Extracts from a personal code telegram from Con Cremin
to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(No. 61)

My despatch March 20th.¹ From conversation with members of Foreign Office, especially two, one of whom, Z., I have known since Paris, I think German Government are counting upon failure of invasion. Indeed, it seems to me that this is fundamental factor in their present calculations.

Z. generally rather doubtful objective, saying that he feels German military authorities must have very good reasons for confidence they display, and compares psychological situation with Spring, 1940. He does not make any detailed prophecy, but remarked that, if England hope, should Germany lose, that Germans would support her in an eventual stand against Russia, she is completely mistaken because Germans believe that, if Germany is defeated, it is because of England insisting on pursuing war even when Germany fighting against Russia.

The second man, who served in London up to the war, expresses conviction that invasion will fail, and for that reason doubts the possibility it will be attempted as failure would mean final defeat of Great Britain as distinct from U.S.A. and would lead to disintegration of Empire. He, like many others, cites Cassino as a proof of ineffectiveness of complete air superiority alone. He is very strong on growing divergency of interest between England and Russia in Mediterranean and Near East.

Z., however, says he believes German Government intends to take no initiative whatever in political field and is leaving matters entirely to military decision.

[matter omitted]

All one hears seems to indicate best German troops are in west. Insofar as Germans believe they are prepared, it would seem better for them that invasion come within the next few months before whatever effect cessation or diminution of Turkish and Spanish exports may have had time to react on armament production. The Germans feel their military situation in west is now stronger than in September at time of Italian troops' defection. Even as regards Russia, they argue movement of front westward has at any rate led to Hungarians and Romanians having to fight with them in greater numbers. The civil population, too, naturally feel less depressed by air raids now than formerly.