Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera on the recognition of General Franco's government in Spain
(Urgent)

Recognition of General Franco's Government

Our position vis-á-vis Franco's Government would be described as de facto recognition. We have been in communication with that Government through his appointed agent at St. Jean de Luz for nearly two years¹. In fact, our Spanish relations have been almost exclusively with Burgos. The British inform us this morning that the resistance in Catalonia is futile and cannot last long. Some of the leaders are already in France, and others in Valencia are seeking to ensure their safety in case of sudden collapse. The British have been informed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that a total Franco victory is imminent and that he is appointing an agent to Franco. In your speech in the Dáil of the 27th November 1936 you said: 'If you recognise a new Government you should recognise it when there is some clear indication of stability, some clear indication that the Government will continue to be able to speak on behalf of the nation of which it is the Government. Everybody knows that if General Franco does become the head of a de facto Government in Spain he must immediately receive de facto recognition from those who have interests in Spain and who have therefore in regard to these interests to deal with some authority in Spain. ... as a prudent rule recognition is not given before there is a fair hope of stability.'

We were informed by our Minister at St. Jean de Luz, and his information is confirmed by Press telegrams, that Ireland, Belgium, France, Russia, Lithuania and Latvia were the only countries not represented in Nationalist Spain. Since that report Franco's position has been considerably strengthened, and France and Belgium are sending diplomatic agents to Burgos immediately. We now find ourselves more or less isolated in the company of Russia, Lithuania and Latvia.

Full de jure recognition has been given to Franco only by the following 12 States:

Holy See, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Hungary, Albania, Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua, Japan, Manchukuo, Czechoslovakia.

The question for us to decide is whether we shall give de jure recognition now or after the fall of Madrid. I fear that, if we wait for the fall of Madrid, we shall appear to be following the lead of France and Great Britain and their satellites, who no doubt will give de jure recognition in the near future for the purpose of winning Franco's favour and weaning him away from the Berlin-Rome axis. It might be better for us to get in before them and to recognise Franco immediately. In that way we shall be more likely to secure whatever special kudos or credit is to be got from advanced recognition. The fall of Madrid may be a long way off. It is now clear that Franco's army has refrained from making a really serious artillery attack upon it. As in the case of Barcelona, he does not want to destroy the city or to turn the people against him. He may therefore be content to force surrender by exhaustion. If we say now that we shall give recognition as soon as Madrid falls, we shall put ourselves into the position of having to wait until that event occurs, and we may find ourselves last in the race.

We have informed the British that we intend recognising Franco after the fall of Madrid. No reaction on their part has yet become apparent.

In all the circumstances, an early decision seems to be called for.