation of relationship by correspondence with the Republican Government and the entering into relationship by correspondence with the Government of General Franco to the extent to which Irish interests had to be protected, were a clear indication of our impartial attitude in what was a family dispute, and that this attitude was in the true interests of both Ireland and Spain although certain to be criticised and possibly misjudged by the contending parties.

Certain countries sided definitely, and more or less openly, with one or other of the opposing regimes in Spain, although such countries subscribed to a non-intervention agreement. Others found it convenient, as time went on, to have official agents accredited to General Franco's Government, whilst continuing their diplomatic relations with Republican Spain; England set the lead in this respect, and those countries which followed her example were actuated largely by commercial, economic or financial considerations but also by the desire to follow closely the development of a situation in Spain which might have important international repercussions; in certain cases the agents appointed to Burgos were men of high military rank.

Ireland had no particular commercial, economic, financial or political interests necessitating the presence of an official Irish agent in the Spain that was under General Franco's control; it seemed that any questions which might arise concerning, for instance, the Irish College in Salamanca or the fate of Irish nationals in that part of Spain could be dealt with otherwise.

Prior to the establishment by various countries of official relations, on the English model, with insurgent or nationalist Spain, some of these countries would undoubtedly have recognised the Franco regime, at least de facto, if General Franco had succeeded in capturing Madrid, the seat of Government in Spain for centuries past.

The position which has now arisen is that Barcelona (the only city in Spain, other than Madrid, to have more than a million inhabitants) has fallen to Franco; it seems inevitable that republican resistance in the rest of Catalonia must soon be overwhelmed; the republican Government has temporary headquarters in Catalonia, but President Azaña is reported to be in Madrid; the odds are now so heavy against the republicans that an early general collapse, followed by the surrender of Madrid, is a possibility which has to be taken into consideration.

Would it not be advisable at this stage to go into the question with a view to our being ready to take action without loss of time in the event of the Spanish capital passing under General Franco's control in the immediate future? Can it be admitted that the fate of Madrid will be justification sufficient for the taking of a decisive step on our part? And, in this case, would it not be advisable that I should be instructed now to notify the Viscount de Mamblas, verbally if necessary but in any case without delay, that it is our desire to accord full diplomatic recognition (merely de facto recognition would be out of the question) to General Franco as soon as he is master of Madrid. It would, in my opinion, be a mistake to wait for that event to occur before moving in the matter; it may be taken as certain that most of these States that already have agents in Burgos will hasten to accord de jure recognition of the new regime immediately after the fall of Madrid. If we wait, we may find that the Irish Legation may be one of the last to be re-opened in Madrid. Any preliminary steps which may now be decided on should shorten the delay in my return to Madrid after the conclusion of hostilities, and it would of course be useful to make sure in advance that I would be persona grata to General Franco, although I have no reason to doubt that this would be the case.

I would recommend that this question should be given urgent consideration.

As mentioned in my report of 19/12/38¹, nationalist Spain is recognised juridically by the Holy See and by two of the greater European Powers (Italy and Germany), by three other independent European States (Portugal, Hungary and Albania), by Japan and her protégé Manchukuo, and by three of the minor South American Republics (Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua).

Czechoslovakia is now said to have decided to grant de jure recognition to Franco, apparently as a result of the capture of Barcelona. Therefore, as regards the smaller European States, there are four countries (Portugal, Hungary, Albania and Czechoslovakia) ahead of us, even if we were to give diplomatic recognition to Franco right away; this is of course not intended as an argument in favour of recognition but merely to recall to your mind the precise position as it is to-day.